“There is already a new government, Mr. Yushchenko, you just didn’t notice it. And it won’t go away, and there is no way to squeeze it out.” Six month ago these words, uttered by Viktor Yanukovych in the November 2004 televised debate, were considered a bad joke. What looks like a bad joke now is President’s Yushchenko’s response to his opponent. “We have found what to squeeze it out with — elections,” the newly-elected president said three weeks later.
Ironically, it was also an election, this time a parliamentary one, which swung the political pendulum in the opposite direction, pushing what was once Yushchenko’s team from power. Unfortunately, this team, mostly for subjective reasons, squandered the opportunities that fate offered it on two occasions.
The mistake of the first Orange coalition, headed by the president at the time, lay in the limited scale of its decisions and projected reforms. Its members followed the path of reformers who try to carry out reforms without changing the system. In the past, this method propelled Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev into political oblivion. While criticizing the vices of “Kuchmism,” the Orange people in fact did nothing to destroy the nutritive medium of these vices. Moreover, they were unable to do this by force of their political narrow-mindedness because they were essentially products of that very system. A convincing illustration of this is the way party lists were drafted for the parliamentary elections.
The president, who was the leader of the coalition, should also assume his fair share of responsibility for the defeat. Yushchenko confused the natural desire of a president to be “the hetman of all Ukrainians” with the desire to be the darling of all political party leaders. This led to the signing of the notorious memorandum as a result of which vote riggers were pardoned and hard-earned freedom turned into licentiousness — not to mention the fact that Yanukovych’s popularity ratings, nine percent at the time, gradually began to rise.
As the era of “Ukrainian parliamentarianism” was ushered in, the president assumed the position of something in between an ostrich and Leopold the Cat (hero of a Soviet animated cartoon, who appealed for friendship — Ed.). Meanwhile, the party that represented him seemed to be overestimating its capacity. Instead of conducting an elementary analysis of the reasons why their ratings, which had exceeded 50 percent at the beginning of their rule, were steadily dropping, they rejoiced over the overall percentage and were in a state of euphoria, convinced that what was going on was irreversible. This attitude played a sick joke on them. Excessive self- confidence resulted in the gross underestimation of political opponents, while Oleksandr Moroz’s burning desire to be parliamentary speaker finally ruined the already fragile coalition.
The Day asked some experts to comment on why the Orange coalition failed to materialize.
Volodymyr MALYNKOVYCH, director of the Ukrainian branch, International Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies:
“To understand what caused the current failure of the ‘democratic coalition,’ we should start from the very beginning. The Orange people lost because they disillusioned many of those who had voted for Yushchenko and thronged to the Maidan. In my view, this is only natural because it was impossible to satisfy the demands raised on the Maidan. I will remind you that there were three main demands. First, ‘distribution of bread,’ i.e., social benefits irrespective of whether or not they were economically justifiable; second, ‘prison for bandits,’ i.e., punishment of the previous regime’s functionaries; and third, stripping the oligarchs of their illegal earnings, i.e., reprivatization.
“It is impossible to meet these demands for many reasons. Social benefits without economic growth mean inflation. Replacing a large number of even medium-level civil servants reduces the overall professionalism of administrative staff. Now the third, principal, demand: wiping out the oligarchs. This cannot and should not be done. A war against the oligarchs is a war against the Ukrainian economy. There is no question that they amassed their capital unlawfully, but this shadow capital helped the country ride out the economic crisis. Oligarchs should be controlled and demonopolized. There can be no simple decisions in today’s Ukraine.
“The Tymoshenko cabinet worked with the consent of, not contrary to, Yushchenko. It pursued a crowd-pleasing policy, wishing to satisfy the demands of the Maidan, which cannot be satisfied.”
“This resulted in a fiasco, and Yushchenko shifted the blame to Tymoshenko, who used her charisma to switch the Maidan followers’ attention to herself, which in fact stirred up a conflict in the Orange camp.
“To crown it all, there was no unity, not just inside the Orange team. Within Our Ukraine there were at least four, if not five, dissimilar political forces that had only united by force of circumstances.
