A rather controversial situation had taken shape in the course of the political situation after April 8. Allegations that the reform of the political system has failed do not reflect the entire reality. To be precise, this reform has stopped halfway. Verkhovna Rada has decided to introduce a proportional representation system at the central and local legislative level, but the relations between the president, parliament, and cabinet remain the same.
Some regard this as the best possible outcome of the political reform. The opposition’s cherished dream has come true; from now on, people’s deputies will be elected to parliament and local councils on a proportional basis. Only two years ago, this would have appeared completely unrealistic. The proportional system is expected to markedly reduce the effect of the so-called administrative resource. Without doubt, the left and right parties and blocs now stand a fair chance of substantially expanding their presence in parliament and local self-government bodies. In 2002, they received the absolute majority of mandates from the national constituency.
The non-left opposition appears to benefit from the failure of the political reform. A representative of the right camp is considered a favorite of the coming presidential race. Accordingly, the possibility of limiting the presidential powers and strengthening the cabinet’s role is regarded there as an attempt to steal their victory. Such suspicions have a point, of course, but no one can rule out the possibility of someone else becoming the next head of state, like Viktor Yanukovych.
However, the current situation with the political reform should not be considered in terms of benefits for certain parties or presidential candidates, but from its ability to further democratize the political system and overcome its current divisions. Discussing the political reform, one must bear in mind that the subject is the system, and that its elements (institutions) should conform to each other.
The proportional electoral system is practiced in a number of European countries and is adequate to the parliamentary, presidential, and premier’s elections. Simultaneously, studies and opinions of noted Western analysts (Arendt Leiphart, Juan Linz) point to the Latin American model, combining presidential rule with a proportional electoral system, as the worst there is (as weak, unstable, and ineffective).
Three years ago, The Day wrote about the hazards of an eclectic, unsystematic approach to the political reform. Unfortunately, precisely this option is being implemented.
What we have is perhaps the worst possible version of the proportional electoral system. Elections of people’s deputies only within the national constituency will result in a sharp reduction of regional representation in parliament. On the other hand, closed electoral rolls (with the voters having to cast their ballots for parties or blocks rather than individual candidates) threatens to depersonalize the political choice and provide favorable conditions for that “iron law of the oligarchicization of political parties” that has been effective since the early twentieth century, so that the electorate’s choice will be programmed from the outset and then edited by the political leadership (and sponsors).
The proportional electoral system will facilitate — albeit artificially, in many respects — the strengthening of the role of political parties, especially with regard to elective authorities. However, if the president remains in a position to form the cabinet and local state administrations, the parties will remain politically impotent, so that no proportional procedures will help them cure this ailment. At best, they will serve as construction material when building a pro-presidential parliamentary majority. At worst, there will be another war between the head of state and an antagonized parliament. Considering the ideologically polarized and fragmented party system of Ukraine, the second scenario appears most likely.
Yet this author would not be surprised to witness the appearance of a draft political reform soon, providing for a stronger presidency while preserving the proportional electoral system. This option could be proposed by either presumptuous ignoramuses or by irresponsible adventurists. Alas, there are enough of both in the Ukrainian political community.
Conflicts between the branches of power, resulting from the institution of the proportional system, will most likely commence at the local level. City mayors, elected directly, more often than not turn out party-unaffiliated, whereas city councils will be formed based on an exclusively party principle. Local self-government authorities could thus turn into political battlefields and “local presidents” (city mayors) could face hostilities started by party coalitions. Such conflicts happen even now, but after the enactment of the proportional system they might become a routine occurrence.
The inference is obvious. When renovating a large architectural project, certain engineering rules must be observed. The same applies to the political reform. Otherwise the structure will run cracks, or it will collapse. This is a fact and it should be remembered even in the heat of political combat.
The current political reform is incomplete, and it can only worsen the political system of Ukraine, which is anything but perfect. After saying A, you are supposed to say B. It is necessary to constitutionally — or at least legislatively — reaffirm the principle government being formed by the parliamentary coalition. When this principle takes effect (after the presidential or parliamentary elections) is another matter, subject to coordination among the interested parties. It is important to secure the complex nature of political transformations. A similar systematic approach should be demonstrated toward local self-government. A democratic reform of the Ukrainian political system is an objective social necessity. That is precisely why this reform must not fall prey to various power play technologies, even less so petty politicking, or narrow-party egotism within the coalition.
