Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Azerbaijan was more than a meeting between the leaders of two countries. The situation in the South Caucasus is anything but stable. Apart from the continuous Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, there is Iran’s nuclear program, with the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan aggravating pro rata mounting international sanctions against Tehran.
Baku is increasingly irritated by the absence of progress in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. More and more often voices are heard demanding a military solution, so the occupied territories are regained and territorial integrity restored within the generally recognized boundaries. Considering that the Azerbaijani armed forces are being rather quickly re-equipped and trained, the possibility of unfreezing the conflict and upsetting the existing status quo no longer seems remote.
Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have of late dramatically sharpened, with the arrest on espionage charges of two Azerbaijani poets, Farid Huseyn and Shahriyar Hajizade, adding fuel to the fire. The two were apprehended during a literary festival in Tabriz. The verdict in their case was to be announced on September 10, but on September 4 Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei pardoned them and had them handed over to the Azerbaijani consul in Tabriz. Despite the repeated top-level invitations, the President of Azerbaijan refused to attend the non-aligned summit in Tehran and visited Minsk instead for talks with his Belarusian counterpart (Belarus also takes part in the non-aligned movement).
This event best illustrates the current relationships between Baku and Tehran. The Iranian political leadership resolutely condemns Israeli companies that supply arms to Azerbaijan, accusing the latter of allowing an attack on Iran to be prepared on its territory. Azerbaijan as resolutely rejects this.
Baku needs foreign support, of course, expecting it from Ankara in the first place. This is only natural in view of the historical, cultural, economic, and other ties between these countries. In fact, mutual support has been repeatedly proclaimed in both capitals and practiced despite the existence of some sharp angles. Thus, Baku reacted negatively to the signing of the Zurich protocols, and even more so to the possible opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. Ankara eventually discarded the idea, but a bad feeling remained in Baku.
As Turkey took an increasingly uncompromising stand in the Syrian conflict, its relations with Iran went from bad to worse. And then came Moscow’s turn.
Until recently, the strategic partnership between Moscow and Ankara seemed rock-solid, with Ankara allowing the construction of Putin’s pet project, South Stream, in its part of the Black Sea. During the war in the Caucasus, Ankara delayed passage of US ships through its straits, so they reached the Georgian ports after the end of hostilities – possibly because so requested by Moscow.
Now the situation looks very different. Turkey is getting actively involved in the issue of security in the South Caucasus. Recently Georgian border police held maneuvers with Turkish Coast Guard cutter TCSG-71, aimed at improving border guard techniques, with an eye to subsequent joint military exercises. Turkish border guard officers visited Poti and laid a wreath at the monument to the victims of the Georgian-Russian war at the local coast guard base.
Laying a wreath was an act of political demarche against Moscow – as was the joint military exercise. The fact that only one Turkish cutter took part in it does not change the political meaning of the whole thing; today just one cutter, tomorrow the Turkish presence in the eastern part of the Black Sea may be represented by a considerably larger number of vessels. Judging by comments in the Georgian and Turkish press, this joint military exercise would not be the last one.
Then there is the energy aspect. The signing by Ankara and Baku of a treaty on the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) – from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey, to the Bulgarian border – would considerably reduce the South Stream’s chances. To begin with, TANAP is shorter by far; second, gas transportation on the ground is much less expensive than on the bottom of the sea. Constructing the South Stream pipeline, Russia must be prepared to sell gas at a loss or bury and sink billions of dollars in the Black Sea.
President Aliyev and Prime Minister Erdogan held talks not in Baku but in the resort city of Gabala. The choice of the site was not coincidental. Located here is a radar station leased by Russia. The lease term is coming to an end while the parties cannot agree on the amount of rent. Azerbaijan wants the sum to be larger by many times and Russia does not agree. Therefore, the site of the talks was a loud and clear signal to Moscow: no one in Baku will be sorry to see the Russians leave Gabala, and Ankara shares Baku’s feelings.
Changes in Turkish foreign policy, particularly the presence of anti-Russia overtones, affect Ukraine, primarily in the energy sphere. Ukraine still hopes to take part in the construction of TANAP, as this would be important for our pipe-rolling businesses.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies would considerably lessen Ukraine’s dependence on Russia, with an eye to expanded extraction on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov shelves, also in Poltava and Kharkiv oblasts. In the long run this would allow Ukraine to stop importing gas from Russia.
Of course, the simplest way would be to have LNG supplied from Azerbaijan through Georgian seaports, but overcoming resistance from the pro-Russian lobby and struggling with red tape lasted long enough for all Azerbaijani gas imports to be contracted by others, including by Ukraine’s more mobile Romanian neighbor.
In May 2012, Ukraine and Qatar signed a memorandum on understanding in the energy sphere whereby the parties will study the possibilities of mutually advantageous cooperation in terms of LNG supplies and construction of an LNG terminal. Now arrangements have to be made for LNG deliveries from Qatar, Algeria, and eventually the United States and Canada. This will mean passage through Ankara-controlled Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Apparently this was discussed during a meeting with the Turkish prime minister in Kyiv and Yalta (YES). Ankara is fully aware that LNG supplies to Ukraine will be a direct blow to Moscow’s policy in regard to Kyiv. Turkey is thus openly counteracting the attempts of the Russian leadership to use gas leverage to make Ukraine join the Customs Union and enter all related spaces.
Turkey is thus starting to play an important role, on a broader international scale, in curbing Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. This is especially evident in the South Caucasus. The Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance is aimed at reaching precisely this goal.
Add here are the polarized approaches to the Syrian problem and Iran’s nuclear program. There appears to be a new line of tension in the Black-Sea-Sea-of-Azov region that does not help peace and quiet.
