The words “patriot” and “patriotism” come from the Greek “patrio” – homeland. Patriotism is a concept filled with positive and, without any doubt, in most countries, including European countries, patriotism is only approved by both the indigenous population and migrants because patriotism, in fact, means solicitous attitude to everything that surrounds you: environment, nature, informational space, and people, it means knowing the history of your people and respect for traditions; after all, it means taking care of the future of the land you consider native – concern about what will remain after you. According to the research conducted by Research & Branding Group in summer last year, 76 percent of the Ukrainian citizens consider themselves to be patriots of Ukraine. Also, 72 percent are proud to be citizens of our country and every second Ukrainian (52 percent) is willing to protect his country if there will be such a need. Besides, the vast majority of respondents – 93 percent consider Ukraine as their homeland. However, according to the Ukrainian government, there is not enough patriotism in the country. Therefore, starting from 2013 till 2017 the state plans to allocate 40 million hryvnias each year to ensure that we are patriots. It is written in the “National Target Social Program for Patriotic Education of the Population in 2013-17.” Let’s see, according to the authors of the concept, what are the signs that suggest that Ukrainian people are not patriots. First of all, it is the great number of Ukrainians, especially ones aged between 18 and 39, willing to emigrate (nearly 50 percent). This is the main reason. Then it comes to the following reasons: “systematic crisis of identity, economic disintegration, social differentiation of society, and devaluation of moral values…” It is hard to disagree with these diagnoses but is the lack of patriotism really the reason for social differentiation and devaluation of moral values? Maybe there are other reasons and the lack of patriotism is only caused by them.
The concept suggests recipes for fighting imperfect patriotism – various kinds of educational work. There is even a state plan made. Here is an example. Since, according to the authors of the concept, discussions on patriotic topics belong to signs of patriotism, then if in 2013 this figure will be, let’s say, nine percent, in 2015 there has to be already 15 percent of such discussions and in two more years – 17 percent. Another sign is “voting for parties with patriotic ideology at the elections.” In 2013 it’ll be 22 percent and in 2017 – 35 percent. It would be interesting to know what are those parties with “patriotic ideology”? Will films about OUN-UPA be considered patriotic? Is it patriotic to praise those who won in Great Patriotic War? There is the total number of 17 of such patriotic signs which need to be increased. This plan, despite good intension, paves the way straight to the copy of Soviet style patriotism.
According to the plan, in five years when the work will be done (for 200 million hryvnias) the number of those willing to emigrate from Ukraine will reduce by half. Thus, the “new impulse of spiritual healing for people” will work out. By the way, among those responsible for its formation, i.e. the implementation of the concept, there will be: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Oblast State Administrations, etc. We decided to speak with Vadym VASIUTYNSKY, Doctor of Psychological Sciences, professor, head of the Laboratory of Masses and Communities Psychology at the Institute of Social and Political Psychology NAPS of Ukraine about whether we need to cry or laugh in this situation.
Mr. Vasiutynsky, before speaking about Ukraine I want to hear your opinion about what is now happening in Russia: those who disagree consider themselves patriots and Putin is using patriotic language. Isn’t it paradoxical?
“The issue of patriotism in Russia is, in a sense, not as acute as it is for us: it is not a question for the absolute majority of citizens whether they should love or not love Russia or whether they should love it along with Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, etc. (Obviously, the exception can be the representatives of national minorities of Russia, however today their patriotism is not expressed much – almost like in times of the Soviet Union. Nobody asks, for example Chechens about their patriotism.) Altogether nearly four fifths of Russian citizens are its sincere patriots. This factor strongly unites Russian society as well as it unites the society and the government. Unpatriotic government in Russia is simple impossible. That is why the patriotic rhetoric of Putin is quite natural, as opposed to democratic, while there, of course, is a certain level of manipulation with patriotism. However, every government manipulates with patriotism, even the most democratic ones.
“What concerns the protests, they, firstly, are still too weak for such a big country, and, secondly, they are not anti-Russian at all. We could rather speak about the fact that its participants have somewhat different vision of Russian patriotism – more democratic and progressive patriotism rather that traditional. Ukrainians are in a better situation in that respect because they have to become consolidated in positive attitude to their own Ukrainian patriotism, while Russian people have to overcome the imperialistic complexes and it can be a rather painful and long-lasting process.”
PATRIOTISM IN UKRAINE IS ON THE LEVEL IT WAS IN 2004 AND 2005
In the new-old concept “National Target Social Program for Patriotic Education of the Population in 2013-2017” it says that we need to increase the level of patriotism. In particular, it provides the data to show that the level of patriotism among young people is low because 50 percent of them want to leave Ukraine. Can one call unpatriotic a desire to work abroad and realize oneself there, especially when there are no conditions created for that in Ukraine?
