The issue of restoring the nation’s nuclear status is raised by Ukrainian politicians at what looks like regular intervals. On December 6, the parliamentary caucus of Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party introduced in the Verkhovna Rada a bill entitled “On Repealing the Law of Ukraine ‘On Ukraine’s Accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of July 1, 1968’ and Restoring Ukraine’s Right to Possess Nuclear Weapons.” Authors of the bill explain that such a law must be passed because the Ukrainian parliament needs to respond to the Russian Federation’s violations of its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum, the inability of the UN Security Council to take immediate action as provided in the Budapest Memorandum because of the veto power exercised by Russia, and the failure of other signatories to take any practical action to comply with their obligations. The Day asked experts whether Ukraine was able to restore its nuclear status and what the consequences of such declarations might be.
“WE HAVE TO CLEARLY IDENTIFY WHAT SPECIFIC OPTIONS WE HAVE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE”
Volodymyr OHRYZKO, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, head of the Center for Russian Studies:
“Unfortunately, the West treats the Budapest Memorandum as a document that did not create legal obligations for the Western countries which signed it. Unfortunately, such is the official position of the signatory countries. It turns out that Ukraine was the only party to commit to legal obligations, and it has faithfully complied with them. People are actively debating whether we should have done so at all, or whether it would have been better to comply only partially with them. I think this has already become a matter for historians. What I am worried about now is the legal status of that document.
“If it is actually non-binding, then the question arises whether we should comply with our obligations under it. International law provides that if one of the parties to a treaty is not complying with its obligations, the other party may consider the treaty to be as good as repealed. This means that we may (I am not saying that we should) raise the issue of withdrawing from the NPT and restoring our status as a nuclear-armed nation. It is another matter altogether whether it would help us to protect national security or, conversely, create difficulties. Experts are of two minds about it. Some say that we may force the West to face up to the issues which have been put on the agenda. We should care about it in the first place, as it has to do with the real national security of Ukraine rather than some pieces of paper that were signed but not complied with. Other experts believe that by taking this stance, we will incur additional difficulties. There is a bit of truth in that latter assessment as well. However, the situation requires clarity. We have to identify all the tools that can really secure our national interests.
“We must bear in mind that this country has become a victim of Russian aggression and is at war. What protection did we hope for? We hoped for and counted on support from the Memorandum’s signatories in case of threat to national security. But in practice, we have not received assistance enabling us to actually deal with the aggressor. And it is reality, because we really have not received weaponry which could have become a deterrent. Thus, we must consider how we can get that weaponry. Weapons can be nuclear and conventional. There are some conventional weapons now which are not inferior to nuclear ones in their capabilities. We can obtain medium-range missiles that have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers. Should we move successfully in this direction, there will be no need to maintain a nuclear deterrent. There is a number of options, but restoring the nuclear status should be one of them, to be used if other options are recognized as lacking. It is not that we have to declare Ukraine a nuclear-armed nation. This is technically impossible and requires extensive preparations. But we have to clearly identify what specific options we have for national defense.
“I have always supported active foreign policy that raises issues with our partners instead of just responding to what we are offered. It is much more productive and efficient that way. Unfortunately, given that we have a corrupt economy, a corrupt political scene, and a weak state, many politicians believe blunt approaches to be unworkable. But this does not mean that we have to abstain from solving this problem and conducting a clear and principled foreign policy. Without a successful economy, a healthy political situation inside the country, and internationally respected elite, we cannot ultimately guarantee national security.”
“NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAN BE EFFECTIVE AS WELL”
Ihor KABANENKO, admiral, a defense and security expert, politician:
“In short, legislation which restores the nuclear status of Ukraine can be seen as an attempt at intimidation and blackmail of the international community: since you have not complied with your obligations under the Budapest Memorandum, we will recreate nuclear weapons. Generally speaking, blackmail and intimidation are, to put it mildly, not the best tools to defend one’s interests at the international level, especially when they target partners who have remained supporters and lobbyists of Ukraine, demonstrated solidarity with this country and helped us survive in these difficult historical conditions. Meanwhile, a withdrawal from the NPT of 1968 will create a whole set of factors threatening to turn Ukraine into a rogue state.
“Declaring that ‘Ukraine has restored its nuclear status’ would be unlikely to deter the Kremlin. Even hypothetically assuming that the political decision is there, we will not get nuclear weapons neither tomorrow nor in the long term, because besides manufacturing technology, which, incidentally, needs development and a series of tests (where and by whom would they be carried out?), there is also the issue of creating nuclear delivery systems (missiles, aircraft systems, etc.) with guaranteed prevention of unauthorized actions, a separate command system for their use and protected military facilities for their storage (even if you count the ones left over from the Soviet era, they need repairs and thorough reconstruction). This requires huge human and financial resources as well as a lot of time. For it is not enough to be a nation with uranium mines and nuclear power stations, including the largest of its kind in Europe, as nuclear weapons need much more.
“Certainly, given the events of recent years, creating mechanisms of armed deterrence is highly advisable. But to get there, we should use the opportunities that we already have or can actually attain in the short term. Non-nuclear deterrence can be effective as well, ranging from purely military capabilities (special operations forces, highly mobile military component, cyber security units, long-range precision weapons, etc.) to public-government ones (consolidation of society, for the new generation warfare is waged for the hearts and minds of people, and this is the key to hybrid confrontation) which all combine to deal with the threats posed by the new generation warfare. Here, consolidation of society is a very important matter: if we are able to unite around shared social and political values and civilizational choices as well as to develop shared mechanisms of damage control enabling government and society to oppose destructive outside influences, we will endure and win. We should take care of it, as well as the security of nuclear and other potentially hazardous infrastructure installations in Ukraine. There are a lot of opportunities there for deploying political will and resources of the state and achieving a better and more secure future.”
