The Year of Ukraine in Russia has come to an end; the Year of Russia in Ukraine has just started. As regards the Year of Ukraine in Russia, Moscow referred to it as “an unprecedented in world practice social and political project aimed at filling the strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine with concrete content” (quotation from Aleksandr Yakovenko, representative of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Virtually all high rank officials in both Ukraine and Russia gave their highest appreciation to the project, did not stint their praise, simultaneously completely forgetting to explain what exactly it brought to Ukrainians and Russians and in what way it differed from the previous years, in this sense.
As regards the Year of Russia in Ukraine, skeptics claim sarcastically that in fact this is not the first such year; first probably was 1654, when on January 8 (new style) Moscow boyar Buturlin received Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s oath of allegiance to the Russian tsar in Pereyaslav. As regards “feedback,” it was said that Russian tsars swear allegiance to no one but Our Lord. Incidentally, preparations for celebrating the Pereyaslav Rada 350th anniversary have already started on the high level. Experts, in part, Head of the VR Committee on European Integration and former foreign minister Borys Tarasiuk, forecast that in the course of the Year of Russia in Ukraine “one can expect further steps to surrender our strategic national interests in our relations with Russia.”
The Year of Ukraine in Russia was primarily characterized not as much by frequent meetings between the presidents of the two countries: Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin’s meetings had been equally frequent in 2001, during the first wave of the cooling down in the relations between Ukraine and the United States and Western Europe. At that time it was Russian capital, under the far from transparent conditions, that won the tenders for privatizing a number of Ukrainian enterprises of strategic importance. The triumphant procession of Russian oil companies in Ukrainian land in the absence of any serious competition was rather a sequel to this.
A peculiar feature of the Year of Ukraine in Russia was the fact that, as soon as it was announced, the final stage of parliamentary elections in Ukraine has started. Moscow representatives, including such official persons as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin or Head of the Russia’s Presidential Administration Aleksandr Voloshin, as well as less official ones, didn’t stop before ostensibly specifying “with whom” and “why” they work in Ukraine. The demonstration of their influence on seemingly pure Ukrainian affairs was not only overt but also deliberate, and the official Kyiv obviously didn’t have anything against it.
Also significant was the fact that on the eve of making decisions important for Ukraine’s future (e.g. if we should participate in Prague summit and, if so, on which level) President Kuchma met with President Putin. First visit by newly appointed Prime Minister Yanukovych was also to Moscow (it was a working visit, while the one to Warsaw was the first official one).
One can gain an impression that exactly during this year Moscow has done everything possible to gradually make Ukraine more easy to guide, simultaneously preserving surface attributes of its state independence. This was Kremlin’s view of the Year of Ukraine in Russia. The Year of Russia in Ukraine will be also characterized by the fact that during this whole year real fights will start in the course of presidential campaign in Ukraine, and every candidate will seek support in Moscow.
Last year was also accompanied by Moscow’s harsh pressure on Kyiv to force it to enter the Euro-Asiatic Economy Commonwealth (EurAsEC). One of its champions was Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Kasyanov who claimed that only under this condition Moscow would sign the treaty On Free Trade with Ukraine. So far Kyiv insists that the “observer plus” status would best answer Ukraine’s interests, which wouldn’t impose any obligations on it, simultaneously allowing Ukraine to take part in various projects. In terms of Ukraine’s strategic development the prospects gained from its entering EurAsEC look rather dubious: Russia itself requires big resources (not only raw materials but primarily financial and technological ones) for its socio-economical modernization, not to mention other member countries. However, exactly this discussion might be among major issues during the Year of Russia in Ukraine.
Another issue, which came up in the end of last year, is transition from strategic partnership to strategic alliance, offered by a group of Russian experts. This idea has immediately found positive feedback on part of Ukrainian establishment. To proceed with this discussion, it is necessary to define what this strategic alliance will look like, what its goal will be, how it might correspond with different goals for strategic development declared by Russia and Ukraine, and what influence it might have on both countries as well as on their relationship.
It is known that Russian leaders propose their Ukrainian counterparts to unite the potentials of the two countries and coordinate their efforts. This thesis was repeatedly voiced by President Putin and in the conclusions of Russian experts. Obviously, it will also be frequently voiced during various events in the framework of the Year of Russia in Ukraine.
So far the “uniting of potentials” manifested itself in Russia imposing taxation on rolled metal exports from Ukraine (as well as Kazakhstan, EurAsEC member country), in the decreasing, according to both countries’ statistics, level of commodity turnover, in tariff and other restrictions implemented primarily by Russia, which do no good to the so-called partnership in economy and trade relations. This was also admitted by Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin, who simultaneously is Special Representative of the President of Russia in Trade and Economy Relations with Ukraine. This is the most realistic estimation of the Year of Ukraine in Russia and also far from best start point for the Year of Russia in Ukraine. In addition to the trade wars, there are other sore spots in Russian-Ukrainian relations: slow progress in delimiting sea borders, unsolved question of compensations to the families of those killed in the plane downed by Ukrainian military at the Black Sea. The issue of the consortium being created for maintaining the Ukrainian gas transporting system is also still unclear.
Evidently, there will be no less rhetoric during the Year of Russia in Ukraine than during the Year of Ukraine in Russia. At the same time, both Russian leaders and experts (in part, those from the Russian Public Politics Center) point out that talks about integration are pure populism, that the slogan, To Europe together with Russia, doesn’t meet understanding in Russia itself since it hardly can be implemented in practice.
Obviously, one can speak about partnership or, even more so, alliance between the two countries only after its founding principles are defined and it becomes clear what it will bring to a man-in-the-street, what will be its advantages for not certain groups in each country but for their citizens. And when the relations are based on clearly defined national interests of each part and measured by the “European standards” of which it would be premature to speak as yet. At present, according to most Ukrainian experts, partnership exists only between separate business and political groups in Russia and Ukraine. This was the reason why the Year of Ukraine in Russia has passed unnoticed by broad public. The same is threatening the Year of Russia in Ukraine.
