1.On systemic incompatibility and a forced dialog. It is difficult to find in modern history an example of such an internally contradictory model of interstate relations, which consists of an unsolvable conflict between reciprocal deterrence, on the one hand, and a forced dialog and even temporary partnership, on the other. From the very outset, the USSR and the US were alien systems and civilizations based on irreconcilable principles. But, ironically, the Soviet Union managed to turn into a major world power thanks to, in many respects, America’s economic and technological aid, which made it easier for its ideological adversary to establish itself.
Yes, Germany also rendered essential assistance to the Soviet Union, but still it is the US that helped the USSR to industrialize its economy and carry out the second modernization (Peter I carried out the first modernization at the expense of Europe’s resources, too). Involving the leading Western states, above all, the US, into economic buildup and militarization was the key goal of the Soviet state’s “fathers.” “We are determined to reach an economic agreement with America,” Lenin said in October 1919. It is the Americans who helped the Soviets build new factories and power plants. “The Americans helped us a lot. We must admit it. They helped us better and more decisively than the others. We thank them for this,” Stalin said to US Ambassador Averell Harriman, noting that about two thirds of all the large Soviet enterprises were built with US technological and other assistance. Antony Cyril Sutton, a British-born American economist, wrote in Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917 to 1930: “At least 95 percent of the [Soviet] industrial structure received this assistance.” The Americans rendered the bulk of this technological assistance to the USSR. The conclusion is that Soviet communism was built with the help of Western, mostly American, capitalism. It was, of course, an amazing know-how of the USSR to tap the resources of an ideological adversary in order to strengthen its own system.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian elite managed, no less effectively, to take advantage of the situation of postmodernism and ideological relativism in order to continue exploiting Western, including American, resources – this time not so much to strengthen the Russian state as to satisfy their own interests and personally integrate into the Western world. Of course, the position of the US, the Western civilization’s leader, was the main factor that helped create favorable conditions for this integration which watered down Western society from inside and weakened liberal norms.
The dialectics of Russian-American relations shows that, on the one hand, the USSR failed to withstand the arms race and rivalry with the US. But, on the other hand, no one else but America relaxed its ideological vigilance and facilitated the restoration of Russian autocracy after the collapse of the USSR, letting the Kremlin tap Western resources for its own needs. Ironic, isn’t it?
2.The “deterrence-dialog” model worked quite successfully in the Kremlin’s interests until 2014 – the annexation of Crimea and the war with Ukraine. Let us admit that this model also helped Washington pursue some of its interests. This was obvious during the US war against international terrorism in Afghanistan and even more so in the process of making a nuclear deal between Obama and Iran. Some US big business leaders managed to advance their interests in Russia. For example, Exxon Mobil, whose chairman Rex Tillerson is now the US Secretary of State, even received a medal from Putin for successful cooperation. But the “deterrence-dialog model” still more benefited the Russian system which managed to form the mechanism of a “swing:” on the one hand, to keep up internal mobilization and create the eternal “foe image” on the basis of chronic anti-Americanism and, on the other, to legitimize its great-power status – the backbone of authoritarian power.
But this model cracked when Crimea “staged a comeback” to Russia in 2014. The West had to respond to the violent change of borders and the upset of world order. As the West imposed, albeit rather unwillingly, sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin became no longer able to fully tap Western resources to reproduce its system. The Kremlin is very well aware of the problem, and it has been trying in the past two years to restore the previous balance of “deterrence-dialog,” this time on its own conditions.
3.The new reality of Trump’s America. To what extent will it help the Russian system of personalistic power to survive or, on the contrary, will complicate its existence?
Paradoxically enough, Trump’s America is the Kremlin’s headache. The presidency of Obama was ideal for the Kremlin because he tried not to irk Moscow until the last moment. Trump is a serious and so far unclear challenge to the Russian elite. Actually, it is a political landscape with a host of impressionistic hues, but the very balance of main trends is clearly not in the Kremlin’s favor.
Here is what characterizes the new US leader’s way of ruling and mentality and is positive for the Kremlin: intention to drop America’s global ambitions and worldwide responsibility, mistrust towards the EU and NATO, renunciation of the globalist agenda and the erstwhile “advance of democracy” ideology, undermining Atlanticism as a system of alliance-based relations with Europe, and intention to find a pragmatic ally in the battle against worldwide radical Islamism. This is supposed to inspire optimism and hopes in the Russian elite. Trump’s emphasis on national populism is in line with the attitudes of the Russian ruling class.
But it is just one side of Trumpism. Let us look at its other side. There are some negative points that are expected to rouse alarmist feelings in the Kremlin. The Russian elite is hardly prepared to support Trump in his attempts to deter Iran and China – why should there be new enemies on the border? Moscow knows what Trump’s campaign against “radical Islam” may lead to – why should the Kremlin create problems not only with the surrounding Muslim world, but also with Russia’s own 20 million Muslims? But what should worry the Kremlin still more is Trump’s “America first” main slogan. Firstly, this slogan means reliance on military might and, hence, a new arms race which Russia is unable to sustain today. Trump is going to increase military spending by 54 billion dollars, which exceeds Russia’s annual military expenditures. Secondly, Trump is going to flout the global rules of the game, and his unpredictability is creating the situation of a Darwinian world, for which Russia is not prepared. Putin can only be predictable if he understands how America will be acting, i.e., if America is predictable. And Trump is knocking out the linchpin of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.
It is also worthwhile to look at the very style of Trump’s behavior, which will hardly allow him to find a common language with Putin. Trump’s method of “transactions,” as he himself has repeatedly said, is to push the dialog partner to the wall, squeeze him like a lemon, and force him to accept the deal on his, Trump’s, conditions. But Putin is unlikely to let him be driven into a corner. As Philip Gordon, one of the Obama administration’s officials, said, the very style of Trump’s behavior may lead to serious conflicts. I will add: especially if Trump begins to play with nuclear toys.
It is also self-evident that US political society is teeming with mistrust and hostility towards Russia as a result of suspicions about Russia’s attempts to influence the US elections. In this situation, any dialog with Moscow will de-legitimize Trump’s presidency, and he is, of course, aware of this.
So, looking at the balance of positive and negative factors in the US-Russia relations, I would say this paves the way to rather unstable relations and potential tension. Even if the two sides suddenly reach a certain compromise (but in what?), it is likely to be short-lived.
Lilia Shevtsova is a Russian political writer
