Since 1996, Ukraine has had its Constitution Article 10 of which reads: “Ukrainian shall be the official language of Ukraine.” Of course, this wording would be enough for law-abiding citizens and the authorities to observe the state’s fundamental law. However, the 70 year long domination of the Soviet system instilled the syndrome of flouting the law in a certain segment of society. This is why a group of People’s Deputies turned to the Constitutional Court for a final verdict regarding Article 10 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court put the final dot on December 14, 1999, in confirming of the official language in Ukraine. This Constitutional Court ruling triggered the heavy-handed and cynical interference of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ukraine’s internal affairs, which aroused indignation in broad circles of Ukrainian society.
More and more new cynical techniques are being resorted to in the struggle against the Ukrainian rebirth. Among them are, no doubt, the hired articles published in Izvestiya by journalist Yanina Sokolovskaya. However, the television spot on Ukrainian language policies prepared by ORT correspondent Natalia Kondratiuk, which went on the air February 18, 2000, went beyond all bounds. She not only cynically juggles the facts but also openly mocks Ukraine’s whole language policy, as a Ukrainian citizen shows her contempt for Ukrainian government institutions, and pours scorn on Ukraine’s political course proclaimed by Leonid Kuchma, on November 30, 1999. Such “reports” by Ms. Kondratiuk not only evoke indignation in society but also give birth to anti-Russian attitudes in a considerable part of it. Even among the so-called Russian-speaking population there has been grumbling about Ms. Kondratiuk! This does not at all correspond with Ukraine’s national interests and does not meet the aspirations of us as citizens who want to build a state of our own in the atmosphere of political stability.
Materials of the kind shown by Ms. Kondratiuk on February 18 also evoke prejudicial attitudes among a certain part of Ukrainian society toward the government, for the latter is unable to defend society’s interests and dignity. We, Ukrainian journalists, deeply concerned about the future of our state, are forced to demand that you, Mr. Minister, put an end to the anti-Ukrainian escapades of Ms. Kondratiuk and her like. Such materials do not fit into the classic framework of the freedom of speech and testify to crude permissiveness.
We hope that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the organ that accredits foreign journalists in Ukraine will come to the necessary conclusions.
With respect,
Halyna LEVYTSKA, weekly Chas,
Za vilnu Ukrayinu, Lviv,
Iryna YASHCHEMBSKA, weekly Narodna hazeta
Editor’s note.
Ms. Kondratiuk has sent the following reply after The Day asked her to comment on this open letter:
Natalia KONDRATIUK:
“I am not going to comment on this message because it reminds me only too well a specimen of the Communist Party style vocabulary extensively used in the Soviet times to criticize those who thought differently. I cannot speak this vocabulary and this kind of language, nor can I conduct a debate on such a level.”
It seems to us that this friction can be the object of serious debate, and we put the following questions to some well-known television commentators:
“Do you think Ukraine’s information independence is under threat today?”
“What are the reasons why not only many citizens are oriented toward Russian television news but also many politicians take up Moscow PR techniques?”
“What are the causes of the objective — unfortunately! — lagging behind of our information and analytical television to its Russian and East European counterparts?”
Ivanna NAIDA, anchor, “Reporter” information program, New Channel:
1. I think this threat does exist. In principle, it would be too early to speak about informational independence today. To approach it, one must find answers to three questions: who plays the tune, who calls it, and who listens to it? A considerable part of influential Ukrainian media are in reality owned by either Russians or representatives of the Western capital. They obviously have interests of their own. I do not say they come into conflict with Ukrainian interests and, if they do, to what extent, but it seems to me they do influence our information field. And this also constitutes a certain threat.
In addition, most Ukrainians, including many journalists, still do not regard Ukraine as a full-fledged state, feeling an inferiority complex, misunderstanding, or being unable to find a national idea. This is why the viewer is satisfied with information of Russian channels and how it is presented. Otherwise, the Russian media would not enjoy such popularity and influence in our state. This is why our viewer needs, due to many circumstances and reasons, its own independent national press.
2. Not in the least for the reason that the quality of Russian television is on a higher level them that of Ukraine. Now about technologies. As far as I know, big money was invested in working out Moscow election technologies. We did and do borrow from them because, first, these technologies — with all the similarities of the political and social processes in the two countries — ensured the desired controlled result, and, secondly, there was no need to spend our own time and resources to work them out. Poverty prompts the desire to copy tried and true patterns.
Independence brought us a territory and the population living on it. But we still lack a formed nation and state. And our people do not regard Ukraine the way the Americans do America. No matter how lofty it sounds, the lack of a national idea is the main cause of our backwardness.
3. For decades, Russian, not to mention East European, television has received the best forces and big money, and developed certain traditions. Ukrainian television has tried to say something more or less of its own in the past five years. It is obvious that we fail to reach even the Russian level. But I think this gap is beginning to narrow even now and will be finally bridged by time, investment, and a new generation of Ukrainian journalists.
Denis ZHARKYKH, STB:
1. A threat to Ukraine’s information independence really exists. The ability of external forces to foist on Ukrainians opinions and sentiments detrimental to this country is a completely visible reality. The worst thing is that Ukrainian bureaucrats are reducing the problem of information security to the language issue. In reality, nothing threatens the Ukrainian language, in contrast to the Ukrainian way of thinking. But the latter field has even fewer experts than the former. And instead of putting their thinking caps on and plunging into the information war already unleashed, Ukrainian officials have engaged in a political war and are combating the Russian language. It just does not occur to our new bureaucrats that anti-Ukrainian sentiments can also be aroused in Ukrainian, which some media in fact do. It does not occur to them because these bosses are worried not about this country’s interests but about their own careers. All they can do is to take the Russian media to task. They think it a trifle if this eliminates such a serious trump card as the bilingual status of Ukrainian culture, if Russian politicians and the Ukrainian Left make political capital out of this, and if this impairs the political image of this country as a European state! Who is to take the blame? Pushkin?
2. Ukrainian citizens did not choose the Moscow technologies. This choice was made by someone else for them. What could Ukrainian politicians be guided by? They must have wanted to buy cheap and sell dear. They thought it too expensive to raise our own political technologists, so they bought the stuff from Moscow. As a result, they are still failing to pay for it. For the Ukrainian media have become unconsciously dependent on Moscow. During the election campaign, only the Muscovites were allowed to indulge in free thinking, while the rest were made to stand at attention. The results were enough to make one cry: the Muscovites, having no competition, were producing outright obfuscation, while only dish-lickers were promoted in our media. And when the Muscovites and the national media found themselves on different sides of the barricades, there was nobody to defend the Ukrainian interests. This was a free (but very expensive!) supplement to those Moscow technologies for which the Ukrainian people will be paying for years.
3. The main cause for Ukrainian television’s inferiority to the Russian and East European media is that it supports nobody but the current regime. Ukrainian economic clans and the opposition display much less versatility in penetrating the information space. And if they succeed, they behave like a bull in a china shop. For example, when I still worked at the Inter channel, I suggested and made a spot on Nikolai Berdiayev, Kyiv’s first Social Democrat and world-famous philosopher. What struck me most was the fact that the great thinker, unlike the current SDPU(o) leaders, was never given airtime either in my or any other interpretation. It is still a common idea that, to raise the popularity of a certain politician it is enough to show him many times on television and to destroy one not to show him at all. Proceeding from this logic, Nikolai Berdiayev will not take offense, for he will not have to run for Verkhovna Rada. Our television still espouses the black-and-white Bolshevik ideology rejected long ago not only by Europe but also by some of our more eastern neighbors.
