The presidential election is slated for April 3 in Kazakhstan. Few if any doubt that the incumbent head of state, Nursultan Nazarbayev, will be re-elected. He has been president since 1989 and his campaign program promises further smooth modernization while upgrading the government machine. “We will modernize our political system in a planned manner. Political reforms are an inalienable component of our medium-term strategic project, aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of Kazakhstan,” reads the program, carried by the government-run media on March 29.
Is there any connection between Nazarbayev’s campaign promises and the events in the Middle East and North Africa? What are the threats of a personality cult in Kazakhstan? More on this in the following interview with Dosim SATPAYEV, director of the Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group.
“Nazarbayev’s presidential campaign does not place much of an emphasis on political reform; 80 percent of his action program focuses on Kazakhstan’s socioeconomic progress. Also, one should not overstate the effect of the events in the Middle East and North Africa on the situation with Kazakhstan. For example, what happened in Kyrgyzstan — and the situation was strongly reminiscent of the events in Tunisia and Egypt, in 2005 and 2006 — failed to cause a chain reaction, or a domino effect. This is proof that the political and economic situation in Kazakhstan is different. There are [local] specificities that lower the likelihood of a coup d’etat in regard to the incumbent president. At the same time, I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of a Kyrgyz scenario after Nazarbayev steps down.
“Competing elite groups would then use every resource, including some or other protest groups, stage street rallies, you name it. The Tunisian, Egyptian, and Kyrgyz scenarios are possible in Kazakhstan, but most likely after Nazarbayev. In the current political situation, he faces no serious adversaries within the elite or opposition.”
How does Kazakhstan respond to the personality cult propaganda? Foreign media report that Kazakh grade schools have special classes extolling Nazarbayev’s role in the creation of their state.
“It’s true that a personality cult process is underway. It started three to four years ago. At present, Nazarbayev’s historic role is being emphasized on all official levels, particularly in the pro-presidential milieu. Last year, they enacted a law on the leader of a nation, placing him at the top of the pyramid of power, with a status that is more important than just head of state. Nazarbayev must have borrowed something from the Chinese and Singaporean models, with their key figures, Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew. Be that as it may, his task was to place himself above all existing political posts and legitimize himself as the founding father of a sovereign Kazakh state. This characterizes the incumbent president as a rather ambitious individual who wants his name in the history textbooks as not just the first president, but also as the man who actually created the state of Kazakhstan.
“All this is proof of succumbing to some of the Soviet vestiges of the turn of the 1980s, with their communist-party-general-secretary personality cult; that the [Kazakh] president is no longer fully aware of current realities; that he may fail to correctly assess some of the current trends in Kazakhstan. True, as an expert player of the political game, he was able to neutralize the worst of his adversaries (some of them are abroad), so this aspect poses no threat. On the other hand, there is the compliance factor and his fondness of tactical games. Both are very likely to have a negative effect on Kazakhstan’s political prospects in the long run. For the investors, for the political elite, for the man in the street, the big question is what will happen after Nazarbayev.”
There is little doubt that Nazarbayev will be re-elected as president and will rule the country for another term in office.
“Let’s put it this way. He will get another five years as president, but there is a law on his status as Leader of the Nation. In other words, he can step down as president any time, but retain a great deal of political authority. Under this law, all top-level bodies of authority must coordinate every key domestic and foreign political issue [with the Leader of the Nation]. This status will allow Nazarbayev to formulate [and legitimize] a hereditary-authority-transfer instrument. In fact, the possibility has been food for thought for many in Kazakhstan. As for the presidential election, the main problem now is voter turnout. Spin doctors in Astana got themselves caught in their own trap after convincing everyone that Nazarbayev would win the campaign; there is a fair chance some of his true supporters will forget all about casting their ballots. Our Risk Assessment Group is monitoring Kazakhstan’s authorities and the pro-presidential forces’ efforts to improve turnout. On the other hand, even if turnout is low, will the Leader of the Nation win fewer votes than during the previous election?”
What do you think will happen after Nazarbayev steps down? You can’t expect a regime to exist relying on a single person, can you?
“Most people in Kazakhstan are discussing Nazarbayev’s possible successor. To me, this discussion makes little sense. Another list of names. There is a man behind each name. Also, any unwelcome successor can be deleted. Therefore, the incumbent president should see his main task in forming viable political institutes in Kazakhstan in the next five years, ones capable of securing a collective continuity of political power that would focus on Nazarbayev’s political guidelines. This could benefit him at the moment: a stronger parliament, with other political parties having seats. Also, he could make his Nur Otan [Glimpse of Hope] Party — a figurehead formation — into a full-fledged political force. He should pay serious attention to the weak civic institutions. Should he lay any kind of foundation for such institutions, this would be good for democratic progress. Otherwise, everything would be back to where it is now, with separate groups making political decisions — and with separate figures as heads of these groups, acting as decision-makers. These figures would make their decisions proceeding from their own rather than national interests.”
