On February 18, the Turkish authorities announced their intention to “respond decisively” to the attack in the center of Ankara which had killed at least 28 people and left another 61 injured. A powerful explosion occurred in small hours of that day, which saw a car exploding when buses carrying soldiers drove by. It occurred near the parliament and the general staff buildings. Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Bekir Bozdag called the explosion “a terrorist attack.” Incidentally, this was the second attack this year. Our readers will surely recall the suicide bombing that occurred in Istanbul in January, killing at least 10 people, mostly tourists from Germany. The Turkish government suspects the Islamic State of being behind that earlier explosion.
“Turkey will not hesitate to use its right to self-defense anywhere, anytime, in any case. Our determination in reprisals gets stronger with such attacks that target our unity, coexistence, and our future inside and outside of our borders,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a statement, which appeared a few hours after the explosion.
Meanwhile, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu identified the Kurds as perpetrators of this attack. “According to information obtained by us through a leak in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Democratic Union, a single person executed the attack. His name is Salih Neccar, born in 1992,” Davutoglu was quoted as saying by CNN Turk.
The US condemned the attack. In particular, spokesman for the US National Security Council Ned Price said: “We stand together with Turkey, a NATO ally, a strong partner.”
The Day asked a Ukrainian and a Turkish expert to tell our readers how this attack could affect Turkey’s role in solving the Syrian crisis, and to comment on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s proposal to create a no-fly zone over Syria for the protection of civilians from air strikes.
“ANOTHER ESCALATION IN THE TURKISH STATE’S RELATIONS WITH THE KURDS IS TO BE EXPECTED NOW”
Oleksandr BOHOMOLOV, president of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Kyiv:
“This is a very serious attack which resulted in many lives lost, so it was not for nothing that Erdogan canceled his visit to Baku, and Davutoglu his voyage to Brussels. Obviously, the bombing should be seen in connection with the intensification of Turkey’s military efforts on the Kurdish front. The only possible reading is to see it as a response by the Kurds, since it targeted soldiers. Therefore, another escalation in the Turkish state’s relations with the Kurds is to be expected now.
“It is totally obvious that the Kremlin is communicating with the Kurds and quite possibly, supplying them with weapons as well, as reported by the media. Various Kurdish delegations have been invited to Russia quite often. After all, relations between the Kurds and the Kremlin started back in the Soviet era. When I spoke with experts in Ankara in November 2015, discussing the situation in Syria, we saw the Russians using the Kurds to destabilize the situation in Turkey as a plausible option.
“Regarding Merkel’s proposal on a no-fly zone, it, even if belated, can be seen as an attempt to exert political pressure. I see no way for Merkel to actually get it implemented.”
“THE TERRORIST ATTACK IN ANKARA WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SYRIAN IMPASSE”
Dimitrios TRIANTAPHYLLOU, director of the Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University, Istanbul:
“The terrorist attack in Ankara will further complicate the Syrian impasse. Turkey has failed to become a key player, one to be consulted before any decision, even though it had an opportunity to do so after shooting down a Russian aircraft in November 2015. Russia used this opportunity to marginalize Turkey and make itself into an essential player in Syria. Turkey is concerned about the growing role of the Kurdish Democratic Union party and the possible unification of the Kurds in a unitary state that would include parts of its territory. However, it remains to be seen whether Turkey can garner sufficient international support to get its concerns understood. Should it prove unable to do so, Turkey will increasingly act as a spoiler.
“Merkel’s proposal is linked to the above, because she is more concerned about the impact the flow of refugees has on her country, her government and the EU. A ceasefire could lead to a reduction in the flow of refugees and thereby reduce pressure from Turkey, which cannot control this flow, wants more money, and strives to play a major role in this process. Merkel’s proposal is also a recognition that the EU has turned out to be fundamentally incapable of becoming a key player in the final resolution of the Syrian crisis, although it will most likely be called upon to bear the bulk of the burden of reconstruction. The proposal is doomed to failure because Russia is unlikely to change its stance on this issue.”
