The whole world is closely watching the formation of new administration under US President Donald Trump, especially in the field of foreign policy. Ukraine is primarily interested in assessing the position of White House’s leader on Russia and the situation in Donbas. Whereas Trump’s cabinet members have clearly commented these issues, condemning Moscow’s actions, this cannot be said of the president. However, there was an event past week, which brought some clarity about the foreign policy of the White House. President Trump strongly condemned the Assad regime for a chemical weapon attack on the opposition, which killed more than 20 children. Moreover, past Friday he ordered an airstrike on the Syrian airbase, from which the planes with chemical weapons took off. This led some experts to talks about the “Friday agenda” of President Trump as opposed to the “Thursday agenda,” which actually predicted the policy of isolationism on behalf of the US in the international arena – as a candidate, the New York billionaire had promised not to interfere in Syria and to improve relations with Russia.
The Day asked Steven Pifer, Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings Institution and former US Ambassador to Ukraine, to comment on the meaning behind the American president’s recent actions and the role Ukraine will play in US foreign policy.
“THE WORLD INTRUDES INTO THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY”
“The world intrudes into the US foreign policy, and so my guess is that President Trump did not expect he would do this. After the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons, on Wednesday he spoke in very harsh terms, and I do not know if that was planned or it was an emotional reaction, but he pretty much drew a red line in the past, and he felt he had to respond.”
Some believe that it was a clear signal to Russia, which supports the Assad regime and is formally responsible for the actions of the Syrian authorities...
“It could be a message. The Russians have enabled Assad, the Russians in the United Nations Security Council protect Assad. I think what was interesting here is that for all of this previous talk about better relationships with Russia, this did not start with President Trump promoting an attack on Syria.”
As we see, the West reacted positively to the abovementioned airstrike on the Syrian airbase. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran condemned them, saying that Trump had breached his campaign promises. What do you say to that?
“I did not expect that Russia would welcome or support us. Secretary Tillerson is still going to Moscow [on April 12], and we will see how the Russians react there. At some point the Russians have to understand that with activities like this kind of attack, using chemical weapons, they can’t expect we will sit by and watch it happening.”
“UKRAINE IS A BIG OBSTACLE TO A BETTER U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP”
What do you think, which message will Tillerson bring to Moscow?
“Well, the message that I hope he carries is that ‘Look, we would like to move to a better relationship, but we have to fix some problems, one of which is what Russia is doing to Ukraine. We cannot have a better relationship unless we find a way of fixing these questions.’ And to my mind, Ukraine is a big obstacle to a better US-Russia relationship. Unless Russia’s relationship in the Donbas changes, I don’t see how we can get to a better US-Russia relationship. If we could manage our differences, it would be better, but it is going to be hard to go back to normal while Russia is still conducting a military campaign in Donbas.”
We have heard strong statements from the US Permanent Representative to the UN Nikki Haley, from Defense Minister General Mattis, and even from Secretary of State Tillerson condemning Russia for its actions in Ukraine, but so far no such statements have come from President Trump. What do you think is his stance on Ukraine and Russia?
“I was very nervous in November, when President Trump was elected: what would it mean for American policy towards Ukraine? I have grown more comfortable over the past eleven weeks because I have seen what Ambassador Haley has said, what Secretary Tillerson has said, what Secretary Mattis has said, what Vice President Pence has said. I agree, I will feel more comfortable when I see President Trump saying the same. But we still are a lot better in the terms of American foreign policy than we might have expected back in November and December.”
REUTERS photo
Some experts believe that Trump Administration should be judged by its actions, not words. What would you say to that?
“Let’s look at both. The concern about President Trump is that I’m not sure whether he would instinctively support the policy the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense would. That’s kind of traditional mainstream Republican policy on Russia, NATO, and Ukraine.”
We see that the National Security Council under President has assembled a strong team, but we also see Steve Bannon as a strategic advisor and Trump’s son-in-law Kushner. And there is the question of who actually has more impact on the US president?
“This is the biggest question. There is the National Security Council staff under General McMaster which has very good people on it. There is Mr. Bannon and his strategy group, and there is the president’s son-in-law Mr. Kushner. And I do not yet know, of those three, who does the president pay most attention to? If we have a crisis, who does he call first? And the opinion of who he calls will lead to a different American policy. I think the good news is that his National Security Adviser General McMaster seems to be asserting his position, and I hope that continues.”
“IF UKRAINE DOES NOT INTERNALLY IMPROVE, IT’S GOING TO BE LESS INTERESTING”
One of the panels here in Kyiv Security Forum was titled ‘What role Ukraine will play in US foreign policy.’ Do you have any comments about this?
“I feel more comfortable about where Ukraine is now than, say, three months ago. I am less concerned about a grand bargain. There was not a grand bargain under the Obama administration, and there would not be a grand bargain under the Trump Administration. It was always hard to see what a grand bargain could be. I am less concerned about a grand bargain coming at Ukraine’s expense now, and I think it’s a good thing. But it is also important that Ukraine internally do some things, like accelerate reforms, particularly accelerate anti-corruption things, because Ukraine needs to demonstrate it is moving in the right direction as fast as it can. It will get a positive reaction from Trump. If Ukraine does not internally improve, it’s going to be less interesting.”
