The visit of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to Ukraine was not only a positive sign for our country, it has also prompted us to analyze the reasons behind Ukraine’s unreadiness to join the most powerful military-political bloc. After all, it was a position of our government, expressed by President Poroshenko in his meeting with the NATO Secretary General in Kyiv: “Is Ukraine ready to join NATO? No. But we have to prepare for it.” And so, which portion of this path has Ukraine already gone through, and what opportunities did we have? Delving into the near past will also provide some answers for those who think that the cooperation with NATO has just yet begun. They are wrong.
Even before the year 2000, Ukraine had been implementing quite consistent and meaningful cooperation with the Alliance. Our country had participated in Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and then there was a “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” of 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Commission had been operational, also many diverse meetings and official visits had been carried out. NATO and Ukraine had been forming an atmosphere of mutual trust. Yevhen Marchuk, the NSDC Secretary, was appointed the Chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation with NATO in December 1999. And then a radical change of the foreign policy vector came, shifting from simple cooperation to legitimizing the course on Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO.
Ukraine’s intention to join NATO was announced officially for the first time on May 23, 2002 at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council. “The changes in the political situation in Europe deprive the continued adherence to the policy of non-alignment of any sense to Ukraine. In some ways, the non-alignment can be even harmful,” Marchuk said back then. It is also important to emphasize the position of the then president Leonid Kuchma, because it will change after a while: “We know that no one has ever waged a war inside NATO. And I want us to never fight one – this is the main goal of our policy. It is a pragmatic goal. And this goal serves the interests of all Ukrainians, for the European security can not be build without Ukraine.”
Already in October 2002, the Parliament held hearings on NATO. Some major discussions gave rise to the decision: “The determining factor for the successful implementation of this course for Ukraine is the preparation for NATO membership according to the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of May 23, 2002 ‘On Ukrainian Strategy regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’ as well as according to the Decree of the President of Ukraine of July 8, 2002.”
The Ukrainian intentions with regard to the integration into the NATO structures were confirmed in the Law of Ukraine “On the Basics of the National Security of Ukraine” of June 19, 2003, which was approved by the constitutional majority. Even the Party of Regions had voted for it. Article 8 of the “Basic Guidelines for the State Policy on the National Security” stated, that Ukraine conducts active foreign policy in order to “acquire membership in the European Union and NATO while maintaining at the same time good relationship and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, as well as with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and of the world.”
JULY 10, 2002, DONETSK. A SENSATIONAL VISIT. SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE COUNCIL OF UKRAINE YEVHEN MARCHUK (LEFT) ACCOMPANIES NATO SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGE ROBERTSON IN THE FIRST EVER VISIT OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL BLOC HIGHEST OFFICIAL TO UKRAINE. CHARACTERISTICALLY, AT THE TIME THE ENTIRE DONETSK ELITE, RANGING FROM MAYOR OLEKSANDR LUKIANCHENKO TO GOVERNOR VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH, HAD WELCOMED ROBERTSON’S VISIT. ALSO, A ROUNDTABLE ON “REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS” HAD TAKEN PLACE IN DONETSK / UKRINFORM photo
At all the stages of the implementation, this Basis was created, represented, reported on, and provided with answers by Yevhen Marchuk. By the summer of 2003, the necessary legal framework for the implementation of this course had been already set up. But that’s not all! Ukraine had expressed its intention to join NATO more specifically in a new edition of the “Military Doctrine of Ukraine,” which was approved by the NSDC and put into action by the Presidential Decree of June 15, 2004. “Terms of military security of Ukraine” were defined in the 2nd Chapter (“Military and political foundations of the Military Doctrine”), paragraph 9 as follows: “Building of the trust between countries, consistently reducing the threat of military force use, implementing the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, the ultimate goal of which being the accession to NATO as the foundation of the system of European security.”
