Moldova’s new President Igor Dodon started by actively reaffirming the friendship between his country and Russia. His first visit, as head of state, to Moscow was well to be expected. Moldova’s left wing politicians had long kept in touch with the Kremlin, trying to outsmart each other, demonstrating their pro-Russian stand.
There is a popular joke in Moldova, to the effect that anyone can win an election campaign if there are billboards showing him standing beside Vladimir Putin. This presidential election was blatantly rigged, with the electorate being fed tales about the prospects of friendship between Moldova and Russia – but only if Moldova rejects European integration. Igor Dodon won the presidential race aided by members of that “pro-European” government who had, since 2009, been reiterating European integration, while stealing resources and dividing them among themselves.
Moldova ended up as an impoverished corrupt country, locked within Russia’s information space, taken hostage by Igor Dodon. The latter’s statement about the federalization of Moldova, proposing European officials to hold trilateral negotiations, involving Russia, is graphic evidence that Moldova can take a big step backward, as far back as the “Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.”
In terms of aggressive geopolitics, Russia’s national colors have been unfurled in Syria and Ukraine. For the time being, Vladimir Putin has abandoned large-scale projects like Novorossiya, but is looking for weak spots to strike a blow. The Kremlin has of late taken a keen interest in Moldova, but this does not mean that its interest in Ukraine will weaken. Vladimir Putin is trying to show us his “attention,” but Moldova is a bridgehead and the deployment of Russian forces there is an additional means of pressuring our country. No one should have any illusions about the Russian troops being blocked in Transnistria. There is no way to prevent Transnistrian tomatoes from appearing on Odesa’s markets.
When you stop thinking about your future, you always start thinking about your past. Irresponsible populist politicians come to the forefront of your mind, with their shameless campaign manipulations using the disoriented electorate. So far, it is hard to believe that Moldova will return to the NKVD era. Russia’s gold reserve isn’t enough even for Transnistria, with Gagauzia (a pro-Russian autonomous region of Moldova) receiving small aid from Moscow. Moldova would be too heavy a burden to shoulder.
Sanctions, Syrian and Ukrainian campaign expenditures (especially the occupation of Crimea) cost the Russian federal budget too much for the Kremlin to consider further spending here and now. They might decide to make separate targeted allocations, so Igor Dodon may carry out his mission or fail. In the latter case, he would follow in Viktor Yanukovych’s footsteps and end up the same way as all those other devotees of strategic partnership with Moscow.
Nor should anyone expect Moldovan wines to beat the Russian Standard Gold Vodka. The Kremlin has no intention of making Moldova a developed country. It needs this country as an anchor that will keep Moldova within the sphere of Russia’s interests. Until now, Transnistria and Gagauzia have acted as this anchor, but now there is a possibility to use Moldova as one. Russia’s policy boils down to using Moldova as a weapon in its geopolitical war, rather than helping that country and its people.
The next several months will show what the new Moldovan president is all about, and his stand in the relationships with Brussels and Moscow. The Kremlin is sure to demand from Igor Dodon deeds, in addition to his words about loyalty and friendship, so they can see where this captain is steering his ship. The intrigue is whether Igor will remain in office long enough to offer Moldova to his beloved comrade Vladimir on a silver platter.
In the United States, the existing system of legal restrictions and democratic institutions remains effective enough to have an effect even on Donald Trump (I mean the retirement of Michael Flynn). There is no such tradition [practice] in Moldova.
Moldova’s political class, after “oversleeping,” missing Igor Dodon’s breakthrough and victory, has only one option. Namely, reducing the losses to a minimum, so that Moldova can suffer as little as possible from the new president’s wrong decisions. Considering the man’s profile, this would take multilevel defenses.
COMMENTARY
Michael SYRKELI, political analyst, Moldova:
“What Igor Dodon is trying to achieve, his campaign speeches answer Russia’s interests, to a great extent – like revising Moldova’s agreement with the European Union, to the detriment of better relations with Europe. In Brussels, he proposed to revise the agreement and that Russia should be involved. He was told that the EU doesn’t discuss bilateral agreements with third parties. Without a doubt, it isn’t Moldova or the European Union that is interested in revising the agreement. Russia is.
“Igor Dodon’s second task also meets Russia’s interests. I mean resolving the conflict of Transnistria by federalizing Moldova, based on the Kozak Memorandum [proposal for a united asymmetric federal Moldovan state, promoted in 2003 by the Russian politician, Dmitry Kozak, close ally of Vladimir Putin and one of the key figures in his presidential team. – Ed.] that was ultimately rejected by Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. The document read that Moldova should become a federation including Transnistria, Gagauzia, and the rest of the territory, with a bicameral parliament. Any decisions made by the Lower House could be blocked by the Upper House (e.g., Gagauzia and Transnistria) if found to be to the detriment of their interests. Considering that both these regions are pro-Russian, it is easy to guess whose interests they would serve or defend. Russia may well try to use the Kozak scenario as an example in settling the Donbas conflict.
“If the Transnistrian issue is settled using an upgraded Kozak scenario – considering that Igor Dodon reiterated in his campaign speeches that he would settle the issue by federalizing Moldova – Russia is most likely to insist on a formula that will allow it to keep its military presence there. This would mean Russia’s political and military buildup in Moldova and in Eastern Europe, close to Ukraine’s southeastern border and Romania’s eastern frontier.
“To carry out this action plan, Igor Dodon needs a controlled majority in parliament. He doesn’t have it, but recent polls indicate that he may have it after the scheduled (2018) or early (2017) parliamentary elections. There is an active public discussion of an electoral reform in Moldova that could throw a big monkey wrench into the works of a Dodon-party-run majority in parliament. If formed the way it is proposed, it would help consolidate the current regime. The latter would be of little help in building a state ruled by law the European way. All things considered, Igor Dodon wouldn’t mind making a deal with the Kremlin, with regard to issues that are of special interest to him.”
