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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

Thinking about Russia’s historical development

16 June, 2009 - 00:00

Before the national holiday of our neighbors — Russia Day — we asked our readers and The Day’s experts the question: What kind of Russia do we love? Even though trouble-free periods have been far and few between in the Ukraine–Russia relations, we have been always convinced that only by setting aside all the biases and double standards can we learn to listen, hear, and thus have constructive and friendly dialogue without which we cannot move on.

It is especially important to have this kind of dialogue now. The situation has reached boiling point as can be seen from the mail we receive, in particular the articles by the two authors in The Day’s current issue. Without underestimating all the good things in our common history and culture, however we can not ignore new troubling symptoms.

Valerii Chaly, deputy director general of the Razumkov Center, told The Day: “There exists quite a dangerous tendency in that the perception of Ukraine in Russia is fairly negative. The information is presented in one-sided way through the main TV channels, making Ukraine appear as a not-so-friendly state in Russia. The Ukrainian mass media have followed suit and have been emphasizing problems.

“I believe that it is an absolutely wrong approach. The sooner politicians and statesmen in both countries understand how unacceptable it is, the better effect it will have on the relations between our countries in the future. It is time to focus on the issues that will make the cooperation between the two counties possible and work out a common approach to them. These are the issues of cooperation in the sphere of economy and energy, cooperation in market segments where we do not compete with each other and can join our efforts to enter foreign markets.

“We have to analyze our agenda and work out a new algorithm for cooperation, situation analysis, and suggestions about solving crisis problems in order to set up partnership relations. We have to understand that our relations are strategic in nature. Stability and security in Europe largely depend on how Ukraine and Russia will build their relations.

“Very important in our relations is the emphasis on the relationships between our nations. This kind of relationships has a wider meaning than only the relationships between presidents or heads of parliament. We cannot avoid discussing questions about history and historical memory. This part of agenda should be left to historians, while politicians and statesmen have to think about the future of both countries. There is no doubt that the future will be defined by our nations. There is no doubt that we will be building mutually beneficial and constructive relationships between our countries based on several understandings. First, we have to understand that each country is acting according to its national interests. Second, we are two independent countries. Third, we will always be together as partners, and this is, in fact, the guarantee that politicians will not take us away from the strategic partnership line through some unnatural measures.”

SELF-CELEBRATION

Russia Day is the official name of the main state holiday of the Russian Federation. Strangely, a short time after it was introduced the ruling elite in Moscow and its propaganda apparatus made every effort to remove its short history from the citizens’ memory. Why? The answer is more than obvious in the context of the state (and in particular foreign) policy carried out by Russia.

Should we remind Russians about the holiday’s name origin? Initially, it had a different name—Russia Independence Day. One wondered: Independence from whom? From a country that was common for all at some point in time, ideological details aside? Pardon me, but why then are there some people in Moscow who cannot accept the same status of independent Ukraine, which was the second largest Soviet republic in terms of population and economy? One doesn’t have to go far to see this. It is sufficient to look at the content and the tone of programs on the Russian state TV channels’ coverage of events in Ukraine.

Take, for example, the stand adopted by the Russian mass media on the recent gas issue. The declaration about modernizing Ukraine’s gas transportation system, which was signed on March 23 between Ukraine (rightful owner) and the European Union (contractor), was to Russia (a third party which has no rights regarding the operation according to the market laws) as a red rag to a bull. Russian officials said: How come they did not offer us a share even though it is our gas that is being transmitted through the pipelines? In reply we can say: and so what? Today your gas is being transported, but tomorrow the market situation can change and it may be replaced with gas coming from elsewhere. The pipelines, though, have been and will remain the property of the sovereign Ukrainian state. So maybe it is the independent international position of Ukraine, rather than the gas or the pipelines, that irritates the Kremlin, causing its largely inadequate reaction?

That is why any mention of Russia’s independence in this context can cause independently thinking Russians to ask their authorities very awkward questions, which the latter are not so willing to answer. And it is not only about Ukraine— in the relations with virtually all of its close neighbors Russia is practicing the kind of policies that would fit the 19th century at best. One obvious example is the situation with Georgia: Russia, which positions itself as a democratic state, essentially annexed part of Georgia’s territory. Another example is Belarus, a country Russia until recently has called its main (and nearly the only) alley in entire Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And what do we see today?

On a recent visit to Minsk Putin’s deputy in the Cabinet and the minister of finance, Alexei Kudrin, commented on the $500-million loan to Belarus. This loan has long been agreed upon but Russia has not carried it out yet. He accused the partner state of feeding off Russia and dropped a broad hint that the decision about the loan will depend on Belarus’ economic policy. How do you like this? There can be different opinions on the present situation in Belarus, but Russia’s or its minister of finance are not well-placed to teach others what their economic policy should be.