Ukraine’s serious disposition for the Alliance membership had changed the attitude NATO had towards our country. At the Prague Summit, the Alliance had introduced a new, higher regime of relations with Ukraine – the Action Plan. “The Action Plan is an arrangement agreed upon both sides, not only for military cooperation, but also as an annual plan for Ukraine’s internal transformation according to the NATO standards: in the military sphere, in the judiciary and law-enforcement systems, in the economics, freedom of speech, human rights, etc.,” Yevhen Marchuk writes on his Facebook page. “A Presidential Decree had been adopted that introduced the system of government coordinators on NATO cooperation at the level of deputy ministers. We had managed to raise the popular support in favor of NATO membership to 32-33 percent. New NGOs were founded to support this course. The whole process began to gain momentum, and NATO also begun to show its interest. And thus Russia began to worry – and, shortly after, to act.”
The Kremlin’s work became apparent immediately. In the summer of 2004 – after the Istanbul NATO Summit – Leonid Kuchma went for a 180-degree turn of his policy towards the Alliance. As soon as it became clear that Ukraine was very close to sign a Membership Action Plan at NATO, Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin had disappeared from the sight of the press for a couple of days somewhere on the Azov Sea coast. Upon his return, Kuchma gives the order to have any mention of the cooperation with NATO excluded from the Military doctrine... Eventually, Yanukovych’s team, when it came to power, used the parliament to remove any references to this formula from the Law “On the National Security of Ukraine.”
One should also remember the history of the Bucharest Summit 2008, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then president of France Nicolas Sarkozy had blocked Membership Action plans for Ukraine and Georgia. As a result, in August of the same year, Russia invaded Georgia and illegally occupied 20 percent of its territory. And the past year, apparently realizing that NATO would not respond, as it was the case with Georgia, Moscow illegally annexed Crimea and now maintains its aggression in eastern Ukraine. Similarly, it is certain that if Kuchma, the second president, had not toyed with our foreign policy, and if Yanukovych, his best student, had not followed suit, Russia would probably have not dared to initiate the open aggression. Ukraine would have had a very different status and relationship with the Alliance.
The incumbent government has to draw conclusions as well. First, the recent history of Ukraine and the path our country has passed should be examined closely. And secondly, it is unacceptable on behalf of the government to speak about Ukraine’s unreadiness to join NATO today. It may even be true for now, but we need to talk about our intent and desire to quickly pass this way and catch up.
ON THE POLITICS OF “SOFT ISOLATIONISM”
Hryhorii PEREPELYTSIA, doctor of political science, conflictologist, professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv:
“The issue is that the current president has no political will, similarly to Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and Kuchma. This is the most important thing. Ukraine is ready, and in 2005-06 we had already the Intensified Dialog. In other words, we have passed the first phase for NATO membership. The second and final phase would have been the Action Plan for NATO membership, which we had not been granted at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.
“Therefore, one can say that Ukraine is unready for the visa liberation. It’s only an excuse. And in this regard we see only some empty declarations about the membership. But according to recent opinion polls, 67 percent of the population support NATO membership. And the president somehow reacts declaratively on it. But it is untrue that Ukraine is not ready for NATO membership, because the preparation process consists of the Intensified Dialog and then the Membership Action Plan.
“Incidentally, it can be said that no country was ready to join the Alliance. The country must go through the Action Plan for NATO membership in order to be considered ‘ready.’ Therefore, the president’s declaration was not solid, and demonstrates a lack of political will in regard of the Euro-Atlantic integration.”
Why is it so, that on the one hand, political decisions were taken in accordance with the NATO course in 2002 and on the other – president Kuchma shifted to the opposite direction two years later?
“The issue remains with the interests of the oligarchic capital and the oligarchic authority, which, unfortunately, have not changed at all, not after the Orange Revolution, and not after the Revolution of Dignity either. The so-called post-Maidan ruling elite, which are in power today, pursue the same interests as the old oligarchs. I think it’s the rear guard of the oligarchic regime established in the times of Leonid Kuchma. Their corporate interests were the same as of Yanukovych, long before Yanukovych himself. And it is the interests of this transfer class that do not go well with the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The integration requires transparency, political reform in the dismantlement of the oligarchic system. And consequently, if we go to NATO, we would be required to play by the rules that are defined for member states. And this is the main problem.
