Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spent less than a day in Kyiv before flying on to Dublin. The official results of his talks with Ukrainian counterpart Kostiantyn Hryshchenko and meeting with President Kuchma are as follows: the parties have discussed the issues of coordinating the ratification of international agreements and transferring to Ukraine part of former Soviet real estate properties abroad, along with international security issues and the situation in Iraq (at this moment reports came of the release of Ukrainian hostages who worked in Iraq under contracts with a Russian company). Aside from these official results, the talks were essentially a presentation of Putin’s new foreign policy.
The only public statement by Minister Lavrov during the Kyiv talks that deserves special note is that the sides have agreed that the whole range of issues on common European security, including relations with NATO, will be solved by Kyiv and Moscow transparently, based on mutual notifications, consultations, and coordination. Lavrov’s multilevel and abstruse statement was accompanied by a thesis to the effect that “episodes will not affect the [Russo-Ukrainian] relationship.” By episodes he meant the memorandum recently ratified by Verkhovna Rada, which allows NATO forces quick access to Ukrainian territory for international exercises. This decision was not well received in Moscow, with Russian diplomats and military top brass stating that such a move by Kyiv goes beyond the bounds of Russo-Ukrainian partnership. According to Hryshchenko, during the Kyiv talks the ministers reached “complete understanding of the fact that despite all our similar approaches to many international policy issues, there are issues that we see differently.” Hryshchenko believes that this is neither a tragedy nor an obstacle for the development of the relationship.
Thus, caution and rigidity is the first thing that Lavrov has demonstrated not so much to his long-time colleague Hryshchenko (the two go back to the time of Lavrov’s permanent representation of Russia in the UN) as to the public at large. After nine and a half years in New York and his stint as deputy of Russia’s pro-American Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Lavrov is versed in the flows and currents of the international politics, is familiar with policy architects in the leading countries, and is proficient at using the instruments of the diplomatic and legal casuistry. Lavrov’s record also includes the pacification process in the Balkans (ending the war in Bosnia and signing the Dayton Peace Accord; the Kosovo crisis and the signing of the peace agreement), handling the 9/11 crisis, and the Iraqi crisis. There are also more recent examples such as his direct involvement in the handling of the Ajaria crisis.
Lavrov promises a consistent foreign policy and states (in an article carried in The Wall Street Journal) that Russia is a powerful country with its own interests to protect. In this article he refers to the former USSR as a “zone of vital interests” for Russia and describes the main course of Russia’s policy in this region as the “development of integration.” President Vladimir Putin made a similar statement in his first news conference after reelection. Ukraine was not mentioned in either case, which prompts the conclusion that, while Moscow considers the US, EU, Japan, and China as its equals in the arena of international politics, the CIS is rather a “space,” in which it can play according to its own rules. Obviously, in its talks with the world’s leading players Moscow, represented by Lavrov, will continue to assert its rights to dictate its own rules of the game in this region.
“There is no place for empire” — such is the gist of the first several messages of Minister Lavrov. Indeed, the empire in the old sense or even a liberal empire is not discussed anymore. What exactly is discussed will become known soon. Quite probably, Lavrov’s visit to Kyiv, which could not be other than a get-acquainted visit for both sides, will change something in the approach to events in neighboring countries. Russia has already suffered the consequences of its traditional approach in Georgia. Obviously, Russia’s attitude toward the elections in Ukraine and its relations with the Ukrainian elite will require adjustment on both sides of the border, which might result from Lavrov’s first visit and future contacts. Lavrov is characterized as an inflexible and assertive diplomat, and could be expected to instruct his subordinates to get the Ukrainian leadership to ratify as soon as possible the agreements on the creation of the Single Economic Space and on the status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Obviously, given the possibility of a change in power and ruling elites in Kyiv, the ratification by Verkhovna Rada of these documents, which are crucial for Moscow, could be stalled indefinitely, the more so that Ukraine is yet to see the benefits of joining the SES, while the agreement on the joint use of the Sea of Azov hastily signed by Presidents Kuchma and Putin is debated in both Kyiv and Moscow. Moreover, it is quite possible that with a change in the ruling elites the issues and problems in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship could be no longer solved by the presidents and their confidants behind closed doors.
