A year after the war began and the Ukrainian army was rebuilt, Ukraine is again debating the formation of a professional army. Experts and the public were “stirred up” by Arsen Avakov, Minister of the Interior, who wrote in Facebook past week: “I’ve been thinking about mobilization waves in this country, the stupidity of military commissars who hand a summons to passersby on Kharkiv’s streets, the Transcarpathian smugglers being drafted into the army, and Ukraine’s defense capability in this difficult period.” “We must urgently place the army on a professional contract-based footing, reducing the strength of troops and increasing the salary and social security of the highly-qualified military,” the minister continues. “As a minister and member of the National Security and Defense Council, I am going to propose that this action be taken as soon as possible.” Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk immediately responded to Avakov’s statement, instructing Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak to assess the cost of professionalizing the army.
The comments and initiatives of Ukrainian governmental officials are very opportune albeit belated. As long ago as in 2004 the then defense minister Yevhen Marchuk presented the “White Paper of Ukraine,” in which he described a development strategy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces until 2015. The paper suggested that the Ukrainian army be considerably professionalized, its strength be optimized, and the defense budget be essentially increased. But it turned out that the priorities of Marchuk’s successors had nothing to do with boosting the state’s defense capability and forming viable armed forces. And in the times of Yanukovych, the leadership’s priority was to destroy Ukraine’s security and defense sector. And only now, 11 years after Marchuk’s “White Paper,” after more than a year of war and unsuccessful calls of experts, Ukrainian officials have begun to speak again about a professional army.
The Day has spoken to Valentyn BADRAK, director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies, about the direction in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine should develop and the extent to which the old idea raised by Avakov is realistic.
“If Avakov’s statement resulted in some practical actions, this would be a very positive and even revolutionary step. But I am wary of praising him because he has made these statements on the eve of the autumnal local elections. While society lacked information and promises on this matter, the government was steadily rebuilding a Soviet-type army. Besides, our history crawls with this kind of statements – one that left the deepest imprint on our minds is when, on the eve of the scheduled parliamentary elections, Yulia Tymoshenko promised to form a professional army within a year, although all experts were saying it was impossible.
“We have people who understand that, unless a contract-based army is established, we will be unable to live and develop the defense sector as such, and there are also people who are prepared to do this. But it would be very good if some plans were made public – e.g., how many years it will take to switch to a professional army according to Avakov’s ideas. In my view, taking into account the war, this would take at least four years, even though it usually takes the armies of other countries 5 to 6 years to do so. But we have a ‘seasoned’ core of the armed forces, and if we use it as the core of a professional army, we will make a ‘hyperjump’ in this direction. Compared to the other countries that put their armies on a professional footing, Ukraine has some advantages and can create a unique trump card in the shape of professional troops, which will be a factor of containing the Russian aggression.
“The containment forces of today may consist of special-purpose units because, analyzing the structure of the governmental defense order, we must say that we will run short of strategic armaments in the next 3 to 5 years. In all this time, we must not only rely on the patriotism of people who are defending the state and on weapon supplies from America, but also build the containment forces on our own. They may be based on various special-purpose units that can penetrate as far as 300 km of the theater of operations. It is also necessary to develop special units of the General Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – Marshal Zhukov once preferred this kind of forces and achieved serious successes in their development. Undoubtedly, there must be mountain-warfare, underwater, and police units of special purpose.
“Ukraine has very strong traditions in this field, and if there were a certain political will, this could become a serious trump card for some time.”
Are there any risks in putting a fighting army on a professional footing?
“The only way to improve the situation is to carry out this kind of reform. But it should be a gradual, not abrupt, process. We must not press forward with, and thus distort, this idea. There should be a realistic stage-by-stage program subject to certain, including parliamentary and civil, control. At present, everything is being carried out without proper documents and nobody bears responsibility for these processes and their failures. In addition, our ‘uniformed managers’ are accustomed to report that all is OK in the army – even when there are very many problems there.
“A new army can be formed and rearmed at the same time, for a professional soldier will be of little use if he has obsolete Soviet weapons. Another risk is to believe that even a professional and well-equipped army can resist on its own a longtime and large-scale aggression of a country like Russia. So, we should also decide in what way territorial defense troops will be deployed.”
What is the fundamental difference between today’s Ukrainian army and a potentially professional one?
“The Ukrainian army has seen burgeoning development since the Ilovaisk tragedy. Many people who watch the course of hostilities are saying there are major positive changes at the company and battalion level – improvements in control, communication, etc. But we should not forget that Ukraine has now been in a third-generation war, i.e., one where no aircraft or ballistic missiles are used, which Russia has foisted on us. Therefore, it is not exactly a real modern warfare. Today the Kremlin is trying to inflict as many losses as possible on the Ukrainian army personnel, while we are unable to respond because our military-political leadership is afraid to get a ‘4+’-generation war, in which up-to-date aircraft and missiles are used, because the Ukrainian army is not yet prepared for this. But why then are we not getting ready?
“To take a strategic approach to military reform, we should change our attitudes to rearming and recruiting. Today, in the 21st century, we must not focus on just increasing the army strength – it is, of course, a mistake to bring it up to 250,000. In the conditions, when Ukraine has a heterogeneous society consisting partly of militarized and trained people and partly of the people who are not prepared to accept war, the state must exclusively focus on a professional army. In addition to patriotism, the latter should be in a position to receive a ‘motivational package’ from society, which will compensate their readiness to fight.
“We must say that Ukraine will have a professional army not just when a decision has been made to switch to professional recruitment and there is not a single conscript left. This will only occur when soldiers who have served on contract for over three years account for at least 50 percent of the personnel. And if the army receives strategic weapon systems, such as missiles, combat aircraft, and new air defense systems, we will see what we are dreaming of – Ukraine will turn into a ‘European Taiwan.’ Then not a single Kremlin adventurer will have a desire to carry out sabotage or an attack.
“Developing military technologies, Ukraine will be able to boost its economy faster – our state has always been a player on the global armaments market, and, selling war-tested weapons, we will be able to make up for our expenditures for the security and defense sector. There are quite a few examples of this in the world, such as Poland, Turkey, and South Africa. This is in fact the only way for us, for otherwise we will always be under Russian threat and our society will always shudder at losses.”
What do you think of the motivation system in today’s Ukrainian army?
“Owing to a difficult economic situation, the state has to resort today to the administrative element as a temporary instrument for keeping people prepared for war. But if we were striving for a professional army, there would be no problems that we have now with mobilization – social inequality would be overcome at once. The next step after the announcement about the formation of a professional army should be the announcement about a motivational package. We have also had contract-based units before, but the resignation rate has exceeded the intake rate precisely for want of a motivation system. Today, in wartime, some elements of this system are being created, but it is a sporadic process. For example, it was decided that ATO fighters can be admitted to higher educational institutions on a non-fee-paying basis, but it is only one element of the motivation system. Besides, the latter should also include reduced-price housing, retirement pay, and cash awards. The people who feel they are internally, psychologically, and professionally prepared should be the first to go to war – no matter whether they are mobilized or conscripted. And if the current situation continues, there will be many instances when a certain number of people (4-5 percent) will offer resistance or dodge military service. This never-ending sore point will cause anxiety in society, provoking rallies and resistance. And if no decision is made about the formation of a professional army, the government will have to continue to carry out mobilization by way of coercion, but this is a wrong way. This way looks easier, for it seems to be demanding fewer resources – at first glance only. If a professional army system were established, it would be cheaper than the current pattern of the armed forces.”
