Irina Vlakh confidently won the governor’s elections in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia in Moldova, becoming the first woman to occupy the post. In fact, her victory became apparent in the first round when she collected 51.11 percent of votes leaving her rival Nikolai Dudoglo far behind (19.05 percent).
When she wrote on her Facebook “We can be together with Russia,” it became clear that her trip to Moscow (where she met with the Duma’s Speaker Sergei Naryshkin and then with Valentina Matviyenko, chairperson of the Federation Council) was a success and she now had the Kremlin’s support. Nor was there anything coincidental about the concert starring the rock band Lyube, with Nikolai Rastorguyev performing his hit “We’ll Force Our Way,” in the autonomy’s second largest city of Ceadir-Lunga a day before the election.
Where is Gagauzia going to force her way with the newly elected leader? Is Irina Vlakh a puppet on the Kremlin’s strings? Will Comrat (the autonomy’s capital city) be able to reset the complicated relationships with Chisinau?
Answering this question in the affirmative would be premature with campaign rhetoric and generous promises still in the air. Unlike Transnistria or New Russia, the Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova is not artificial or fake. It survived a brief period of nonrecognition as a republic in 1990-94. In December 1994, the Moldovan parliament passed the bill “On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri)” in December that granted a compact Gagauz community in the south of Moldova the status of autonomy. After the administrative reform of 1999, Gagauzia’s status was finally laid down in the Constitution of Moldova.
Moscow has been using unrecognized, self-styled, and genuine autonomies and national movements as means of influencing newly independent states. Under Putin, such unrecognized republics and autonomies have become political tools used in an effort to restore the Soviet empire by persuading post-Soviet states to join the Customs and the Eurasian Union.
One can only wonder about Ukraine’s inattention to the Gagauz Autonomy, considering Moscow’s activities in that region. “Ukraine must step up cooperation with an autonomous territorial entity in the south of Moldova, namely Gagauzia. Today it is a matter of strategic importance,” says Yurii Dimchoglo, an ethnic Gagauz member of the Odesa Regional Council, adding, “Both the Ukrainian government and media paid little attention to the election campaign in Gagauzia which is located next door to Ukraine. There was only one Ukrainian national among the 70 international observers who monitored the election of the bashkan [governor] – and this considering that there are over 30,000 ethnic Gagauz in Ukraine.”
In fact, these ethnic communities are located near their Moldovan counterparts, divided only by the border between the two countries. They maintain close contact. In view of the Kremlin’s keen interest in Gagauzia, as evidenced by the recent elections, this has a direct bearing on stability in Moldova and Ukraine.
Today it is important for Ukraine to build normal relationships with the new leader of Gagauzia, particularly because any person elected as the head of that autonomy will have to bear in mind the realities generated in the mind of the Gagauz electorate by the Russian media – and they have already built a stereotype to which any candidate bashkan must conform. Stronger trade business contacts, joint projects would offer additional opportunities for Ukraine, Gagauzia, and the rest of Moldova. They would serve as an additional guarantee of stability in the region.
Irina Vlakh’s predecessor Mikhail Formuzal did his best to bring the relationships between Comrat and Chisinau very close to the boiling point in the past year. He at first did a good job of attracting Turkish and European investments to the autonomy, but toward the end of his office the impression was that he had of late been using only Moscow methods. He pushed through a referendum poll that proved of very little value from the legal point of view, but which showed that [most] people in the autonomy wanted to join Putin’s Customs Union. His office as bashkan ended in numerous scandals and intrigues. In the last two years he had done very little for the autonomy, for the Gagauz language, for the Gagauz lobby in the Moldovan administration (as bashkan, he was a member of the government).
Formuzal used most of his enthusiasm to rock the Gagauz boat, being openly involved in the Kremlin’s geopolitical projects. There was no Right Sector in Moldova, so people in the autonomy were fed stories about the horrors of European integration, that men would be subject to same sex marriage and the rest of the populace would be sold as slaves to Romania.
Irina Vlakh will have to reset relations with Chisinau and within Gagauzia. The People’s Assembly (Parliament) of Gagauzia is vested with a number of important powers and can restrict the authority of the head of autonomy. Vlakh’s success in her post will depend on her ability to come to terms with the People’s Assembly and Chisinau.
Without economic reform, without an effort to make the autonomy more realistic, without the ability to have the national projects funded, the new bashkan’s political future may instantly become obscure.
Ms. Vlakh will, of course, continue with her pro-Russia rhetoric, along with marches under St. George flags and with St. George ribbons, pompous May 1 celebrations. However, without a coherent economic and social policies people in the autonomy may quickly find themselves tired of dancing around with foreign flags and symbols.
Ukraine has a bitter experience of Russian television propagandists like Kiselyov and Solovyov emptying bucketfuls of lies on its audiences on a round-the-clock basis, so much so Ukraine had to work hard to restore its own citizen’s loyalty.
One has to realize that the Gagauz Autonomy has fallen prey to Kremlin propaganda, that the Gagauz man in the street is being brainwashed, that his mind is being packed with foreign notions and preferences, mainly along the Good-old-Soviet-times lines.
The Russian World uses the same technique. Oleg Gazmanov (he also toured the autonomy during the election campaign) and Nikolai Rastorguyev will sing their nostalgic hits; Nikolai Valuev will give boxing master classes, Sergei Naryshkin and Valentina Matviyenko will pose for the cameras with the future bashkan – but after there will be just too much of Russia, there will emerge characters like Girkin or Streltsov. Then there will be just too little room left for the Gagauz.
In fact, Mr. Rogozin, deputy head of the Russian government, has already sent such a message to the autonomy and the rest of Moldova. After the elections in Gagauzia, he declared: “These elections were quite important in the sense of reinforcing Russia’s position in Moldova.” One should add: also, in the sense of preventing Moldova’s European integration. Interestingly, Dmitry Rogozin visited Ukraine at the peak of the Euromaidan (December 2014) and inspected (sic) defense-industrial facilities in the east of Ukraine. What happened then is generally known. Rogozin’s obvious interest in that region (in 2012 he was appointed as the Russian president’s special representative in Transnistria) wasn’t coincidental. Ukraine and Moldova should get prepared. Better still, get prepared and start acting.