“Of course, they could have forged an ‘Orange coalition’ if Petro Poroshenko had not demanded too much. Had they given Moroz the speaker’s post, the coalition would have surely begun to work. But this would not have lasted long because the conflict would have continued all the same. Tymoshenko would have faced the ambitions of our president, who hardly wants to play second fiddle. On the other hand, there would have been a conflict with Moroz because his party would have dissolved in the ‘Orange sea,’ it would have become insignificant. And the conflicts in Our Ukraine did not vanish into thin air. They were there, they continue to exist, and they will always be there. Our Ukraine is in fact doomed to disintegration. So this outcome of the ‘democratic coalition’ was to be expected.”
Yuriy RAIKHEL, deputy director of the Region information and analytical agency (Dnipropetrovsk):
“In my view, the so-called Orange coalition was doomed from the very outset. What temporarily united its participants was their joint struggle for power. However, their views and ideological principles with respect to key issues, such as political reform, accession to the EU, WTO, or NATO, and the status of the Russian language, were incompatible. The socialists always had a special stand.
“It will also be recalled that there were never-ending squabbles between the ‘Orange coalition’ partners. When Tymoshenko was prime minister, she frequently quarreled with the socialists, e.g. with Agrarian Policies Minister Baranivsky and State Property Fund chairwoman Semeniuk. I don’t even want to remember Tymoshenko’s conflict with Our Ukraine, especially Poroshenko. Whatever the case, the incessant fighting among the Orange leaders was one of the factors that brought down the Tymoshenko cabinet. Tensions between Our Ukraine, the BYuT, and the Socialist Party did not ease after the elections, when they got down to portfolio distribution and brought this process to the point of absurdity. I will say again that, in my opinion, the ‘Orange coalition’ was not viable. It broke apart a year ago, not now, and it was impossible to put it back together.
“As for the lessons to be learned, I am sure there is no tragedy at all. On the contrary, the implementation of political reform set into motion a multiparty system in parliament. As one coalition collapsed, another immediately sprang up. It has every legitimate right to exist. This is a European practice. But one thing arouses concern: the new coalition was formed ‘under the carpet,’ through secret talks. These kinds of ‘Byzantine” methods are not typical of European politics. Let us hope this is just a symptom of growing pains.”
Volodymyr PRYTULA, political scientist, Symferopil:
“There are a lot of reasons why the Orange people lost. Many of these reasons are subjective and related to the Orange leaders’ personal ambitions and the personal stand of the president of Ukraine. In my view, Viktor Yushchenko is the president of a future, well-balanced, Ukraine. Today’s Ukraine is not yet mature enough to accept methods of government that the president is stubbornly offering despite their obvious ineffectiveness at the moment. The truth is that right now Ukraine does not need a president who does not abuse his power and tries to set up mechanisms and conditions for democratic self-government.
“What Ukraine needs today is a president who is a typical post- Soviet competent manager, something like Kuchma-3, who can and knows how to stoop to intriguing, playing a sudden dirty trick on his political adversary, to yell, apply pressure, and overtly break the law — ‘in the public’s interests,’ however. Unfortunately, Ukraine still needs a Stalin-type ‘tough boss.’ Regional leaders were waiting for this type of president: they would have unquestionably obeyed him as if he were a god, because this would have largely relieved them of responsibility that they are unable to accept in full measure. A president who creates conditions for a creative approach in regional government is inevitably regarded as a weak one, and a vague protest is increasingly brewing among the regional bosses against having to find ways out of all kinds of crises and be responsible for everything. This is why they are all saying that Ukraine does not have a ‘tough boss.’
“On the other hand, Ukraine is split and divided into clans and is under the tremendous influence of the Russian factor. I mean not only the activities in Ukraine of many Russian foreign-oriented structures but also the domestic ethnic factor. Therefore, in this situation the government should have steered the country in a ‘hands-on’ mode.
“But the Orange team underestimated the seriousness of this situation and unleashed infighting while the economy is under the control of anti-Ukrainian forces and many political structures and state apparatus are adopting an anti-Ukrainian stance. Under Kuchma, the state was able to remain in the same condition because these politicians and bureaucrats had an opportunity to steal and share something, and therefore the interests of those representatives of the establishment who saw Ukraine as a money-making mechanism never exceeded the allowed limits and never boiled over into discontent with the government and the president.
