Borys TARASIUK, director, Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation:
1. There will be a consensus in society about Ukraine’s membership in NATO. On the other hand, a public opinion poll recently conducted by the Razumkov Center, shows that 53.7% of Ukrainians favor this country’s NATO membership. If you take Slovakia, an official candidate for North Atlantic alliance membership, only about 40% of the population support this move.
Simultaneously, the main function in any state is performed by the political elite which bears responsibility for strategic decision-making with respect to societal development.
Speaking of the Ukrainian strata in power, especially the executive power structure, there is no consensus on this matter because the state leadership pursues an inconsistent policy on this question.
This inconsistency can be illustrated, for example, by the fact that in the summer of 2000 the Euro-Atlantic element vanished from the vocabulary of Ukrainian executive branch representatives. Only at the beginning of this year did it reappear.
As to the attitude of Ukrainian political elites, the Razumkov Center survey shows that up to 70% of experts favor Ukraine joining NATO.
Now about the legislative branch of power: if you compare the present and the previous lineups in Verkhovna Rada, you can expect now a more favorable attitude toward prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO.
2. As to the most suitable model of Ukraine-NATO relations, their evolution has thus far confirmed that the chosen approaches are right. We have now come to a point when we must set ourselves clear priorities and strategic goals.
But when Ukrainian leadership representatives claim they are prepared to go in their relationship with NATO as far as the alliance itself is, and this is an attempt to avoid making political decisions.
As Ukraine is a European country, it must act the way other Central and Eastern European states do, integrating in the common European and common security space.
It must be admitted that each stage of Ukrainian independence has seen a model of relationship with NATO that was the most suitable one at the time.
3. Here one must look back a little and admit that, historically, it is Ukraine that initiated the development of relations with NATO. In particular, the document known as Special Partnership Charter was drafted before the Russia-NATO document was. NATO signed the latter document before it did the Charter out of tactical considerations.
We must understand the reasons why NATO did so and we should not expect Ukraine to be granted the same status with respect to the alliance as Russia enjoys now because Ukraine is not of the same weight as the Russian Federation.
The level of Ukraine-NATO relations has always been higher than that of NATO-Russia relations. We should not compare these now because what NATO offers Russia is a status that conforms to it as a nuclear state.
4. There is a need for a debate on the prospects of relations between Ukraine and NATO. I am personally prepared for one. The institute I head has conducted a series of roundtable discussions in the regions so that the regional political, academic, and journalist elites could grasp the essence of the relations we now maintain with NATO and better understand the advantages and disadvantages of Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO.
Heorhy KRIUCHKOV, Communist Party of Ukraine:
1. There is no common opinion on this in society today. And all polls have shown that most citizens oppose Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Quite probably, this opinion will change in case NATO transforms into a Europe- wide collective security military- political alliance. But now the negative attitude toward NATO can be explained by several factors. One of them is the military nature of this organization. Besides, the delicate question of NATO membership is associated with a reduced relationship with Russia, a thing that the absolute majority of the Ukrainian people reject.
Given very strong anti-NATO sentiments in society, the leadership does not make public, for some reason, its program of strategic partnership with NATO. If something is being concealed, this will only reinforce the negative public attitude. Only openness, honesty, and objectivity will impel the public to reach a consensus on this matter.
2. What could become the most suitable formula for such relations is turning NATO from a military alliance of a limited number of states into a pan-European system of collective security. Besides, Ukraine could have the right to vote in this group, in contrast to the current paradigm of relations (when Ukraine, as a strategic partner, cooperates with but has no right to vote in NATO). This would also be quite essential. And one more thing: if all states of Europe joined this kind of an alliance, this would really be the guarantee of peace, security, and equitable cooperation. Besides, I think this transformation would put an end to the partition of Europe.
3. I do not think the ongoing transformations in Russia present any danger for Ukraine. Quite the contrary. This rapprochement cancels the existing confrontation between NATO and Russia. So the steps being taken by NATO and the political leadership of Russia in fact undermine the anti-Russian component which has always existed in NATO. This will in turn stabilize relations between NATO and Russia, which Ukraine will only gain from. For the confrontation of these two forces, which regard Ukraine in a geopolitical context favorable to them only, is dangerous for us. So the less confrontation of this kind, the better for Ukraine.
4. Mapping out foreign and domestic policies is the exclusive preserve of Ukraine’s legislative branch. But if Verkhovna Rada puts off the discussion of these matters, what kind of a nationwide debate can there be? I think we must first solve this problem and only then speak about a debate on the level of society.