“Therefore, as it was during Yanukovych’s rule, they adhere to a policy of soft isolationism, flirting with NATO, but avoiding any serious steps towards the membership in the Alliance. And we see that those corporate interests are continued to be backed by new President Poroshenko. And this is a key reason why he lacks the political will. However, the history has already demonstrated to us once, what the rejection of the NATO membership means, as it became a prerequisite for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia knew that no one will provide military assistance to a non-aligned Ukraine. And the fact that we abandoned the neutral status actually changes nothing.
“Now we say: here we are opening the door, we officialy abandon the non-aligned status, but it is the door we don’t want to enter. And what should the Stoltenberg’s reaction be when the agenda is the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and our president says that we are not ready. What should the reaction of the Alliance be? Very well, you are not ready – it is your right to be such; no one will not pull you towards NATO. Then they offered cooperation instead of membership, and Poroshenko said that the formula suits us. I’d say that this formula may suit him, but Ukraine is not satisfied, because no cooperation guarantees the security and sovereignty of Ukraine. Those are provided only by the NATO membership and in particular by the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”
As we know, 13 years ago, part of the political elite of Ukraine, in particular the then NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk, had applied the efforts to adopt the NSDC decision on the Euro-Atlantic integration, and the course to join NATO had been legislated by the parliament. Why did this trend not entrench, and was it the fault of the civil society?
“The entire fault lays witin the interests of the transfer class, which is interested neither in the European nor in the Euro-Atlantic integration, but only in the state of soft isolationism. And despite having embarked for the European integration, we are well aware that this ultimate goal is illusory. Even the Association Agreement does not guarantee any membership perspective for Ukraine; thus the representatives of this class are in favor of the European Union and the European integration, knowing that the EU membership is a prospect quite vague, while NATO membership is a real one. That’s why they refuse to join NATO, saying they want to join the EU first. In fact, the oligarchs want to join no one: neither the EU nor NATO. There is no political will, as long as the interests of the transfer class do not coincide with the European integration and the Euro-Atlantic course.”
“WE HAVE TO LEGITIMIZE THE PEOPLE’S DESIRE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP THROUGH A REFERENDUM”
But we have a society, which has demonstrated its maturity during the Revolution of Dignity for the first time in history – can it put some pressure on that transfer class in order to join NATO as soon as possible? Especially given the fact that the Movement for NATO Membership was created recently.
“Indeed, this movement aspires to take over this function instead of the president. Whereas the head of the state does not want to join NATO, then the people will have to say what they want. A way to do this is through the referendum. Although the referendum is not required for membership, and generally the Alliance can ignore it, but it is the president who cannot ignore it. It is no coincidence that the Movement for NATO Membership is led by Leonid Kravchuk, who at the time used the referendum as means of consolidation and legalization of Ukraine’s state sovereignty. And now Kravchuk once again voices the same idea. If the president and the government do not want that, we must legitimize the people’s desire for NATO membership through a referendum.”
In other words, this is the only way to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to NATO, isn’t it?
“Yes, this is the only way that could compel the president to hear the voice of the people. He cannot just ignore the results of the referendum at will. And if the referendum is organized properly, more than half of the people will vote for the membership. The sociological research points this out very clearly. Even in the Donbas, the support for NATO membership has grown from 2 percent to over 20. Surely, we are not talking about the occupied territory of Donbas. Also, the people of the annexed Crimea, who had always been against NATO, are no longer part of the electorate. Therefore, the percentage of NATO support in Ukraine has risen even more. There are chances of getting a positive response on a referendum regarding this issue.”
Some military experts say that Ukraine should not pursue NATO membership, because we will be refused anyway. What would you say to that?
“I’d like to say to those experts, that they should take the machine guns themselves and then restore Crimea and the occupied territory of Donbas, and guarantee us solid defense against Russia instead of NATO. Some time ago we had the military experts and diplomats who were saying that we did not need NATO and the non-aligned status was the greatest guarantee of our country’s defense. And what came of it? And now they are again repeating this same song. Do we have to expect the historical disaster of Russia starting a large-scale offensive against Ukraine? What would they say to that? Would they run to Lviv, or to Central Europe, or would they serve the Russian propaganda?”