“As soon as this freedom to steal was curtailed, Ukraine began to experience problems: the previous regime’s functionaries resorted to sabotage and speeded up the sale of state-run entities to foreign, mostly Russian, commercial structures. What also played a major role was Russian pressure by means of the so- called ‘gas problem’ (to be more exact, fuel problem) which was used as an economic weapon primarily against the Orange team. But despite this, the latter still continued to bandy words.
“At the same time, Ukraine did not have a wide choice of new and competent managers. The ‘new people’ came from the Orange leaders’ entourage, not from the public sphere, which would have been the chief achievement of democracy. Society is looking forward to a younger generation of bankers, economists, and managers of Arseniy Yatseniuk’s level, but he was one of a kind, but we needed hundreds of people like him. The newcomers were either losers from the Kuchma era or those whom Kuchma’s regime had kept out of power and had thus lost their skills, if they ever had any. There were also chameleons who, deep in their hearts, were neither democrats nor experts but simply opportunists.
“The fault of the Orange team is that it failed to foresee and prepare for this situation. They should have found political and organizational ways and means to resist this enormous foreign and domestic pressure and to tackle Ukraine’s internal difficulties. One never takes power only to lose it so mindlessly. This power in Ukraine has in fact been lying about gathering dust in the streets for nearly 18 months. And now we have those who came and said: there is such a party! (An allusion to Lenin’s famous answer to the claim that no party can exercise control over Russia — Ed.).
Naturally, the entire Orange team is to blame for all this, including the president himself, the representatives of Our Ukraine and the BYuT, and especially Moroz and Tymoshenko. That the Party of Regions was determined to stage a comeback was not at all unexpected. The Orange leaders were unable to work as a team. Having come to power, they did not know what to do with it: they ran around like a child who has been given a very expensive gadget. Not knowing how to use it, they simply broke it, then threw it in the garbage with little regret and gleefully joined the other ‘kids,’ who are now playing with our destiny, and Ukraine’s, in the ‘Verkhovna Rada sandbox.’
“There is another question. OK, they lost. But which of them will now answer for the fact that their helplessness also inflicted a defeat on us, i.e., those who stood on the Maidan, worked for democracy, supported them, expected them to run this country skillfully and efficiently, ensure freedom of speech and entrepreneurship, effective reforms, and Ukraine’s breakthrough into a new reality and accession to European structures, those who hoped for better living standards, suppression of corruption, and the right to know the truth about their own country, but instead will have to live once again in a totalitarian Ukraine?
“Why are all of us suffering? Why has Ukraine slid back to the situation of five years ago, why have millions of Ukrainians lost this time in their lives? Their greatest fault lies precisely in this, not in the fact that they lost their power. Their destiny is their own business. They are to blame, first of all, for letting down the Ukrainian people and failing to realize our hopes for an historic breakthrough. This is very sad.”
Dr. Serhiy KRYMSKY, Professor of Philosophy
“The Orange politicians made quite a few mistakes mostly as a result of infighting and a lack of willingness to compromise. But in my opinion the root cause is different. The root of the problem is the electorate, which chose to vote for politicians who possess no proper ethical, moral, and cultural qualities, politicians who are unaware that in all historical periods it was not economics per se but economics with culture that helped overcome a crisis.
“Bitter as this may sound, the fault lies with the electorate, which is still too immature to understand the historical problems of contemporary Ukraine. This is the root cause of all the troubles.
“The cardinal mistake of the Orange team is that it paid inadequate attention to the Donbas and the southern regions. I have often visited these places and seen that people were completely uninformed. Even well-educated persons would say to me, ‘Look, the Americans are occupying us! The economy is going to the dogs!’
“Why? Where are the facts? All this is simply ugly propaganda. Those regions should not have been left without the proper attention. So the Orange people should work with the electorate and inform people instead of squabbling.
“I have always been an optimist, but now I am forced to say such pessimistic things.”
