After DonaldTrump’s inauguration speech, all the –tiny‑ remaining hopes have been strongly showered. Some were still expecting that Trump as president would not have resembled the president-elect and the campaigner. His speech has been confirmation enough that he hadn’t changed. On the contrary, with his “America First” discourse, he even put an emphasis on his most illiberal and isolationist stances. His discourse, that fully embraced the populist play-book, is unprecedented, at least since AndrewJackson (7th president of the U.S., 1828-1837), in American history.
The billionaire’s philosophy poses a direct threat to the U.S. democracy. Blaming the establishment –that he is part of‑, intending to be the representative of the people against the intermediary bodies –maybe including the judiciary and the Congress that we never mentioned‑, giving a free-hand to all kinds of selfishness and close-mindedness, he appears to be a major challenge to the liberal forces within the U.S. Everything shows that his discourse has been directly inspired by his far-right adviser Stephen Bannon, former head of fake-news and supremacist website Breitbart News, more than by the moderate Republicans. Some of his final remarks about the diversity and the unity of the American people, regardless their origins, the color of their skin, and their social positions, and his praise for the tradition of liberty, appear to be purely rhetorical. Unsurprisingly, the European far-right leaders applauded a speech that France’s Marine Le Pen, Netherland’s GeertWilders, or Germany’s FraukePetry could have as well pronounced in their own country. Many commentators also rightly pointed out that Putin as well could have expressed the same things. Some very classical sentences, which we usually had in both Republican and Democrat presidents’ discourses, never appear in Trump’s speech: it clearly shows the contempt for freedom, human rights, and democracy, at home and abroad. With Trump not only America is no more the “indispensable nation” that it intended to be since one century or more, but he may turn into one of the most destabilizing powers.
Nonetheless, when it comes to America itself, the comparison with Russia is obviously irrelevant. Unlike Russia, the U.S. has a strong and vibrant civil society, a genuine system of checks and balances with the judiciary and the Congress, but also with the state governments, and a tradition of freedom and independence. It has the capacity of resistance that autocratic nations do not have. Any attempt of the president to be a kind of dictator is doomed to fail. However, in the coming weeks and months, there will be a stress-test for those institutions that the world must pay attention to, since its results will indicate to which direction the U.S. foreign and security policy is likely to move. First of all, the Congress is supposed to confirm –or not to confirm‑ some of Trump’s cabinet nominees. If it confirms some of them, either embedded in clear conflicts of interests or not really committed to promote abroad liberal principles –especially over Moscow’s violations of international law‑, it would signal a lack of independence –and courage‑of the legislative branch that would offer grim predictions for the future of the U.S. policy. Hence, it would herald that the “never Trump” GOP members have lost the battle within their own party. Secondly, most of the D.C. specialists are still wondering: who will govern? Some consider that the White House’s triumvirateBannon, Priebus and his son-in-law Kushner will prevail in most of Trump’s policy orientations –for the worse. Some add General Flynn to this list. Obviously, there are contending views over Russia and China between them and some of the cabinet nominees such as Secretary of Defense General Mattis,CIA’s head MikePompeo, and the U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley. It’s still unknown if they will have a say –or at least influence‑on pivotal issues. Thirdly, also unprecedented, many of the senior civil servants to be appointed by the president are not yet, and most of the Republican senior security specialists seem not be willing to work with the Trump’s administration. Fourthly, there are some investigations going on over the alleged links between some of Trump’s team members and Russian officials and agents during the campaign. Some do still expect –even without any strong hope‑ that it could lead to the impeachment procedure.
Whatever it could be the indications that Trump undisclosed –or confirmed‑in his inauguration speech are a source of deep concern for Europe and the free world. Beyond the fact that the 45th president is cozying up to Vladimir Putin and, as a recent interview with European newspapers shows, fully embraces the Kremlin’s stance over NATO, Brexit, Europe, Syria and Ukraine, his new isolationism offers everything but reassuring perspectives. In his inauguration speech, Trump has bluntly announced that he doesn’t intend to protect the other countries, that he doesn’t want to pay for military operations abroad, and thus that the assistance to democracy –including human rights activists and free media‑and the defense of other countries, even if threatened by an aggressive power, would not be anymore a true concern for America.As I already put it, with Trump’s election the –gloomy‑ 21st century has truly begun. Not only we could expect that he would turn a blind eye to Russian aggression, but also that he wouldn’t even blame Moscow for that and show any sort of empathy and moral support. The only hope for the people who are claiming for freedom and democracy relies in a surge of Europe. If the European leaders are not willing to do so, it would put an end to the expectations of a peaceful and fairer world that the European liberals expressed after the end of World War II and the Fall of the Berlin Wall. It’s high time to belie this prophecy.
*Chairman of the Paris-based Centre for Study and Research for Political Decision (CERAP), editor of the journal Le Banquet, author of three official reports to the government, including two on international strategy, and of 21 books, including France: The Impossible Reform? (in French), Paris: Flammarion, 2004; Shall We Save Liberalism? (with M. Canto-Sperber) (in French), Paris: Grasset, 2006; When France Disappears From the World (in French), Paris: Grasset, 2008 and 2013; The Word in 2030.The Rule and The Disorder (in French), Paris: Perrin, 2011;andFrance Needs Others (in French), Paris: Plon, 2012.
