Here The Day discusses the Verkhovna Rada’s criteria of professionalism, effectiveness, relations between the political elite and electorate, prospects of the political reform, the 2004 “ideal candidate,” etc., with Oleksandr KRYVOSHEYENKO, president of the Political Marketing Center (former director of the Youth Parliament Analysis Center of Ukraine).
How do you believe the parliament’s professionalism and Verkhovna Rada’s effectiveness can be assessed? By the number of bills submitted, the time every member speaks from the rostrum, percentage of those with a post-secondary education, and so on?
The parliament’s key function as the supreme legislative body is to coordinate and implement the interests of various social communities in making legislative decisions and exercising control over the executive. Considering that these interests are often quite controversial, the work of Verkhovna Rada must have not only a legislative but also a political character. This means that it should not just pass bills, but also — and above all — make balanced political decisions. It is another thing that such decisions must be given adequate legislative embodiment. Accordingly, the quality of the political and administrative decisions made by the parliament is the main indicator of its effectiveness. This is manifest in such simple and easily understandable things as the well-being of most citizens, easing social tensions, but not in the passing of dozens of bills at once — of which lawmakers boast from time to time. Quantity is also important, of course, but sometimes it’s better fewer but better (allusion to one of Lenin’s last works — Ed.).
Does the political elite consider the so-called voice of the people when making socially important decisions?
The model of state administration that exists in Ukraine, representative democracy, envisions the delegation of power to those wielding power by the people. In other words, under the Constitution, the people has the right to exercise power through those we know as delegates. In reality, power is in the hands of a small group, the so- called clannish elite, whereas the majority of the population is less capable of influencing the decision-making process than in the developed democracies. At the same time, the power elite can’t be blamed for everything. There is a formula that tries to embrace the essence of the relationship between society and the powers that be. It says that society has its pressing problems solved to the extent to which that society makes its government solve them. Unfortunately, most people in Ukraine believe that their participation in the formation of the political system and deciding their own destinies is reduced to voting. On the one hand, this attitude can be explained by the absence in the Ukrainian mentality of the objective of defending one’s right to a better life (among other things, because of historical circumstances) in people’s relationships with the regime and in monitoring it. The masses, lacking organization, are interested in doing so but are often unable to understand this. Those we call the Ukrainian elite today really enjoy such a status only from the standpoint of their functional characteristics. In other words, these people actually wield power and influence administrative decision-making. However, it is often hard to view them as an elite in terms of their value, as “the best of the best,” the worthiest representatives of society determined to carry out their duty to their people.
Will political reform change the situation?
Political reform, in principle, is capable of stepping up positive sociopolitical changes, depending upon its character. The entire period of Ukraine’s independent history has been marked by the struggle between the president and parliament for power. The 1996 Constitution allows a degree of flexibility in interpreting some of its clauses (at the time of enactment it was the best possible compromise that could be reached by the key political players). In particular, it is a balanced mechanism of political responsibility, something we don’t have and something I regard as a substantial argument in favor of political reform.
Many in the opposition would very much dislike any reduction in the president’s authority today, while those in power are not overly enthusiastic about the political reform either.
I wouldn’t describe people like Yushchenko as opposition. After all, he doesn’t seem to consider himself in opposition. We are talking about the so- called radical opposition, mainly the Socialists and Communists (although people currently with Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine were among the authors of the bill on amendments to the constitution). The Socialists and Communists haven’t stood, nor are they likely to stand a chance of their candidate winning the presidency. So reducing presidential powers would play into their hands, for this would increase their influence in the parliament. At this stage of struggle against the president they simply have no other opportunity to weaken his influence except by limiting presidential powers in Ukraine.
You have mentioned only the Socialists and Communists — does it mean that no one else is interested in the political reform?
A lot of others are interested, yet each has his own objective in mind and thus his own concept. I think that political reform will largely depend on the key candidate from the presidential camp, as well as on the scenario the regime will try to play out during the election campaign. For the time being, those in power, led by the president, have made sufficiently clear the parameters of the political reform as they see it. In other words, by showing initiative, the regime has set the rules of the games for all the other players to observe. Now burying the political reform under verbiage and otherwise soft-pedaling it will be difficult. The question is what kind of model will it use. There is no doubt that this model will reflect a compromise achieved between those in power and in opposition. We can catch a glimpse of this scenario even now. For example, parliament has once again rejected the proportional representation election bill, and this has a most direct bearing on changes in the Constitution and, consequently, the political reform. I think the lawmakers would act differently if we had a single candidate representing those currently in power.
