Lessons from Konotop triumph

Among the events that Ukrainians can be proud of is the glorious victory in the Battle of Konotop on June 28 (Old Style), 1659. It was won by the allied forces led by Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and the Crimean Khan Mehmet IV Giray with the assistance of the Polish army with Andrzej Potocki at the head, as well as a number of Serbian, Moldavian, and German mercenaries. The defeated force was a huge, 100,000-strong Muscovite army commanded by Princes Grigory Romodanovsky, Aleksey Trubetskoy, and Semen Pozharsky.

In the Russian imperial historiography, and to even greater extent in the Soviet historiography, the Battle of Konotop was interpreted as a “fatal,” unwanted, and nearly absurd page of the past. However, this victory is, without exaggeration, exceptionally significant for an objective, unbiased understanding of our national history free of both the humiliating stereotypes of the “common fraternal past” and the provincial and self-adoration elements. Even more important is, no doubt, a sober, honest, and frank analysis of everything that took place after the Battle of Konotop, and the reasons why this victory, gained in such a difficult bloody struggle, was lost, and, in a sense, betrayed. Let us consider these questions one by one.

According to the estimates of the contemporary Ukrainian historians, the Battle of Konotop was a culmination of the Ukrainian-Muscovite War of 1658–59. How and why did this war start? The government of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was extremely irritated by the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach on Ukraine’s union with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth concluded by the Polish king and Hetman Vyhovsky. Moscow regarded this document as a drastic change in the hetman’s foreign policy orientation: his pro-European stance meant that the tsar would inevitably lose his control over Ukraine.

The negotiations were still going on in Hadiach when skirmishes erupted between the Cossack army and Muscovian troops located in Ukraine. Soon after the Hadiach Treaty was signed, Tsar Alexei addressed all Ukrainian people declaring that Hetman Vyhovsky had “betrayed” him and calling on Ukrainians not to recognize hetman’s rule or obey him. The tsar’s appeal was reinforced by a significant military “argument”: a huge Russian army headed by the above-mentioned Trubetskoy, Romodanovsky, and Pozharsky set out from Putivl in the spring of 1659 to “subdue” Ukraine.

Vyhovsky wanted to explain his positions to the foreigners, above all, Europeans. The hetman’s manifesto to capitals of the Western countries read: “We, the entire Zaporozhian Army, declare and testify before God and the entire world that the great wars that we have waged against Poland had no other purpose than the defense of the Holy Orthodox Church and our grand-grandfathers’ freedom to which we keep to with love. It was given to us by our Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whom we will always remember, and our Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky.

“We have put our private affairs far aside for God’s glory and public affairs. For this reason have we concluded a treaty with the Tatars, Her Serene Highness Queen Kristina of Sweden, and later with His Serene Highness King Carl Gustaf, and we have been unswervingly loyal to all of them. We have never given any reasons to Poland to break the agreements but have held our loyalty to all as sacred, keeping agreements and unions.

“We accepted the protectorate of the Great Prince of Muscovy for no other reason than to protect, with God’s help, our blood-won freedom and pass it on to our descendants after our death.”

The author went on to say that Tsar Alexei did not fulfill his obligations before Ukraine and, instead, started negotiations with Poland at Ukraine’s expense and even without its participation, quartered his military garrisons in Ukrainian cities without the hetman’s consent, and began to fuel riots against the hetman’s power in Ukraine. Ukrainians are not to blame for the new war, Vyhovsky underlined—they had to defend themselves.

The military actions unfolded in the following way. Prince Trubetskoy’s army’s advancement was impeded near Knotop due to the resistance mounted by the Nizhyn Colonel Hryhorii Hulianytsky with a mere 5,000 Cossacks of the Nizhyn and Chernihiv Regiments. Later Hulianytsky locked up in Konotop and courageously contained the Muscovite soldiers while waiting for Vyhovsky to come to rescue with the main army.

The three-month heroic defense of Konotop indeed enabled Vyhovsky to gather an army and approach the fortress. The balance of power was obviously not in hetman’s favor on the eve of the crucial battle of June 28, 1659. However, thanks to good reconnaissance, sudden advancement (the enemies did not know about all of Vyhovsky’s forces and the size of the Tatar cavalry), he managed to encircle the tsar’s army numbering at least 70,000, split it into separate groups, and completely defeat it. (This happened after a short and fierce battle in which the Tatars took the enemy in the rear.) Vyhovsky had 16,000 men at his disposal plus the 30,000–35,000-strong Tatar cavalry.

The victory was stunning. Thirty thousand Muscovite soldiers were killed. They expected Vyhovsky to set out for Moscow at once. Several notable voyevodas were taken prisoner; Tatars beheaded the famous Prince Pozharsky for insulting the Crimean Khan. The renowned historian Sergey Solovyov wrote:

“The bloom of Moscow’s cavalry, troops that happily accomplished campaigns of year 54 and 55 have perished in one day — the victors got only about 5000 captive. The unfortunate were led onto an open space and slaughtered like lambs — that was the agreement between the Crimean Khan and the hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks! Never again was the tsar of Moscow able to master an army that strong. In mourning clothes showed himself Alexei Mikhailovich to the people and the terror seized Moscow.

“After capture of so many towns, after capture of the Lithuanian capital the royal city trembled for its own security: in August by tsar’s decree people of all ranks hurried to build fortifications around Moscow. Often the tsar and the boyars were present themselves during the construction; people from outlying areas, their families with meager belongings filled Moscow, and a rumour spread that the tsar was leaving to beyond the Volga and Yaroslavl.”

