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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

Leonid KRAVCHUK: “The way out is to elect a parliament that we can fearlessly entrust with electing the president”

13 January, 2004 - 00:00

On January 10 Ukraine’s first President Leonid Kravchuk turned seventy. The Day could not miss this favorable opportunity to speak to such an illustrious bearer of political experience and a person who knows this country’s real modern history. Aged seventy, Leonid Kravchuk is still in an excellent intellectual and physical shape. His judgments are straightforward and always independent of the current political expediency.

“The first question is connected with your jubilee. Summing up the results on the eve of your seventieth birthday, what do you think are the main assets of your political biography?”

“Fate decreed that I had to address various problems at stages that were different both in time and politically. While holding a high Communist office, I think I made a significant attempt to democratize the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and make it an independent entity rather than a combat unit and integral part of the CPSU. I made quite an effort to this end, and that effort led to certain decisions: we managed to pass the declaration on the economic sovereignty of Ukraine while the latter was still under Communist rule, as well as to make amendments to the CPU statute. In other words, attempts were made and — I say this openly — they were connected with my active participation. Yet, I became convinced later that it was impossible to fully reform the CPU owing to its pattern of rigid centralization and complete subjugation to the authorities in Moscow.

“Then came the Declaration of Ukraine’s Political Sovereignty. I can say without exaggeration that the role I played in this was notable. This was a great step on our road to independence.

“Another significant event was the Act of Ukraine’s Political Independence which I proclaimed from the Verkhovna Rada rostrum on August 24, 1991, and which was voted for by a parliamentary constitutional majority. This resolution was finally endorsed on December 1, 1991, in a nationwide referendum. What happened in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha (forest and nature preserve in Belarus where the USSR was dissolved and CIS created — Ed.) was the decisive stage of our state’s road to independence.

“I consider these two dates — August 24 and December 1, 1991 — the summation of my life. Even if I had done nothing else, this would have been enough for me to feel happy and that my life had not been in vain. For I had taken into my own hands a young state and laid down the fundamentals of the life according to which it even now carries out its functions. Without false modesty anyone could be proud of this.”

“You once banned the Communist Party...”

“Yes, I signed the order of the Verkhovna Rada Presidium to ban the Communist Party.”

“This made the Communist nomenklatura declare you persona non grata. But now we are seeing things that don’t seem to quite make sense. The Communist Party of Ukraine is a coveted partner for both the government and the opposition. In Russia, incidentally, the Communist Party (CPRF) is just being ruined, although, in contrast to the CPU, the CPRF sometimes seems to be not just a statist but a chauvinistic party. In Ukraine, though, the Communists are occasionally wooed as a political partner. What is the secret of this evolution: from being banned to being a trump card in somebody’s hand?”

“The issue today is not the strategic decisions made at the dawn of Ukrainian independence. The Communist Party is now being used for tactical purposes, such as voting in favor of Constitutional amendments and other things that are important but not strategic questions. If we look at the long term, I am convinced that there can never be an alliance with the Communists, because the goals that the state has declared and those adopted in the CPU program are diametrically opposed. Now there is a competition for the Communist Party, while, on the other hand, Communists are trying to use this competition for their own — usually strategic — ends. In my view, this rivalry does not serve noble goals or, to be more exact, casts a shadow on the goals that certain political forces are trying to achieve at the expense of such alliances. It’s difficult to understand how the national patriots, who did and, judging by their declarations, still do consider the Communists their greatest enemy, could become their allies, while the Social Democrats have become their biggest enemy. How can this be explained if we try to look at this process from the standpoint of a strategy of political goals? I doubt that anybody can explain this. This is why I think that both the government and the national patriots are demonstrating their ignorance of the laws of objective development. Whoever puts short-term goals above strategic ones is not a politician but just someone who adapts to the political situation. Frankly speaking, I do not support the claims, including those of the Social Democrats, that the Left can be an ally or a front. This is unrealistic. Instead, I share the viewpoint that extremism — both right and left — is dangerous for Ukraine.”

At all times these are the two wings that have always complicated the political situation in any country. I hope that the attempts to use the Communist Party for tactical purposes will not strengthen this political force and eventually bring it back to power. Should this happen, it will be the fault of both those in power and the national patriots.”

“Have the Communists already demanded some payback for their political services and if so, what?”

