What really causes surprise is the ability of Ukrainian leaders, no matter what color their party flag is, to get into a fix. In a burst of showing good feelings towards to a territorially large neighbor, they are ready to do anything, without even noticing that this neighbor is setting, also in a burst of brotherly love, some covert and overt traps. Then, on the eve of an election, they tell the people that, unlike their predecessors, they know how to make friends and open up borders in order to live “better and more cheerfully.”
Did Mr. Liovochkin not know, when he visited Moscow to prepare a meeting of the two presidents, that his partners had suggested marking the anniversary of an auto race sponsored by Nicholas II the Bloody, as the Bolsheviks called the last Russian tsar, about which their current Ukrainian followers and allies from the party of Regions have forgotten? Naturally, the chief of our head of state’s staff knew this very well, but he agreed that his boss would be taking part in this essentially anti-Ukrainian event. What is this: a deliberate demonstration of national indifference or an attempt to play up again to the Russian partners who are very sensitive to this kind of symbols and demand showing respect for them in return for their money? In all probability, both things, for the current leadership’s philosophy is that people need a sop, especially as October 31 is approaching. They think they will poll the required number of votes if they dish out cheap buckwheat or other cereals, stir up nostalgic memories, and make some vague hints about unbreakable friendship and the “right” gas price. And then – what will come, will come. But what about the feeling of their own country’s dignity? Of course, Moscow will not pat them on the back for this and will make no concessions. For this is an immaterial feeling.
When you are watching TV footage of the two presidents driving down their countries’ roads, you have a bizarre sensation of deja vu. To begin with, they clearly chose a wrong make to display the achievements of the national car industry. Although the GAZ-M-20 car, made at the Gorky plant named after Molotov at the time, was christened Pobeda (Victory), Comrade Stalin, the leader and teacher of the world proletariat, did not think so. After examining the car in the Kremlin and sitting inside it a little, he reportedly said pensively: “It is not exactly a victory.” The car was largely based on what the world automobile industry had already achieved. First of all, this was a copy of the German Opel Kapitan and prewar makes of General Motors cars supplied to the USSR as part of a lend-lease deal.
Yet Soviet engineers introduced some innovations into the make, which secured it a success in a ten-year period of production. All the more so that Soviet motorists had no alternative, perhaps with the exception of the first-generation Moskvich which was fully copycatted from foreign makes.
It is just a pest of sorts. Russian presidents have always been showing preference to nationally-made retro cars – Putin to the Volga and Medvedev to the Pobeda. They need this to achieve some of their own domestic goals, but why did our president choose to harness himself into this chariot?
The search for answers comprises, as usual, domestic and foreign factors – with reference to both actors in this show. The Party of Regions’ rating is steadily on the wane, which is natural to some extent. The administrative resource alone is clearly insufficient, although Kyiv keeps sending to the party’s regional organizations, so to speak, sky-high vote targets. Some votes may be rigged during the count, especially in the south-eastern regions. Yet the party should be prepared to suffer some losses. All the more so that Serhii Tihipko is irreversibly increasing his rating inside the party. So the goal is at least to minimize the losses. The Party of Regions spin masters think the best way to so is to resort to high-profile foreign-policy actions and to display what in reality either does not exist or does in a minimal quantity.
So what are the assets? Nothing much so far after the Kharkiv accords. As Prime Minister Mykola Azarov said at Yevgeny Kiseliov’s TV show, the Ukrainian government will be persistently trying to revise the gas contacts. “We are setting ourselves a goal to persuade the Russians to revise this extremely unprofitable deal, and will be working hard with Russia [to this effect],” he said. The premier also emphasized: “We are not pressed for time, and we have now some trump cards for negotiations.”
The intention is commendable, but it is very difficult to implement it. Moscow has said more than once that it is not going to revise the documents it can benefit from – not only because they are stubborn or wish to further tighten the gas noose but also because they are afraid of the domino effect. For other consumers of Russian gas may also demand the same for themselves. It is known that Bulgaria and other Balkan countries are demanding a revision, while German partners have also been speaking in the same spirit. Besides, it is too daring to say that the Ukrainian side is not pressed for time. In reality, our negotiators have very little time: the next year’s spring is coming on and a gas price hike is inevitable, as are economic and electoral losses. Our Minister Yurii Boiko used to say something about the construction of a liquefied gas facility in Odesa and thus getting a trump card for negotiations with Gazprom, but then the whole story died out for some reason. In the meantime, Rumania, Bulgaria, and now Hungary have made a deal with Azerbaijan on this kind of cooperation and the construction of facilities in Georgia and Bulgaria. So Azerbaijan may be short of gas for Ukraine now because others have beaten us in this and the trump card has slipped out of our hands again.
Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev said he would take Viktor Yanukovych to Russia in the evening after a sojourn in Hlukhiv. “We will talk about the economy, the social sphere and humanitarian cooperation. We will talk about how to make the life of our people more calm, rich and normal,” he said. On his part, our president mentioned pro-jects connected with the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2012 European Soccer Championship as the example of likely cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. In his words, “there are very many infrastructural projects” which could be carried out by joint efforts. This will hardly please the Ukrainian companies that deal with the Euro-2012 infrastructure – they do not have too much money and do not need additional rivals. The same applies to Sochi. Bitter struggle is rife in Russia for the already allotted and spent Olympic money, and nobody counted on Ukrainian rivaling partners. In all probability, this will remain just a declaration. And politicians will be nodding and telling us about the lost opportunities of bilateral cooperation.
Moscow is going to host a session of the Russia-Ukraine Interstate Commission in November. Medvedev and Yanukovych did not conceal that the main objective of their meeting in Zavidovo was preparation for the November session in Moscow. “We have agreed on a date in late November. We will be getting ready for this. Naturally, there is an enormous range of issues because our economies are complementing one another,” Yanukovych said. What this “complement” is has remained unclear since the times of Leonid Kuchma – too much talk and too little result. Meanwhile, the current leadership has created a real danger of the most important Ukrainian businesses being swallowed up by Rus-sian ones. Did our president mean this when he said: “We are to make serious decisions on a large number of industries. We are ready. There are some problems, but they depend on our political will. We should slam it once with our fists, as they put it.” Slam a fist where? In Zavidovo? I do not think so.
Another problem that still remains unresolved, in spite of declarations, is the two countries’ borders. It has been said more than once that they have been agreed upon, mapped, and are going to be demarcated, but there is in fact no progress. This unsettled problem hinders Ukraine’s European integration process. Being very well aware of this, Moscow is slowing it down under all kinds of pretext or even without any. A similar headache is delimitation of the Kerch Strait. Russian Foreign Ministry’s press service recently quoted Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying: “One can argue very long about whether the line marked on the former Soviet Union’s maps in the middle of the Kerch-Yeni Kale Canal really existed.” Lavrov says Russian archives show that it was drawn “not to mark the administrative border but only to facilitate economic activities in this water area.” The minister also noted that Kyiv and Moscow are taking a more or less similar stand: “Our standpoints are that we want both countries to freely use the Kerch-Yeni Kale Canal and jointly develop their infrastructures, economic and other projects here.”
As usual, the two sides have agreed upon the main thing but failed to iron out the details. In general, the verbal juggling of obvious facts by Russian diplomats is even worthy of praise. What does it mean, that the distinguishing line marked on Soviet maps was not an administrative border? There was no such thing in the USSR. In spite of all the odds, the Ukrainian SSR did have, albeit formally, administrative borders, including one in the Strait of Kerch. Moscow is also very well aware of this, but it continues to pretend not to see the obvious. A good occasion for our president to slam his fist on the table – figuratively, of course. If he took a firmer stand in this and other border-related issues, Moscow would be saying other things. After all, it is about our state’s territorial integrity, of which he is the guarantor. Why not guarantee it? Besides, the problem of the Strait of Kerch and the Sea of Azov has a clear economic aspect. Lavrov also meant this when he was saying about joint projects. Likewise, we ought to think about the interests of the Crimea, Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts. It is possible to devise, perhaps on a concessionary basis, a mechanism that will allow vessels under the Russian flag to call at Azov ports. We could also find a mutually acceptable solution for other economic problems, taking into account our neighbor’s interests as much as possible, but borders is the holy of holies, and there can be no concessions here by definition. And the firmer our stand is, the sooner we will find a negotiated solution of this undoubtedly difficult but quite soluble problem.
And, to do so, one does not need to take part in auto races that lead nowhere. The unforgettable Ostap [Bender, a po-pular Russian satirical hero – Ed.] used to derive personal benefit from the slipshoddiness of Soviet bureaucrats and the fanfare of the ongoing short-lived campaigns. It is common knowledge how his notorious auto race ended up. Are we following the path of a great schemer?
