After more than a quarter century the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remains a major contributor to strategic nuclear stability. Yet, just as the end of the Cold War heralded the advance of freedom, it also created new challenges to world security. Primary among these are new ballistic missile threats. Iraq showered missiles on its neighbors during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. North Korea is developing a missile which is capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload some 6,000 km and selling shorter range missile systems to Iran, which is working hard to add to its missile arsenal.
In response, the United States is developing plans for a limited National Missile Defense System (NMD). In continuing the work on NMD, we intend to keep our partners, Ukraine among them, fully informed as we address the ballistic missile threat to the United States.
There have been many misperceptions about US plans, and what we intend to do and not do. Let me try to clarify these.
First, no decision has been made to deploy a limited NMD. Rather, the Clinton Administration has agreed with Congress that a decision on deployment will be based on four criteria: 1) the technical feasibility of the system now undergoing development and testing; 2) system affordability; 3) an updated assessment of the threat; and 4) the implications for our overall security, including those served by strategic arms control.
Second, the United States is committed to modernizing and strengthening the ABM Treaty, not to weakening it. Since 1972, the ABM Treaty has been a core element of the framework for strategic stability. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the strategic environment has changed since the ABM Treaty was signed. The Gulf War showed what a real threat theater-range missiles in hostile hands can be. Tests of longer-range missiles in Iran and North Korea raise concerns that must also be addressed. We must adapt the arms control regime, as well as our defenses to meet these new threats, and the ABM Treaty allows for such changes. The changes we are contemplating to the ABM Treaty are limited, and because they would adapt the treaty to modern circumstances, they would make it stronger. They would not undermine Russia’s deterrent force. We are committed to working with Ukraine to ensure the stability of international arms control regimes as we work to meet our security requirements.
Third, the United States is approaching the process of amending the ABM Treaty and developing a limited NMD in an open, transparent, and cooperative way. A dialogue is underway with the Russian government, and we have already had several exchanges with Ukrainian officials. In Cologne in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued a joint statement calling for parallel discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty, and we have proceeded in that fashion. Indeed, the limited NMD system we have described in detail to our counterparts would address only a small number of missiles and would not affect Russia’s strategic deterrent. We have also proposed significant transparency measures that would provide confidence that this limited system would not be transformed into something much bigger that could destabilize the strategic balance.
We are committed to continuing our work with Ukraine and others on the full range of nonproliferation measures.
Like every nation, the United States has a responsibility to look ahead to future security challenges and to prepare for them now. We see Ukraine as a partner in this process, and are committed to working with Ukraine to ensure the stability of international arms control regimes.