“They will and already are doing so. When the ban on the Communist Party was referred to the Constitutional Court, I was present at the session and was surprised. All my attempts to explain these points to politicians and governmental officials were in vain, and I understood that this was something being done deliberately. Then the Constitutional Court did a strange thing: it applied an absolutely unacceptable principle, that a law can be applied retroactively. The court was assessing the 1991 decisions through the prism of the 1996 Constitution. I think that even then an attempt was being made to create the conditions for using the CPU in the struggle against the Right. But this is a very subtle game. And I fear that in this not everybody lost, but only one will win. I don’t want to comment on the CC ruling in this case: it’s final and not subject to appeal. But I do fear that later on the historical plane those who made that decision could be sorry.”

“Power in Russia has been concentrated to such an extent that it has raised the problem of how to make parliamentary elections look democratic. What should Ukraine do in response to this level of Russia’s power consolidation and ability to achieve the goals it sets?”

“Russian power is being concentrated around one person, President Vladimir Putin. We do not have a political figure who could concentrate political power because now, after ten most difficult years of economic construction, Leonid Kuchma is no longer a figure who could unite all the political forces. This is natural. Nobody has ever managed to retain a high image and prestige, working under the hard conditions of a transition period. Besides, there are a lot of subjective factors. So it is difficult to imagine today that either the presidential or the parliamentary elections could produce a person who could unite everybody.

“What should Ukraine do in response to the concentration of power in Russia? I don’t think Russia is now on Ukraine’s side. In my opinion, we should react at least adequately to Russian actions. Such acts are inevitable. For example, the Single Economic Space (SES). I think our politicians take a superficial view of this issue. Everything basically comes down to the question whether SES membership will allow Ukraine to simultaneously be a member of the European Union. But this is a far more sensitive issue. To my mind, we must take a tougher stand on what serves our national interests — for example, insist that we will not bow to such SES requirements as a common currency and customs zone unless we begin with a free trade zone. I have always taken this position. But Mr. Putin said at the latest meeting that, under the agreements, oil and gas are already subject to exemption from the list of free trade zone goods. Is this free trade? What benefit can we get from this kind of free trade? How competitive will our goods be in the common area? For even now we sell 10% more goods in Europe than in the CIS. This is a very eloquent fact.

“And, in general, let me make an observation. I’ve looked through the historical documents of 1654. What was happening in Ukraine in 1649- 1654 strongly reminds me of what occurred here from 1999 to 2004. The figures themselves and the number of years are almost the same. The situation then was that the authorities gradually gave up their positions and turned (or pretended to turn) a blind eye to what the Russian tsar and boyars were doing. What this led to is common knowledge: Ukraine was deprived of statehood for 340 years. If we now fail to make balanced political decisions and for various reasons lose Western support, we will have only one way to go. And, since Russia is already pulling the economic levers, the share of Russian participation in our economic structures is extremely large and continues to grow... Terrible as it sounds, under such conditions history could repeat itself.”

“As is known, a documentary film has been made, in which Shushkevich (leader of Belarus at the time the USSR collapsed — Ed.) comments about you. Some sources say Boris Yeltsin refused to take part in this film. Mr. Yeltsin recently visited Ukraine, but there were no reports about you meeting him...”

“I didn’t meet him.”

“The impression is that Russian politicians and experts in general take a rather cool attitude toward you. Why do you think they do so? Can’t they forgive you for Ukrainian sovereignty?”

“I think that’s it precisely.”

“But Yeltsin and you once worked together to dismantle the former System...”

“When I heard Yeltsin interviewed in Transcarpathia, I thought he couldn’t give up those attitudes. I don’t know; I find it difficult to judge the extent to which he’s now convinced that those decisions were right. But he did not utter a single word about the Tuzla problem, as if hinting that we are unduly sensitive to this. He said what can be said by an individual who still supports Ukraine’s sovereignty. I thinks this is a real fact, but I can’t attach too much importance to this because Yeltsin doesn’t shape Russian policies now. And the Russians treat me this way because they think that had it not been for Kravchuk, Yeltsin and Shushkevich wouldn’t have dared to denounce the 1922 treaty that created the USSR. So, in their view, Kravchuk is precisely the person to blame for what happened. The point is all of them — from writers to politicians — still cherish the hope that we must and will live in a Slavic union. And I agree that if Ukraine had not held a referendum, had not elected me president, and if I had not taken such a tough stand in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the participants would not have signed a document like that. This brooks no doubt. However, I have said many times that I had relied not so much on my personal views, although it coincided with the referendum results, as on the will of the Ukrainian people. The people voted for independence, and I carried out their will. The president cannot do otherwise if he really respects his people.”

