The parents-children problem has been aggravated in Central Asia, as far as succession of power is concerned.
A few years ago, Kazakhstan saw President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s elder daughter Dariga actively position herself as his successor. Her political career was on a steep rise. But everything changed in a moment. Dariga’s husband was accused of financial machinations, she was forced to divorce him and fell, for some time, into political shadow. Nobody in Kazakhstan has spoken about Dariga’s claims to the presidency ever since.
Similar events are now underway in the neighboring Uzbekistan.
The two daughters of President Islam Karimov, Gulnara and Lola, were allowed everything as if they were genuine whimsical princesses. Gulnara particularly “distinguished” herself by being a political scientist, a diplomat, a businesswoman, a philanthropist, a fashion designer, a singer, and even holding a few governmental offices. As in the case of the Kazakh “princess” Dariga, everything changed abruptly, almost overnight.
Gulnara was obviously aiming for the presidency. She was well known not only in her own country, but also in Europe and the US. She would record the songs she composed by herself under the stage name Gugusha, organize fashion shows, and do many other things. But she has also left a long trail of corruption and other law infractions in a number of European countries. Latvia, Switzerland, and France have launched an investigation into financial fraud and begun blocking foreign accounts. A luxury apartment that belongs to her has been impounded in Moscow.
Central Asian opposition websites are full of detailed descriptions of Gulnara’s quarrel with her father. Karimov allegedly beat up his elder daughter in a fit of anger and scolded his subordinates for failure to keep him informed.
The Uzbekistan media have been instructed not to carry Gulnara’s photographs or even mention her name. Although what is going on in the president’s family is common knowledge, it is not being discussed in public. Our newspaper has requested the Tashkent-based Radio Oriat FM to comment on the events, only to receive quite a characteristic answer: “Family quarrels do not interest us.” When we turned for comment to an Uzbek political scientist and expert, he answered in almost the same vein: “I don’t mix with this kind of people, so I have no idea of who can be saying what… I am far from this topic and can’t help you.” Answering a similar question, Daniil Kislov, webmaster of the Moscow-based Fergana.ru which covers Central Asia events, noted that “there is no such thing as an ‘Uzbek political scientist’ who could comment on this.” Incidentally, it was not difficult to get a commentary in Astana in the case of Dariga Nazarbayeva.
About twenty officials and businesspeople close to Gulnara, including Akbarali Abdullayev, the nephew of President Karimnov’s wife, were arrested. In her Twitter page, where she has more than 40,000 readers, the president’s daughter blames National Security Service (SNB) chief Rustam Inoyatov for what happened. Gulnara thinks that his ulterior goal is to succeed Karimov as president.
The closure of the TV channels and radio stations that belong to her friendly business groups is further proof that Gulnara is in deep disgrace. She is forbidden to leave the country.
Political scientist Usman Khaknazarov gave the most detailed account of what happened with Islam Karimov’s daughter on the oppositional Popular Movement of Uzbekistan’s website uzxalqharakati.com. According to the Uzbek opposition leader, well-known poet and translator Muhammad Salih, who resides in Turkey, the name Usman Khaknazarov disguises a group of Uzbekistan’s secret service officers. He told Radio Liberty that “this information may be coming from Karimov’s closest inner circle or from the service that guards Karimov.”
The president of Uzbekistan has long been dubbed “dad.” It could not be by definition that the “dad” of all Uzbekistanis and the real father of Gulnara had known nothing about his daughter’s wrongdoings before. This seems to be an intrigue the secret services carried out after Gulnara had almost openly announced about her presidential ambitions. Given her hostile attitude to the secret service chief Inoyatov, the latter had a strong reason to be worried. The point is in the growing struggle for power “after Karimov.” Besides, Inoyatov maintains close ties with Gafur Rakhimov. The official website of the US Department of the Treasury openly calls the latter criminal and head of an Uzbek drug-trafficking syndicate.
The ambitious Gulnara Karimova was a serious rival for the Inoyatov-Rakhimov clan. It was not very difficult for the security service to gather materials that compromised her. All the more so that she and her entourage would provide more than enough grounds for this. And Inoyatov does not need to be told how to present this to the “father of all Uzbeks.” He learned very well how to do so during almost 30 years of service in the USSR KGB and then as SNB head.
Moreover, the SNB chief had to pursue a preemptive tactic because there are other rather influential groupings inside the service he heads – which the existence of uzxalqharakati.com and those disguised as Usman Khaknazarov indirectly proves.
Yet Islam Karimov’s younger daughter, Lola, said in a BBC interview that her father is full of health and energy, but there are ample grounds to believe that this is a gross exaggeration. By all accounts, old age (he is 75) is making itself felt.
There is also another, external, component in the scramble for the Uzbek throne. Relations between Uzbekistan and its neighbors are not so friendly. Tashkent traditionally considers itself the leader of this region. Astana and Dushanbe categorically oppose this for different reasons, and Ashkhabad is not too happy, either. There are still more problems with Moscow.
There are some indications that Gulnara favors the improvement of relations with Russia, much to the chagrin of other groupings that prefer the continuation of the current course.
Although the external side of the conflict of interests seems to be left aside, this does not mean at all that it is secondary. As the region is facing geopolitical changes in connection with US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the unclear prospects of the settlement of the Iranian nuclear weapons problem is making Central Asia a nerve knot at the intersection of the leading states’ interests. This in turn revs up power struggle in Tashkent.
Uzbekistan will see a presidential election in 2015. The results of it may be of major importance.