Most arguments against the accession of any country to NATO were cited in relevance to that the country should not have conflicts with its neighbors and, most importantly it should control its entire territory. In particular this applies to Georgia, which has no control over one fifth of its territory; and now our country fits there as well after the annexation of Crimea and the continuing Russian aggression in Donbas. But we know the examples in history regarding the conflicting countries: Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. So, could such arguments become an obstacle for Ukraine’s membership in NATO?
“As for the accession of Turkey and Greece, the main NATO admission method at the time was of a strategic response, it did not imply any conditions of having no occupied territories and whatnot. Then the main criterion for NATO membership was a military threat, and a potential tipping of the strategic balance of power, which brought about the state of stability. And Greece was just of enormous geo-strategic importance for NATO, and that was the main argument for its acceptance to the Alliance. And then the Soviet Union threatened Turkey that it would withdraw from the Montreux convention if Ankara would not allow to build a base in the Black Sea Straits, effectively taking them under control. This was actually an ultimatum and direct military threat against Turkey. Had Turkey given in, the Soviet Union would have taken the Black Sea straits under military control. It would have been a direct attack on Turkey, and so in these conditions of the threat by the Soviet Union, Turkey asked to join NATO.
“We had the same opportunity. And the thing is that the NATO strategy on expanding the stability, adopted in Washington Summit in 1999, has anticipated new membership in NATO in the peacetime, under the condition of stability in Europe. But there was another version of the strategy in the condition of military threats, in case of the Russian revenge, the restoration of the Soviet Union, and the re-emergence of past threats on its part. Then, the abovementioned notion of the strategic response would have been taken into account, which allowed for entirely different criteria for the NATO membership, including those that were for purely defensive reasons.”
“THE REFERENDUM IS PLANNED IN ORDER TO COMPEL THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE THIS DECISION ON JOINING THE ALLIANCE”
So, perhaps now it is the right time for NATO to change its criteria for the accession, given the same necessity for the strategic response?
“Of course, it should be done. But for that, on our part we should have the Supreme Commander who would be responsible for the security and defense of the country, and who would have the political will – which, unfortunately, is not the case now.
“On the other hand, NATO has yet to rethink the situation. They have a long process of negotiation, which would accelerate as the threat from Russia grows, at least for those countries, which are situated across the NATO border. As of yet, they do not believe this threat to be a big one. The threat has been identified, and they have noted that the Russian aggression is the greatest threat so far, but it is not the one, which would involve invasion agains NATO countries on behalf of Russia. Over time, Alliance will depart from the strategic partnership with Russia and will be forced to shift towards the strategy of regional containment. And in terms of this strategy we stand a chance, even despite the fact that we have Crimea annexed. An exchange might be possible as follows: we recognize Crimea as Russian, but we enter NATO. If the formula would be agreed upon at the highest level, that would be a great chance of Ukraine joining the Alliance. But in order for it to materialize, we need the political will on part of the president. While there is no political will, there are no chances for those diverse opportunities for the accession. The political will of the president is the first prerequisite. And that’s why the referendum is planned in order to compel the president to take this decision on joining the Alliance.”
During the visit of the NATO Secretary General in Kyiv, we have heard from Ukrainian president and prime minister the statements that Ukraine counts on specific decisions to be taken on the NATO Summit in Warsaw regarding the future of the country’s accession to the Alliance. What can our country really expect from this summit?
“What expectations might there be when Ukrainian government agrees to limit its relations with NATO to the framework of cooperation? For its part, the Alliance has nothing else to offer apart from what it provides anyway.
“We need that NATO membership, which would give us the guarantees of our defense and security. As for the cooperation, we have been in that framework for so many years.”
So, do you think we should accept a hypothetical proposal to agree on the so-called reunification of Crimea with Russia for the sake of NATO membership?
“Yes, we might do that, because that way we would save the rest of Ukraine’s territory. Russia will not stop at the Crimea and Donbas, because its goal is the destruction of Ukraine as a state. We have to remember that. And it will be a long-term confrontation. The president knows that, as he says that we have to prepare for the long-term confrontation with Russia. And this threat can only be curbed at the moment with the membership in NATO. One may want to opt for the strategy of the defensive fortress, like Israel; but consider, who opposes the Israelis – mainly some terrorists with guns. And we are opposed by a nuclear country. The difference in the balance of power must be felt.”