“We have such an interesting phenomenon: the level of traditional Ukrainian patriotism (concern about native country, commitment to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian historical values that are, as a rule, opposed to Russian) is the highest in western Ukraine. At the same time, as shown by sociological surveys, the highest level of willingness to go abroad is also in the western region. At least among the labor migrants in European countries there is the highest percentage of Ukrainians from the western part of the country. It is hard to say how many of them won’t come back: Poles who began to go to work in Western Europe before Ukrainians did made an estimate that nearly one-fourth of those, who left Poland, stayed abroad. There is a high probability that one-third of Ukrainian migrant workers stayed abroad. Many of them value the Ukrainian identity in their heart but do not transfer it in the sense of everyday life. It is obvious, that the labor migrants can be divided into two groups: those who plan to earn money and return to Ukraine and those who are unlikely to return (they build their life in a different way already: take their children to them, try to receive education abroad, etc.). Humans are polymotivated creatures; it means that they always have many motives for doing something and making decisions. The decision-making process is often influenced not only by the sense of patriotism but also many other conditions. That is why, we should look at this in calm and reserved manner because, after all, every person has a right to make decision about how to build his life and if somebody thinks that it would be better for him to emigrate we should not blame him for it. I know a few concrete examples when children from western Ukraine grew up and went abroad and it was a big tragedy for their parents – not even because their children would be so far away but because they “betrayed their fatherland.” On the other hand, if to speak about the more general social level, of course, willingness of young people to go abroad for the rest of their lives is a big social problem which affects a lot of economic, political, and psychological issues. The main thing for young people is to receive professional knowledge, find a job, and get a chance to realize themselves. What can our unemployed youth do? That is why, when a person is looking for a possibility to earn his living and is not able to find it in Ukraine, it is not his fault, it is, in fact, the situation in which the society puts him.
“Not everyone would agree with this. We have approximately 10 to 15 percent of “zealous” patriots who consider everything through the light of fundamental Ukrainianness. Apparently, these people would never leave Ukraine. However, such hyper-principled position can probably not always be justified and be entirely harmonious. On the contrary, it often displays certain psychological problems of the person who has it. Our life is not straightforward and it is psychologically wrong to take just one aspect and look at every issue in its light. Although, in some sense it is comfortable because such people always have ready solutions. However, not only ‘true’ patriots can be psychologically problematic, the opposite to them ‘true’ haters of everything Ukrainian, the approximate number of whom is 7 to 8 percent, are just as problematic. Those are the people who live in hatred to everything Ukrainian and build their lives around it. It is also an inharmonious, and I would even say unhealthy, position.”
Your Institute has been studying the phenomenon of patriotism for more than 10 years. What tendencies could you indicate?
“In general, the level of Ukrainian political patriotism is growing. According to the results of our annual national surveys conducted since 1994, the number of people, who speak in support of Ukraine’s independence remains at the level of 60 to 65 percent, while those against it are 15 to 20 percent. There are certain fluctuations observed. In the time of the Orange Revolution the level of patriotism significantly increased and at the end of the ‘orange’ government ruling it decreased considerably. This was the result of their leadership: the orange politicians demonstrated clear Ukrainianness and, at the same time, inability to properly govern the country. But the present government, in its turn, has greatly increased the Ukrainian patriotism. It also proved ineffective, but under different slogans. At the present moment the level of patriotism again increased. Moreover, I would say that it has never been so high, except for the time in late 2004 and early 2005.”
DEMAND TO LOVE MOTHERLAND – HALLMARK OF TOTALITARISM
For the state to hope for people’s patriotism it should, at least, give people the opportunity to realize themselves. What other soil can patriotism grow on?
“You mentioned very important psychological and ideological issues. I think the state should not require patriotism from people. If the state makes a demand for its citizens to love their fatherland, it is one of hallmarks of a totalitarian state. The idea of this trend is that the top-rank officials try to be identified with the state, like it was in the USSR: socialistic system – communist party – Moscow – Kremlin – Leonid Brezhnev. Those ideologemes were united into a single entity and in this context the citizens didn’t have a choice: they had to love Soviet motherland, party, and Brezhnev. I don’t think that the Ukrainian state should assume the responsibility to form patriotism in its citizens. It is rather the right of citizens themselves and the society that has to get self-organized.
“We have a post-totalitarian society and we, the citizens, attribute to the state the function of taking care of Ukrainian patriotism. The patriotism that comes from the state and not from citizens can be of dubious quality.”
Is such concept, on which they plan to spend 40 million hryvnias, really needed?
“I doubt the effectiveness of the state concept because it is highly unlikely that it would influence popular attitudes in society. There is no doubt that the state has to support patriotic views, typical of the majority of its citizens. However, there are citizens who have a Ukrainian passport, pay taxes, and so on but they do not feel like being patriots of Ukraine and don’t want to be one. Should they have a right for their own beliefs? I think so. And the state has to protect their rights. This is one of the main social functions of the state to regulate interaction between different groups of people with opposing views. Ukrainian patriots may object: what if the level of such non-patriotism will grow and the majority of population cease to be patriots and would not want independent Ukraine, what will be then? This is a rather complicated question. Fortunately, this situation appears to be totally unrealistic. We have Galicia where nearly unconditional patriotism dominates and the Crimea together with Donbas, where the trends are nearly opposite. It is the state that has to balance these positions without imposing the patriotism of western Ukraine style as well as east Ukrainian pseudointernationalism. Especially because the central Ukraine, which provides the version of patriotism that is more or less acceptable for the whole society, saves us from such contraposition. I think that the state could be guided by it in regulating relations between individuals.”
Today the experts, when commenting on the work of current government, very often draw parallels with the style of leadership in the Soviet era. Is it really the case?
“Not only current government is doing that, their predecessor did exactly the same. I can not say that the authorities deliberately use the Soviet models, it is just that they can not think of any different variants. However, the problem is not only in them, but also in all of us because we all came from Soviet coat and do not imagine any other way it could be done. In attitude of most politicians and, most importantly, in attitude of majority of population, voters, stereotypes prevail that everything should be the way it was before, as usual, as one can understand. What do we still want from politics? Is it a good man who will take care of everyone and will give everyone what he wants? And when it comes to collective self-organization, joint problem-solving by a community, most of Ukrainians are not likely to do any of that. It turns out that the ideological vector has changed but the essence, form, and ritual remained the same. Unfortunately.”