Why, despite such a colossal triumph, didn’t Ukrainians win this entire war against Moscow? Had they managed to do so, the history of Eastern Europe would have been different. Undoubtedly, this was due to the activities of “Moscow party” in Vyhovsky’s rear: it succeeded in sparking a civil war. Incidentally, some Orthodox priests were actively campaigning here telling the parishioners that the hetman had “sold Ukraine to Poles” and was serving Warsaw and Roman Catholics.

Nevertheless, the main reason is different: Vyhovsky and the entire elite were not able to persuade the people that their patriotism is the idea-based patriotism, rather than “patriotism” of big property or a big purse.

The victory still to be comprehended

Sumy oblast has been marking the anniversary of the Battle of Konotop since 1995, but it was only in 2009 that the celebration was given a nationwide status and considerable scale, and attracted 15,000 to 18,000 guests to the festival called “Kozatsky Rodoslav” (Glorification of the Cossack Generations).

The Battle of Konotop unfolded in several stages near Konotop and the villages of Shapovalivka, Sosnivka, Popivka, and Saranivka. So, celebration that started in Sosnivka was continued in Konotop and Shapovalivka. This time a large-scale two-day celebration program included the visit of President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine who unveiled the memorial in honor of the 350th anniversary of the victory at the entry point to Shapovalivka.

The main ground for the festivities was the Cossack Town (an exposition illustrating the Cossack housing and mode of life), as well as the festive stage. In order to create the Cossack Town, each raion of Sumy oblast made a Cossack kurin (Cossack dwelling) recreating the mode of life and traditions of the Cossack times. There were 19 of such kurins, originally decorated and presenting its gastronomic delights, including the real kulish (a kind of thick soup), whose recipe was never disclosed.

“The exhibits include such unique things that some of them are hard to come across even in museums: beehives, Cossack cannons, and the implements used approximately in the early 17th century,” said Liubov Demchenko, a member of the festival’s organizing committee.

The entire exposition of the kurins looked very colorful, and this impression was intensified by the performances of creative groups, who recreated the epic and historical songs, ballads, traditions, rites, and customs of the Cossack era.

The articles made by the masters of decorative and applied art—potters and straw weavers—stood out amidst this variety. Raisa Pavlenko, a master craftsperson from Kyiv, admitted that straw weaving did not come easy to her.

“You can see here guardian angels, an amulet made of straw (incense was kept there) and many various crosses, ‘grandfather’s beard’ (a symbol representing grandfathers and great-grandfathers), and wreaths (for example, a harvest wreath is a symbol of gathered harvest). A circle, as you know, symbolizes the sun and hence life,” Raisa told The Day.

Petro Federiuk and Vlad Selii, the participants from the village of Trudoliub, located near Myrhorod, showed what a forge was like in times of Hetman Vyhovsky: a cart, blacksmith’s bellows, an earth forge, a small anvil, a set of nips and flatteners—this was enough for a blacksmith to accompany the Cossacks in a campaign.

It was impossible not to pay attention to the Ukrainski Kozaky (Ukrainian Cossacks) Mounted Theater and fearless and proud horsemen with oseledtsi (a forelock of hair on a shaven head). Vlad, a theater member on his horse Dohmatyk, said pithily as a true Cossack, “I am a Ukrainian, and that is it. Whether it is this kind of holiday today, or a working day, my blood doesn’t feel less Ukrainian!”

However, most of the guests we approached viewed the holiday exclusively as an opportunity for entertainment and having fun. It turned out that most of them did not even know why the Battle of Konotop may be a matter of Ukrainians’ pride and why it should be remembered. The meaning of similar festivals dedicated to Ukrainians’ great historical victories (not defeats) is hard to overestimate, but only if they are an occasion to comprehend our history rather than just entertainment.

COMMENTSRIES

Ihor LOSIEV, Ph.D in Philosophy, associate professor, Kyiv Mohyla Academy:

“In general, the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian society are still afraid to dot the i’s concerning their past, because many Ukrainians have a sort of genetic fear of the Kremlin, the ‘Big Brother,’ and its interpretation. That is why Ukrainians are afraid to celebrate this really magnificent victory, a real glory of the Ukrainian armed forces. This kind of behavior does not do credit to Ukraine as an independent state, let alone the fact that any independent state should not allow external factors to influence the attitudes to its own history. In this case I am speaking about the general imperfection of the Ukrainian statehood at the current stage. In many aspects we have not rid ourselves of our dependence on Russia, first and foremost in the spiritual, economic, and political aspects. One of our public figures said very wittily that Ukraine is not a part of Russia anymore, but Russia is still a part of Ukraine. And the Russian point of view, Russian opinion, and Russian vision are present in many spheres of Ukrainian mentality.

“Regrettably, creating a system of marking various defeats (there are plenty of them in Ukrainian history), we have absolutely forgotten about our magnificent victories that we should take pride in. The Battle of Konotop is indeed a glory of the Ukrainian armed forces. It is the most brilliant victory in Ukraine’s entire history in terms of its results. In general, history is a great provocateur, because in a single year it has given us two great anniversaries: the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava and the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. Shamefully and regretfully, the anniversary of the Battle of Konotop has not been celebrated on a large scale. This does not do credit to us.”