For various reasons, the ongoing substantive reform of Ukraine’s electoral system deserves public scrutiny.
First, the overhaul of the country’s election system, by its nature and consequences, is one of the major tools for reforming Ukraine’s political system. In many ways, it is equivalent to constitutional reform for it defines the procedure for forming the country’s top representative and legislative body, thus impacting on the political system as a whole. Recall that each past parliamentary election after Ukraine became independent was held under a different electoral system. But the stability of political order is as important as that of the economic and legal systems.
Second, the election system has a major impact on the balance and alignment in the legislature of the interests of various social groups. Thus, proportional representation is good for ideology-based interests expressed by political parties and coalitions, while the majoritarian system makes it possible to represent (with certain reservations as to how effectively) the interests of voters residing in individual areas (electoral districts).
Third, the election system molds the relationships between voters and lawmakers. Under the majority system, voters elect a person who will represent them in an appropriate body by direct vote, while under the proportional system political parties and election blocs act as intermediaries between the voters and candidates.
Four, the nature and specifics of the electoral system has a major effect on the alignment of political parties in the legislature. Had Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada been elected under the proportional system and not the then mixed one in 1998, the Communists would have won 169 seats, the bloc of the Socialist and Peasant Parti e s 59, or 228 seats in total, thus creating a leftist majority.
Why, then, did Ukraine’s Solons vote for the proportional system, indeed?
The simple and quite comprehensive answer is because the proportional system favors political parties, primarily the old timers known to voters and having a stable base of support. Since over two-thirds of Ukraine’s lawmakers are members of political parties, it is no surprise that the proportional system gathered so much support in Verkhovna Rada.
In addition, proportional representation motivates the political elite to seek party affiliation, while many political, administrative, and entrepreneurial heavyweights tend to be reluctant to jump on any party’s bandwagon. Indeed, under the majority system candidates can win seats in the legislature without declaring their political and ideological preferences, while under the proportional system they are actually left with no choice, with the road to Verkhovna Rada open only for those who join one party or another. In turn, party affiliation of the political elite will make it possible to structure Verkhovna Rada, shaping clearly the majority and the opposition. And the parties’ new strengthened roles will bring us closer to the standards of liberal democracy. In a democracy, the legislative and the executive branches are staffed by the representatives of the party which won in the battle for voters with other parties.
Not only the political elite but also the public will be encouraged to align with political parties as a result of the proportional system. At any rate, when citizens are faced with various party election lists of candidates they will have to make their own political choices.
All these are general arguments in favor of the proportional system. But the system’s supporters in the Verkhovna Rada were also driven by specific political reasons, which stemmed from not so much the advantages of the proportional system as from the majority system’s disadvantages. Clearly, for a political party it is cheaper and easier to run a national election campaign than vie for the votes in a couple of hundred of separate majority constituencies. Another important factor is that the majority system allows for a broad use of administrative and financial resources. Conversely, under the proportional system, these factors lose much of their importance, its supporters argue.
Finally, one should take into account the political situation under which the new election law was enacted. In the wake of the fiasco of President Kuchma’s try to get constitutional amendments enacted by Verkhovna Rada and the rift in the parliamentary majority, the new election law was backed primarily by either Kuchma’s avowed or hidden opponents. If the next elections to the Verkhovna Rada are held under the proportional system, this may lead to the emergence of a broad Ukraine Without Kuchma bloc which can not only clear the 4% threshold set for political parties to get into parliament but also substantially change the alignment of political forces there.
It is quite clear that the proportional election system, or rather the political repercussions of its implementation, is not exactly in President Kuchma’s interest, and he might not be alone. Let us examine whether what this system’s supporters expect will come true.
Certain conclusions, not mere guesswork, can be made even now. The concept of proportional representation has already undergone field testing in Ukraine within the framework of the mixed election system. Moreover, there is the experience of foreign countries, which should be taken into consideration.