Could the Communists once again become good sparring partners, this time for the leader of Our Ukraine, now in semiopposition?
I have repeatedly stressed that a single opposition candidate is highly questionable. We have no reason to discuss an opposition alliance neither ideologically nor institutionally. The opposition leaders are busy bargaining and see no option to joint participation in which they would receive the dividends they desire. I am convinced — and this is proven by Symonenko’s and Yushchenko’s statements — that the Communists and Our Ukraine will come out with their own candidates. Actually, I think the main intrigue of the presidential campaign will be the candidate receiving Communist support. This is ha rd to predict at this stage.
Another aspect of this intrigue is how well Our Ukraine, the Socialists, and Tymoshenko bloc will cooperate. I would not rule out the possibility of Tymoshenko and Moroz backing Yushchenko, but I definitely rule out the possibility of Yushchenko backing either. In fact, Moroz and Tymoshenko might form an alliance of sorts, but twenty months before the election they are not likely to make their stance clear, otherwise each will be sure to lose part of their electorate as a presidential candidate. This will accordingly reduce their weight in the course of negotiations and the resulting gross dividends.
Politicians will play their respective roles in the context of the future elections. What kind of play do you think the electorate would prefer? How can one win over the electorate in 2004?
In the last presidential campaign, the candidates bet on the citizen’s paternalistic yearnings (for a “strong hand” and moral politics). I believe that this attitude hasn’t changed much since 1999. I also think that another strong factor will be such traits in the candidate as stability, consistency, predictability, and political responsibility. While the I’m-an-honest-man-but-achieved-nothing-because-they-twisted-my-arm approach was passable in the previous election campaign, it won’t do in the next one. The electorate will want to see candidates that have achieved something politically, not just things they will have invented four months before election day. I think the voters will show more maturity in choosing.
COMMENT
According to what criteria can we evaluate the effectiveness of Ukraine’ s parliament?
Andriy YERMOLAYEV, director of the Sophia Center for Social Research:
“In any case, one should look for these criteria in the sphere of the legislative process. All the rest are various public relations mechanisms for certain deputies and political groups. I believe the foremost criteria for measuring the parliament’s effectiveness is how justified and effective are the laws it adopts. However, the results of Verkhovna Rada’s work are often judged by formal criteria like how many laws were passed in a certain period, etc. This is only the formal side of the issue. I believe an integrated criterion would be more effective though simultaneously more complicated. By this I mean creating ways to monitor every law passed by Verkhovna Rada in terms of its influence on the budget, solving systemic social problems, etc. This would make it possible to evaluate the practical, economic, and social effectiveness of the new laws. In this connection we have a corollary: the ability of Verkhovna Rada to quickly and systematically solve the conflicts arising in the course of the legislative process itself. Graphic illustration of this criterion is the problem of legal codification. The fact that during such a long period the legislators proved unable to settle all the differences and versions existing in the framework of the legislative process is evidence of their ineffectiveness. Whether or not this is connected with lobbying or just a lack of professionalism is another question.”
Viktor RYBACHENKO, vice president of Ukraine’s Association of Political Psychologists:
“Summing up the results of the Verkhovna Rada sessions involved the laws it considered and adopted. This, so to speak, is a legislative criterion. However, when we talk about society’s attitude toward the parliament, the problem of people’s trust for Verkhovna Rada comes to the fore. The reasons for a lack of such trust should be sought in the dearth of bills able to make people’s life easier. The level of trust in the country’s legislative body cannot, of course, be measured by the number of laws considered. Another component of legislative work, the political one, comes into force here. This is why I believe that the criterion for the effectiveness of the parliament should be dual one: on the one hand, the quality and quantity of laws passed, on the other, Verkhovna Rada’s activities as a political institution (addressing pressing, strategic, and fundamental social issues).”
