Recently, we have been hearing growing criticism of the Minsk Agreements. For example, David Kramer of the McCain Institute urged the West, in his article “The Best Ways to Help Ukraine,” to abandon the Minsk Agreements and strengthen sanctions against Russia. Another expert, former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, called the Minsk Agreements “an ugly, illegitimate child.” French expert Nicolas Tenzer also told The Day that the Minsk Agreements were dead. Was, then, our government in error when claiming that there was no alternative, and have we erred by agreeing with it? It is known, after all, that effective diplomacy needs diverse options on the table, including the military option. This question opened our conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vadym Prystaiko. He, along with other deputy foreign ministers of the Normandy format powers who serve as heads of the four working groups, prepared and reached agreement on the agenda of the meeting held in Berlin on May 11.
“I do not quite agree with this approach to the issue. Nothing was predetermined. Our recognition that the Minsk peace process is the only realistic option came in a gradual and complicated way. I do not agree with the claim that we did not try to resolve this problem by other means. We first tried to persuade people, being somewhat unaware who was behind these manifestations of separatism, then attempted to resolve the situation by force. Both sides suffered huge casualties, including Russia. And then, effectively being under the pressure of aggression, we did, indeed, sign these very tough agreements in Minsk. It was a painful process and the agreements are not fair. We are aware of it. However, they stopped the armed aggression and gave us time to reorganize, and I do not mean only the armed forces. The right question to ask would be ‘how will we use this time?’ In short, the Minsk Agreements are the best we have at the moment, and not because Ukraine does not want to get a better deal.”
The crisis talks on the Donbas started with the Geneva format, where the EU and the US, both strong players, were represented. Then we slipped to the Normandy format. Do not you think that had the Geneva format survived, the issue would have been resolved sooner?
“It makes no sense to reconstruct the past along the lines of ‘what if..,’ but it is clear that this question is here to stay. Perhaps, indeed, some better alternative has been lost along the way. The only thing I can say for sure: diplomacy is not the art of seizing the best opportunities, but rather the art of finding the most acceptable compromises. Meanwhile, compromises can be reached only with those who remain at the negotiating table. We need Russia at the table, as it bears full responsibility for what is happening in the Ukrainian east and can influence the situation there. Should we form another format, which will include our partners and friends, but not Russia, it would not make any sense.
“Today, Russia is trying to get Ukraine to negotiate with the so-called ‘representatives of the Donbas’ to enable Russia itself to escape from the negotiating table and avoid responsibility. Their next step would be asking: ‘Why do you keep up the sanctions against us, we have nothing to do with it, while Ukraine must speak with the people of the Donbas.’ This is a hybrid continuation of a hybrid war, I mean a hybrid peace process. And we should not give them this opportunity.”
You participated in the preparation of the Normandy format meeting in Berlin. What was positive about it and will it really bring us closer to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements?
“With regard to the position of Ukraine, we came equipped with specific proposals for step-by-step creation of a more secure environment in the east. We proposed two documents. Firstly, the detailed modalities of the OSCE mission in the occupied territories, security zones, advance to the border and so on. Secondly, we finalized the OSCE proposals regarding the police mission for eventual elections.
“You know about the traditional vicious circle afflicting political talks in Minsk. What should come first: elections, to be followed by security improvements, or security improvements, to be followed by elections?”
Of course, security must come first...
“We are sure of this, but unfortunately, not everyone understands it. Russia obviously does not want to see it. But lately, we have had to put more and more effort into convincing our partners that security conditions should at least reach a level that would allow us to move on.”
You have probably seen Serhii Liovochkin’s article in the French media, where he calls on France and Germany to put pressure on Ukraine to make it comply with political conditions of the Minsk II Agreements, but does not utter a single word to criticize Russia for its failure to fulfill the first provisions of the agreements. Do not you think that it harms our image and undermines our position on the conflict’s settlement?
“I believe that it would be normal if a part of our political class was genuinely looking for alternative solutions to the issue and held a discussion as much as possible inside the country. No one has total monopoly on the best solution. But I do not really believe that Liovochkin cares about the peace process.
“We can only dream that the Ukrainian political elite will someday unite on the fundamental question and lead the society by offering a clear agenda. I do not expect domestic harmony to emerge, but see as perfectly possible the situation where various Ukrainian political forces would say: ‘We, being responsible politicians we are, declare that the nation’s course has been determined, and it can and should be improved, but there is no alternative to it now.’ However, Liovochkin only transmits the Russian position. On the other hand, it is probably a fair reflection of the mood of a certain part of our society, which, unfortunately, has not understood who the real enemy is and what we need to do to defeat it.”
