Ukraine between the West and Russia. This statement itself entails the necessity of a certain choice, a certain clear attitude. The same statement brings us to the conclusion that this choice has never been made, at least by many, in almost nine years of independent existence. Simultaneously a different question has the right to exist: is this the main problem for today’s Ukraine? Very much has been said lately about “Ukraine’s European choice” which allegedly lies in the state’s aspiration to fully integrate — politically, economically, socially, etc. — into the so-called Euro-Atlantic theater. There are very few achievements in this direction. The West is so far not very much inclined to look on today’s Ukraine as one of its own. There are many reasons for this, among them the present condition of the Ukrainian economy that has been slipping deeper into a coma each succeeding year, psychological rejection by many of Ukraine as something other than Russia, and, last but not least, the understandable unwillingness of the West to spoil its relations with Moscow, the latter seeming inevitable in case of a real rapprochement between the West and Kyiv.
“To Europe together with Russia” is quite a popular slogan among both the common people and politicians. And there would be nothing bad about this but for a couple of things. First, Ukraine and Russia have proclaimed different vectors of their development: accordingly, they have different interests (which nobody keeps from coexisting), different “weight categories,” and different visions of the world. Russia has never set the goal of joining the European Union because this is totally unrealistic. Russia is not averse to returning to a bipolar system of international relations, with itself being one of the poles. The somewhat changed accents contained in the phrase “to Europe together” I heard the other day at a Kyiv conference hardly mean something other than the awareness of some things. The Russian leadership must be gradually understanding Russia is no longer the Soviet Union or the Russian autocracy with all the opportunities these had within a certain system of coordinates. Russia can only strengthen itself at the expense of the former components of the empire. One can only guess to what extent full subordination to the interests of Russian policies and Russian elites, inevitable under such developments, will serve the interests of Ukraine and its leadership, which proclaims a desire to put this state into the West’s orbit and make it part of the Western world.
The West itself would probably agree without much hesitation to let Ukraine fall under full Russian influence if it did not fear a strengthened Russia. Meanwhile, the slogan “to Europe together with Russia” is absurd because Ukraine does not need to go to Europe: it was, is, and will be part of Europe even if somebody doubts it or does not want to look at the map.
Why Russia has decided to choose Ukraine is quite clear.
Equally clear is why the West seems less than overwhelmed with the idea of including Ukraine into its space. What remains somewhat unclear is why neither political statements nor theoretical conferences have managed to clarify a very simple point. Today’s Ukraine has no choice between the West and Russia.
Ukraine has the only possible choice, the one it also had nine years ago: to be or not to be. A strong country is able to decide what is better, figuratively speaking, a Volkswagen or a Moskvich. But one has to become a country like this. So the choice might well lie precisely in this.