By the way, one of the experts admitted to me that he was surprised no one at this forum was interested in the reaction of the American side to the recent statement by the Verkhovna Rada to the United States about giving Ukraine the status of a Major Non-NATO Ally or signing a bilateral agreement of safety like the one, for example, between the US and Japan. What do you say to that?
“I suppose I can tell that Major Non-NATO Ally status for Ukraine is not on the agenda in Washington. Sometimes I think Ukraine spends too much effort on trying to get status or a title. The real thing is to work on, for example, getting the US Congress and the government agree to provide lethal military assistance rather than confer status on Ukraine. In the same way we can talk about NATO Membership Action Plan for Ukraine now, and I think it is not going to happen, but we can have an Action Plan with Ukraine that looks exactly like a Membership Action Plan, just is not called the Membership Action Plan. And the key thing is to implement this, I mean, do the things that the plan calls for, and that gets Ukraine ready.”
Why not pose the problem of a bilateral security agreement that would replace the guarantees which were to be ensured by the Budapest Memorandum; is Congress ready for this?
“No one in Washington is talking about that. The problem is, where Ukraine sees guarantees, the term in the Budapest Memorandum is ‘assurances.’ What you are talking about is the United States extending the same commitment to Ukraine as it has to NATO allies. Basically, if we give you a security guarantee tomorrow, it does technically mean that the day after tomorrow we are at war with Russia. I don’t think the Congress will vote for that. As is known, ‘politics is the art of the achievable.’ And again, I think, pushing for more military assistance, and also lethal military assistance, would be an important symbol of American commitment, and also useful here to deter the Russians.”
Wouldn’t it be a great signal of US support to transfer the US airbase from Rammstein in Germany to Dnipro, as it would be a perfect guarantee of security according to Trump?
“That’s not going to happen. But also, this is something which is interesting, you still have 300 American troops in Ukraine training Ukrainian troops. That’s a message, actually a pretty interesting step, but I don’t think we will see a major American base in Ukraine.”
“WE WERE LESS SUCCESSFUL IN HELPING UKRAINE REFORM FASTER”
I was told that you have nearly finished writing a book about Ukraine. Can you tell what it will be about?
“Yeah, it is coming out in the summer. It looks at US-Ukraine relations, primarily from 1991 to 2004. It includes the time I was in Ukraine. For example, I was able to get access to a lot of my notes when I was ambassador here, and I got some things declassified. While it takes a very narrow look, it has a quick summary of what happened between 2005 and the present, and its last chapter is on what the Americans learned in terms of our ability to work with Ukraine and my recommendations on how to make things better. And the basic conclusion I came to is that on big foreign policy issues our diplomacy succeeded. We were less successful in helping Ukraine reform faster. Had we done a better job at it, Ukraine would have been stronger by 2014, Crimea and Donbas might not have happened. Maybe we have to push harder on reform here, because I don’t think we have done it 25 years to now. We have been talking about land reform since 1998, I don’t want to be talking about land reform 20 years from now. I want to say, ‘Look, they [Ukrainians] have reformed land, farmers get mortgages, Ukraine is exporting 100 million tons of grain every year, agriculture is on par with Canada and Australia’s.”
By the way, what impression do you have of speeches of the president and prime minister; have they assured you that Ukraine is moving on the right track, especially in the field of reforms?
“I think important things have been accomplished in the past three years. But I think, like with the glass which is half-full and half-empty, there is still more to do: again, land reform, pension reform, privatization, and anti-corruption. And until these things are done, and done right, Ukraine will not get large amount of investment. Ukraine needs assistance now because it lacks investment, because investment is what makes a growing country, a growing economy. If the president does not move as fast as he can on reform, you will see the phases of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ in Europe. We have already seen some European countries saying, ‘Ukraine is going slow, it doesn’t really change, and we want to go back to business as usual with Russia.’ And I don’t want to see that.”
One of the experts told me that Kyiv Security Forum should focus more on what is happening in Ukraine and how authorities are going to solve existing problems. Do you share this view?
“Yeah, maybe so. Ultimately Ukraine can succeed only because of what Ukrainians do. I mean, the West can help a little bit, but it depends on you. I think the government can be doing more to realize the vision that brought hundreds of thousands Ukrainians in the streets during the Maidan Revolution. What I fear a little bit is, when I was here in 2000, we saw Viktor Yushchenko appointed prime minister. There was a lot of enthusiasm, and then in the end nothing really happened. And then we had the Orange Revolution and a lot of excitement, and then nothing… it did not change. If the Revolution of Dignity fails to succeed, at some point, Europe and Washington will say, ‘Maybe, Ukraine just can’t be fixed?’ I don’t think that’s true, but people will start to think that, and that would be bad for Ukraine and bad for the West.”