Then maybe the Ukrainian government should clearly state that we are at war, rather than claim to be conducting an anti-terrorist operation?
“I recently had a conversation with a person who said the same thing, while we were sitting in a cafe in Kyiv under an umbrella, with blooming chestnuts nearby. I told him: ‘Imagine us sitting in Luhansk or Donetsk. All would be the same, short of a Grad rocket or an artillery shell likely to hit the place.’ It made my interlocutor give it another thought... I would like to recall that president Petro Poroshenko was elected as a president of peace, and he proposed a peace plan.”
Why do we support the idea of deploying an OSCE police mission in the Donbas? Was not it clear in advance that Russia would oppose it? After all, that organization requires consensus for its decisions.
“Let me disagree with you for the second time. I was at the most recent talks in Berlin, and even Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov never spoke out strongly against the police mission. Moreover, he said that decision on the armed or unarmed nature of the mission could be postponed. Clearly, this is diplomatic language. But in principle, Russia will have to explain why it says ‘no,’ should it choose to do so. This is part of the search for consensus. It offers one a way to block this or that measure, but it also forces one to take responsibility for one’s decisions.
“Perhaps some outside actors would be able to help us provide security. You will remember that we offered first a peacekeeping mission, which was rejected. We started to look for other alternatives. And a police mission is one of them.”
By the way, can you explain to us what is the mechanism of strengthening the ceasefire, which Frank-Walter Steinmeier told the press about after the meeting in Berlin? After all, we have long had written protocols on what should be done to fulfill the Minsk Agreements’ provisions, how to move the warring sides away from each other, etc.
“Oftentimes, there is a disconnection between the process and the result, between the effort invested by all parties and the real progress. So, sometimes, the parties are trying to see progress where it is, but is not as noticeable or as obvious as they claim. It is not the first time, after all, that we hear about a mechanism that will move the warring sides away from each other, and the first mechanism was proposed in February 2015. And just two days after its signing, the enemy took Debaltseve. That is, the effectiveness of this mechanism was called into question on the very first day of its existence. We added that the absence of firm response of the parties that signed the agreements in Minsk to the events in Debaltseve which occurred two days after the signing – it was this absence that undermined the agreements.”
What are the prospects for OSCE monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian border?
“I would be grateful if our media constantly reminded the public where the so-called Minsk II Agreements came from, and that they are actually called, and should rightly be called, the Package of Implementation Measures for the Minsk Agreements of September 5 and 9, 2014. The original document provides for creation of a security corridor along the Ukrainian-Russian border. This is the thing which the Russians do not want to see and which they reject all the time. It was only later on that the Package of Measures scheduled the Ukrainian forces’ advance to the border after the completion of the political process.
“But I remind all parties on every occasion: ‘Gentlemen, the OSCE had to reach the border and secure a line of control along it as early as after the Minsk I Agreements.’ When Lavrov says that ‘militiamen,’ as he calls them, are afraid that they will be executed should the border control be reestablished, I remind him that the OSCE mission, which is to reach the border, has no Ukrainians on its staff. It has some Russians, though. I hope that Lavrov does not mean that it is the OSCE mission that will execute the poor unfortunate ‘militiamen.’
“I see getting the OSCE mission, or any other future mission, to provide honest monitoring of what is actually happening at the border while we do not control it, as an extremely important task.
“Now the OSCE is increasingly moving deeper into the territory which is not controlled by the Ukrainian government, and they increasingly reach the border, often risking the lives of the mission’s members. We should bow down deeply to these courageous people.
“In short, our firm requirement is as follows: advance to the border and creation of permanent outposts at the border, which will grow in number until all 400 kilometers of the uncontrolled zone are covered.”
And what could force Russia and the Russian-sponsored separatists to comply with their side of the Minsk II Agreements, enabling us to move to the political part?
“Ideally, they should be forced to do it by a strong Ukrainian military, effective state governance and our society’s unity in confronting the aggressor. I am afraid, though, that at this stage, we should rely on sanctions, which were imposed in response to Russia’s actions. Our president once said very aptly: ‘If sanctions do not work, they should be strengthened to the point where they do work, not lifted.’”
But we heard Steinmeier stating recently that it was getting much harder to reach consensus on the extension of sanctions against Russia.
“I hope that our German colleagues have already advised their minister to refrain from uttering such statements just two months before another sanction review. Since Germany is still the leading nation of the EU, it, knowing how much depends on its actions, should have, in my opinion, acted differently and refrained from sending a signal to other countries that even Germany is hesitating. Russia should be made fully aware of what is demanded of it. In particular, one particular person in Russia should be made fully aware of it, since this person holds the key to resolving the situation.”