When the mixed system was being enacted, one of the arguments in favor was that it would enhance our parliament’s political structuring. True, the political structure of Ukraine’s third parliament became clearer but not only due to the new election system. Under the decision by Verkhovna Rada, only parties that cleared the 4% hurdle could elect deputies from their party lists. As a result, 90% of the legislators elected to parliament joined the eight caucuses of parties that had won on nationwide party tickets. By contrast, the abrogation by the Constitutional Court on December 9, 1998 of the parliament’s decision allowing the formation of caucuses only by those political parties that cleared the 4% barrier has led to visible changes and fragmentation of Ukraine’s parliamentary political structure.
Of the thirteen caucuses and deputy groups currently existing in Verkhovna Rada, seven surfaced already after the 1998 elections. Of the eight caucuses formed in the aftermath of the elections by political parties and election blocs, two (Hromada and the Progressive Socialists) were dissolved, two (the People’s Movement of Ukraine and the Socialists and Farmers bloc) split, and others, except the Communists, suffered large qualitative and quantitative changes, with 10-25% of lawmakers jumping their caucuses to join other groups at each subsequent session of parliament. Consequently, the proportional representation system alone cannot ensure parliament a proper political structure. The latter will have to be constructed after the election using a number of means. One could be the introduction of an imperative party mandate for lawmakers such that they lose their seats if they change their party affiliation.
Speaking of parliament’s political structuring, one should bear in mind that the proportional system intensifies the ideological polarization of legislators. The balance of political and ideological preferences among the Ukrainian electorate is such that the majority (be it Left or Right) will never have a considerable superiority over the opposition. Let us recall the so-called Speaker saga when Oleksandr Tkachenko refused to step down as speaker and parliament for over a month could not garner enough support to dismiss him. Such a scenario can be repeated in the next election, with hardly any changes in the Constitution possible then. Under such circumstances, any situational majority would seem to be a blessing.
Another problem is related to the role of political parties in forming a government. At present, majority legislators act primarily as lobbyists, while the parties represented in Verkhovna Rada are apparently after more tangible rewards. The emergence of a natural majority, not the virtually shotgun-wedding one existing in the Ukrainian legislature now, will be possible only if the winning political parties join forces to form a coalition government. Clearly, the proportional system creates the political preconditions for a coalition multiparty cabinet.
Such a pattern, however, seems to be most effective under a parliamentary system. The one we have in Ukraine is a combined presidential-parliamentary system. Ukrainian lawmakers do not form the government; they only approve the prime minister. If the majority in the parliament is won by parties opposed to the president, this almost inevitably leads to a political crisis. In the view of such leading Western political scientists as Arend Leaphart, Scott Mainwering, Juan Lins, and Michael Wallerstein, the combination of the proportional system with the presidential rule of the government is least desirable for any political entity, causing the emergence of weak, unstable, and ineffectual political regimes like those currently existing in most Latin American states.
Another controversial political and legal issue is that under the parliamentary system of government ministers can retain their seats in parliament mandates, but the Ukrainian Constitution bans such political double dipping. To illustrate, imagine a situation such that a party with a narrow parliamentary majority would delegate its representatives to sit in the government and lose its numerical supremacy over the opposition.
As for the use of administrative resources (the use by those in power within the state apparat and facilities), the proportional system unfortunately is as vulnerable as the majority one. Suffice it to recall the Hromada’s impressive election score when it got the lion’s share of its votes specifically in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Why? Because the oblast’s uncrowned king cum oblast council chairman was none other than Pavlo Lazarenko, the leader of Hromada. In any case, attempts to rig elections by using the administrative resource can be effectively curbed only by broad and close monitoring of the course of the elections and the tallying of ballots, not by radically changing the election system.
The scope of a newspaper article does not make it possible to name some other reasons why the proportional election system should not be introduced given the current political situation. The issue is not that this system is bad for the Ukrainian political environment. It is that changes in the election system, or constitutional order, economic laws, etc. should not be the result of political fluctuations, emotional outbursts or tactical maneuvering against political opponents.
