Ukraine is a sovereign state, so everything that is happening and will happen in Ukraine largely depends on the Ukrainian people’s will and those elected by that people to govern that country. There are two issues, however, that may have a tangible impact on the course of events in other countries, depending on the way they are resolved: Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk territories occupied by Russia. The United States will have presidential and Russia parliamentary elections this year. I believe that both events will affect the status of these occupied territories, each in its own way, even though many still fail to see this interconnection.
The interconnection between the continuation or cessation of Russia’s aggression and US presidential elections is the easiest to trace. If Donald Trump wins the race (I still believe he won’t, but there is no way to rule out the possibility), Putin’s aggressive policy will receive a fresh impetus. Reuters has quoted Trump as saying, once again, that, as the next president, he will improve relations with Russia. He thinks highly of Putin as a political leader and that “I think I would have a very, very good relationship with Putin. And I think I would have a very, very good relationship with Russia…”
Unlike President Barack Obama, who said last Monday, at the close of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, that he’d made clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that until the Minsk ceasefire for Ukraine was implemented, sanctions on Russia would remain, Donald Trump most likely wouldn’t adopt this attitude. He believes that good relationships with Putin could be secured only by lifting sanctions and letting him get away with the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas.
This would considerably worsen the situation in Ukraine. After receiving this support, Putin might step up the military aggression. Sanctions are having their effect, slowly but surely, to the accompaniment of hysterical threats to use Iskander and Topol nuclear systems on Russian television. They are changing the economic situation in Russia and moods of the ruling elite, providing preconditions for changing the regime. Let me stress, however, that sanctions will not suffice to replace this regime, although they do provide important prerequisites.
Kommersant carried analyst Vadim Visloguzov’s article entitled “Finance Ministry Prints a Second Trillion [Rubles]” (on September 7, 2016). It reads that Russia’s Reserve Fund may be exhausted this year, and that in 2017 the Kremlin will have to start spending the second sovereign National Welfare Fund that amounts to $72.7 billion. At this rate, it will be exhausted by 2018. No one at the Kremlin knows what will happen then. Their strategy is best summed up: let’s have a good time today and we’ll think of something tomorrow.
The Russian independent Channel Dozhd’s interview with Vladimir Yevtushenkov, CEO of the Sistema Russian conglomerate company, is proof of the changing moods among the Russian oligarchs. Being one of the richest men in Russia, he said, in part: “Previously, we dreamed of expanding on an international scale, conquering new markets in America, Asia, the Philippines, India, China, but today all these plans have shriveled up somehow.” The way the moods of businesspeople and all people in Russia will change over the next two years, when the Kremlin runs out of resources, when people feel the effect, will largely depend on who will offer Russia which alternative to Putinism.
To this end, the matter of parliamentary elections’ turnout in Russia (September 18, 2016) is very important – I mean the number of people who regard the annexation of Crimea, the aggression against Ukraine as a crime. Those Russian media that have retained a degree of pluralism are very emotionally discussing the subject. One of the main arguments of those loath to cast their votes is that doing so would legitimize the annexation of Crimea.
Personally, I find this argument very unconvincing. Out of the 14 parties taking part in the campaign, 12 are outspoken supporters of Putin and the occupation of Crimea, with just two – Yabloko and PARNAS – explicitly campaigning for the nullification of the State Duma’s unlawful decision to make Crimea and Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation, as well as for changing the political leadership. While respecting the law and Ukraine’s territorial integrity, neither Yabloko nor PARNAS is conducting propaganda in Crimea or Sevastopol, so calling on the members of these parties not to go to the polling stations seems strange – and I’m putting this mildly.
Here is what Grigory Yavlinsky told Echo of Moscow’s Svetlana Sorokina when asked about the Crimean issue (Spotlight talk show, August 30, 2016): “This [solving the problem of Crimea] should start with Russia admitting that it was done against the law, contrary to all agreements, all laws; against international law, contrary to all rules of international law.”
Yuri Kobaladze, the second talk show moderator, instantly interjected: “This will never happen!” Grigory Yavlinsky replied: “I think that’s exactly what will happen.”
Putin-supporting politicians and citizens of Russia are not the only ones convinced that Ukraine has lost Crimea and Sevastopol. Ukrainian patriots who are sincerely concerned about the destiny of their country share this conviction. Ukrainian rock star and public activist Oleh Skrypka told News One: “Crimea will never again become part of Ukraine. There is no such political will or desire in this country. There are no chances, really.”
Indeed, there are no chances, not for as long as Putin remains in power. The current Kremlin gang leader will never let Crimea go or stop the bloodshed in the east of Ukraine. It would be naive to expect the sanctions to make him act otherwise. These sanctions will never affect the quality of meals served in the Kremlin, just as the [Nazi] blockade of Leningrad never affected the delicious meals served for the Leningrad political leadership. The lowering living standard in Russia may cause rallies of protest and there is a chance of reflecting this protest at the State Duma after the September 18 elections.
It is impossible to replace regimes like the Putin one through elections. More often than not, they are replaced as a result of a total military defeat followed by enemy occupation. I hope that the readers of this column do not expect to see anyone attack, let alone occupy Russia with its nuclear arsenal. The Putin regime is sure to be eventually replaced in Russia, but this will happen due to a number of factors, after using all methods of pressure, ranging from sanctions that will cause social protest, because of the worsening economic situation, to the establishment of factions in the representative bodies of power, where such protest could be voiced politically, become alternatively legitimate, and in the event of crisis, be supported by some people in power, law enforcement, security, by people with unsullied records.
Creating this alternative legitimacy in regard to the Putin regime today would be the first step toward its liquidation – and thus toward the beginning of returning Crimea to Ukraine and stopping the bloodshed in the east of Ukraine.
