The barometer of Sino-Japanese relations suddenly showed stormy weather. This happened following what first looked like a minor accident, when the Chinese Minjinyu 5179 fishing trawler either collided with, or was rammed by, a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the East China Sea on September 7, 2010. The incident took place near the disputed Senkaku Islands [Diayo Islands according to the Chinese authorities; Tiaoyutai to the Taiwanese – Ed.], which lie about the same distance from China, Taiwan and Japan, and are claimed by all three. The trawler was detained and the Japanese side claimed the ship had performed dangerous maneuvers that caused two collisions with Coast Guard vessels. Minjinyu 5179’s captain faced up to three years in jail and up to 6,000 dollars worth of fines. As it was, the trawler and crew were released several days later while the captain, Zhan Qixiong, remained in custody under a warrant that allowed Japanese prosecutors to hold him without charges until September 19.
Beijing was outraged and demanded that Tokyo immediately release the ship and crew.
Zhai Jun, Assitant Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that China had decided to cancel the talks with Japan concerning the delimitation of borders on the East China Sea. Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), urgently requested a visit from the Japanese Ambassador, Uichiro Niwa, late that same day. The Japanese were furious about this deliberate and insulting breach of diplomatic protocol. The Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, Yoshito Sengoku, later said that the summoning of the Japanese ambassador at such late hour was a regrettable occurrence, from the Japanese government’s point of view.
The situation was aggravated after a Japanese court of law ruled that the Chinese fishing boat’s captain, Zhan Qixion, would remain in custody for another ten days “without charges.” Beijing responded immediately. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website showed a statement by its spokesperson, Ma Zhaoxu, that read: “If Japan insists on making one mistake after another, the Chinese side will take strong countermeasures, and all the consequences should be borne by the Japanese side.” That Monday night, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya once again summoned the Japanese Ambassador, Uichiro Niwa, and handed him a note of protest.
Then came time for “serious measures.” The PRC canceled talks over aviation rights and the use of coal, and suspended talks scheduled for this month on development plans for oil and gas fields in the East China Sea. It also curtailed a bilateral student exchange program. PRC ended by dispatching “a maritime law enforcement ship to the area, to safeguard Chinese fishermen and their assets” and to force Japan to act in accordance with the Law of the Sea. Anti-Japan rallies were staged in front of the Japanese diplomatic missions in Beijing, Shenyang and Shanghai, albeit far smaller than those in 2005, when Sino-Japanese relationships hit another low. In Shenyang, Liaoning University students approached the Japanese consulate general with posters reading “Never Forget National Shame! Always Remember 18th September Incident!”
Japan insists that the PRC cannot resort to diplomatic means with regard to the Chinese trawler’s captain, considering that the man was apprehended on Japanese territory, so his case will be handled by a Japanese court of law. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku declared that his country would act in a considerate manner, that his government had contacted the PRC, so as to start negotiating the issue as soon as possible, and that these talks would serve to stabilize Sino-Japanese relationships.” He made this statement when asked to comment on the PRC’s decision to delay its ambassador’s return to Japan.
The problem here are the Senkaku Islands, a string of uninhabited islands which Japan claims on the grounds of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which ended the first Sino-Japanese War. Japan considers them a part of its Okinawa prefecture. The Chinese insist that this treaty, which also gave Taiwan to the Japanese, was both unjust and never widely recognized, and that the islands have been on Chinese maps/charts since the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). As it was, in 1945, after the end of World War II, these islands, together with the Okinawa Prefecture, ended up under US control. After the latter was returned to Japan, in the early 1970s, it included the Senkaku Islands. The PRC continues to challenge this status. Back in 1992, Beijing declared them age-old Chinese territory. Beijing still firmly believes the islands must be returned to China, as per the Cairo Declaration, signed December 1, 1943, by the US, UK, and the Republic of China (then ruled by Chiang Kai-shek). The document reads: “It is their (i.e., US, UK, and RC. — Author) purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which it has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which it has taken by violence and greed.” Although the disputable archipelago was not mentioned, today’s Beijing insists it falls under this declaration.
Dr. Kazuhiko Togo, Director of the Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University, formerly in charge of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s European Department, says the differences between Japan and China have nothing to do with WWII and its consequences; that these islands are de facto under Japanese control; that this status is legally sealed by the Treaty of San Francisco, signed on September 8, 1951, at the War Memorial Opera House in San Francisco, CA, by Japan and 48 nations representing the Allied Powers; that there is an official chart effective thereunder which shows that the Senkaku Islands were part of the Okinawa Prefecture; that these islands were actually uninhabited, that no one was interested in them until 1999 when a team of expert geologists working under the aegis of the UN published a report suggesting that these islands contained some 200 billion cubic meters of oil and gas. Taiwan and the PRC started claiming possession of these islands in 1970-71.
The issue of the Senkaku/Tiaoyutai Islands has now acquired international scope. One can see a predominance of domestic, rather than external, factors that have a special meaning for the PRC. The capture of Chinese fishing trawler and its captain coincided with the anniversary of the so-called Manchurian incident. Back on September 18, 1931, the Japanese military staged a provocation, blowing up a section of the railroad south of Mukden. This triggered off the Japanese invasion of China and secession of Manchuria. The Japanese aggressor established Manchukuo, or Manchu State, on the occupied territory, and enthroned Puyi, the Emperor Kangde of Manchukuo. Chinese nationalism thrives on painful memories, despite Japan’s repeated apologies. Hence the slogans about remembering September 18 and the markedly malicious public/official response to the trawler incident.
Chinese web and chat sites are teeming with highly emotional, often aggressive, statements, with the Renmin Ribao (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn) in the lead. Among the comments one finds statements about China having to give those insolent Japanese their due; that Mao Zedong’s ideas should be reinstated in the sphere of military production; that China’s army should be further reinforced, considering the Japanese threat. It is possible that this outburst of hatred against Japan is being guided by someone, somewhere, considering all those important Sino-Japanese business contracts, innovative investment projects. These raging passions may well subside, as suddenly as they rose, yet there is no denying the growth of nationalistic moods in the Chinese public and official quarters. Global Times reads that China should use sufficient resources and force against Japan, otherwise Japan will step up its politics.
In fact, China has an ax to grind about islands with other neighboring countries: Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Says Aleksandr Larin, senior research fellow with the Institute of the Far East at the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation: “China’s might is growing. Against this backdrop one can single out two trends in Beijing’s policy. The first one boils down to settling disputes amicably, as befits a great and responsible power. However, some on the top echelons of power are inclined to resort to harsh measures to serve China’s interests, as evidenced by China’s attitude toward other disputed territories, among them the Paracel Islands (Hoang Sa or Cat Vang in Vietnamese and Shitang in Chinese) in the South China Sea. In November 2002, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan signed an agreement whereby the final decision on the status of the Spratys Archipelago was postponed until 2052. In March 2005, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Philippine oil companies signed an agreement on joint prospecting for hydrocarbon deposits on those islands. The joint communique stressed that all works would relate to the commercial project and have nothing to do with the territorial conflict.
The Senkaku Islands are far from Ukraine, yet we have similar problems with our Russian neighbor, over the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch. At one time the absence of clearly delimited sea frontiers led to the Tuzla Island crisis. The talks are still underway, hard and with many subjective factors to consider. Russia does not want a compromise (which is absolutely possible, with an eye to the economic and transportation interests of both sides). Second, the ambiguous stand taken by the Ukrainian side is subject to [political] conjuncture. Practice shows that such an attitude is a time bomb that can explode at any moment and cause unpredictable consequences. A gaping wound that time can’t heal but make it worse, so perhaps an emergency surgery will be in order.