“Mr. Kravchuk, on December 30 the Constitutional Court ruled that the current president of Ukraine can run for another term. What impact do you think this ruling will have on the political situation?”

“I think in this case this decision will in one way or another be understood as a political, not legal one. In the long run, President Kuchma himself must make a political decision. All I wish is that this decision be in favor of and promote the increased international prestige of Ukraine. I am not going to advise Pres. Kuchma what he should decide — that’s his personal business. This is quite a delicate matter. But what is important for me as the first president is that this should be a civilized decision in favor of Ukraine and democracy, and civilized countries should assess Pres. Kuchma’s actions as democratic. A wrong or erroneous step could lead (it is no accident that I mentioned 1654) to isolation from the West. This would in turn leave us no choice but find ourselves in Russia’s embrace. This would be a political tragedy for me, a person who stood at the cradle of modern independent Ukraine.

“As to the Constitutional Court in its present shape, it is beset with a host of economic, political, personal, and other problems. The Constitutional Court is not yet as loyal to the Constitution, law, and democracy as one would hope.”

“What do you think will be the further course of the political reform? Could the CC decision stimulate this process?”

“There is such an opinion. What was done? President Kuchma and Presidential Administration Chief Viktor Medvedchuk were made bugbears for the opposition. The message is: if you don’t accept the political reform, Pres. Kuchma will run for a third term, and you’ll be worse off for it. In general, I oppose this kind of pressure on and humiliation of officials. I want everybody to make a well thought- out choice. The government could, for example, play on the fact that the programmed goals of the Communists and Socialists fit in with the proposals to conduct our badly-needed political reform. An executive branch cannot be effective if it has two centers, limited rights, etc.”

“Do you think there are chances to complete the political reform?”

“I think certain political elements are interested in it. There is a chance. But after the presidential elections this will be simply impossible.”

“What is going on in parliament about the political reform only degrades Verkhovna Rada in the eyes of the voters.”

“We weren’t able to take the steps that would have recognized one political force everyone could support. The parliamentary leadership is also to blame for this. All those maneuvers between the Left, Right, and Centrists, the waffling, and so forth, made it possible to believe that pressure and strong- arm tactics could help win success. Moreover, the opposition found a philosophical formula: they supposedly will have to act like this because we, the majority, will prevent them from acting otherwise. I suggested to fraction leaders at the last session of the conciliation council: let’s go into the room and discuss all the problems you keep raising all day long, let’s have this televised live. They refused. Why? Perhaps their main objective is in something else. They are not in a blind alley — the rostrum is open. But the opposition wants vote to come out only the way they want.”

“Suppose the reform is carried out and the next president is to be elected for eighteen months. Is there a risk that the legally adopted reform could be blocked in practice because any regime will try to hold on to power as long as possible?”

“If the next president has the current powers, he will be able to do a great deal to speed up or slow down the political reform, regroup forces in the parliament, and more. But one thing reassures me: if the formula set out in the bill signed by 292 people’s deputies is approved, this will weaken the next president’s influence on the executive.”

“Would his administrative resource be limited?”

“Absolutely. It is the parliament and Cabinet of Ministers that would be exerting influence. I always say the main thing is not how the president is being elected — by nationwide vote or in the parliament. Everything will depend on the balance of political forces and those that wield power, on the mechanism of checks and balances, and on the powers the president himself has. This is why I am sure that in this case the president elected for a year and a half would be unable to change anything.”

“But, on the other hand, the public opinion polls show that the grassroots do not want to give up to the parliament their right to elect the president.”

“I always think about this. People do not want to entrust the parliament with electing the president because their trust in Verkhovna Rada is not high. But the president will be elected by the next parliament to be elected in 2006. Incidentally, I was categorically against the election of the president by the current parliament. The way out is to elect a parliament that we can fearlessly entrust with electing the president. So let the people elect deputies they can trust. Everything depends on the voters.”

By Oleh IVANTSOV, The Day
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