Let us have a look at the figures that are known, hopefully, to both Russia’s minister of finance and his immediate boss—Putin. According to the official data provided by Russia’s Ministry for Economic Development, Russia’s GDP dropped 9.8 percent in the first four months of this year, while Belarus saw a 1.2-percent increase in the same period. So what were you saying about efficiency of economic policy, Mr. Kudrin? How can anyone dare teach others something he himself fails to do?

Here are other figures, this time directly relevant for Kudrin’s ministry. Hopefully, Russia’s minister of finance is familiar with the message on the State Budget delivered by President Dmitry Medvedev before the meeting in Minsk. It said in no vague terms that Russia’s federal budget deficit of Russia will be equal to seven percent of its GDP, which is no small figure. And here we have the same kind of data on Belarus. This data is provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is published in the Belarusian oppositional newspaper Belgazeta (incidentally, it is published in Belarus and is sold freely in kiosks in Minsk, which is usually not the case with the same kind of press in Moscow). Here we can read: “The IMF expects that the 2009 budget of Belarus will be deficit-free. A one-percent budget deficit of the country’s GDP is permissible in 2010.” So which economic policy is healthier?

However, the mass media in Belarus do not take liberty to give shallow assessments of the economy of Russia and other neighboring countries. Maybe that is why Belarus and Ukraine, despite the difference in their approaches to a series of international and other problems, have normal, politically friendly, and economically beneficial relations.

Now let us get back to Russia and its main state holiday. A question arises: if you, gentlemen in the Kremlin, are treating your ‘main partner’ like this, what should others expect from you then? Who will trust you? This question correlates with Russia’s policy. Although it has designated itself “a new state” in the past decade, it has plunged itself into its imperialist past. Facts? There is an abundance of them—suffice it to watch Russia’s state television. The past tsars or their subordinates increasingly often appear in many programs, and these are the tsars that are infamous for their cruelty, suppression of democratic liberties, or sheer stupidity.

The apologetics of tsarist Russia sometimes verges on absurdity when the most obvious and widely known facts are ignored. For example, the main state TV channel, Russia, is singing odes to the defense industry of the Russian Empire. If you lend an ear, you would have to believe that before the First World War Russia’s plants were producing the best sorts of steel and nearly the most advanced weapons. One is left to wonder, however, how, given this advantage, tsarist Russia failed to win the war within the first couple of months. The facts, though, are stubborn things: according to a Russian source, until 1914 Russia’s army did not have a single (!) heavy cannon that was up to the standard of the day.

It is small wonder that after the initial offensive on the Eastern Front in mid-1915 the German artillery fire completely destroyed nearly all points of resistance in the Russian Empire’s western fortresses. They surrendered after heavy fire and without a fight because of the enemy’s overwhelming fire superiority. The contemporary TV viewers are “spared” these details, just like they don’t hear that after the Germans’ initial offensive Russian generals surrendered northwestern Ukraine, all of Belarus west of Minsk, and half of the Baltic region all the way to Riga.

Tsarist Russia’s complete unpreparedness began to show by the end of 1914, the first year of the war. P. Miliukov, leader of the Cadets’ Party, who represented the State Duma on one of the joint commissions with the government and the General Staff, learned the situation with the weapons in the army and, horrified, yelled in the Duma: “Where are the guns? Why don’t we have enough guns on the front?” It is not surprising that after only a short while Nicholas II was disowned and cursed in the Revolution of February 1917 not only by the army, which was dying in the marshes, but virtually all of Russia, including the biggest capitalists and even top nobility.

Apart from its military “accomplishments,” the last tsar did a lot of damage on other fronts. He supported the ban introduced by his reactionary father, Tsar Alexander III, under which one was not allowed to speak Ukrainian or Polish in public places under the threat of criminal punishment. Then there was the antidemocratic law on elections to the State Duma, passed after a de facto coup of June 3, 1907. The law cut the representation of Ukraine, Poland, and the Caucasus in the Duma, while the Asian regions were stripped of the right to delegate their deputies. There were also many other things that people who claim to be “democrats” would be ashamed to even think about.

Unfortunately, Russia’s current government is not at all ashamed. Premier Putin recently visited the Don Monastery in Russia and laid flowers on the tombstones of General Anton Denikin and General Vladimir Kappel, philosopher Ivan Ilyin, and writer Ivan Shmelev, whose remains were recently returned to Russia. The prime minister is an official person, second in rank only to the president in Russia’s federal government, so a question is in place: Why was he so selective and one-sided in his choice? Is he troubled by, say, Ilyin’s links to the Nazis, which were reported by the mass media? How about the mass repressions of the civilians perpetrated by General Denikin in Ukraine and by General Kappel in the Siberia, all in the name of the mythical “one and indivisible” Russian Empire,” which no longer existed at the time?

These facts do not seem to perturb Putin. Largely because of this Russia celebrates this holiday, which has changed its official name a number of times and which, with the country way in the past, can be called nothing else than self-celebration.

Oleg Cherkovets holds a Ph.D. in history and lives in Moscow

By Oleg CHERKOVETS
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