As many as 46 soldiers of the 53th Separate Mechanized Brigade, now training at the Shyroky Lan shooting range, left their quarters and marched on foot to the city of Mykolaiv on February 8, urging their superiors to improve their logistics situation. The media immediately distributed photos of soldiers, who looked incomparably worse-off compared to, for example, National Guardsmen with their brand-new equipment whom Kyivites could see policing patriotic rallies, while residents of Dnipropetrovsk saw them providing armed support during the detention of Hennadii Korban. This event is not just an episode, but a symptom.
Firstly, the long-standing question is: why the state takes care of the National Guard in every possible way (and rightly so), while looking at the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) like an afterthought? The experience of Viktor Yanukovych is worth bringing up here, since he emphasized building up a number of strong special police units, which gave rise to talk about the creation of a police state. Ukrainians remember well the end result of such policy: the Berkut riot police’s use for brutal dispersals of protesters and the lack of capabilities needed to repel an external enemy.
Secondly, cannot the aggressor use such soldiers’ protests somehow? The Russian and pro-Russian media are already spreading this news to discredit the Ukrainian army. They say that Ukrainian soldiers are not only used for punitive expeditions, but starved by their superiors as well. Ultimately, the crucial question is what should the Ministry of Defense’s leadership do to solve the problem, instead of drowning it in formal comments once again. Let us recall that the soldiers’ protest occurred against the background of the coming next wave of mobilization.
Yurii Butusov bluntly described treatment of the UAF’s soldiers as “bestial,” though instead of offering specific proposals and respective demands, the expert painted a general picture of how the country’s and the military’s leadership ought to treat soldiers. Other experts cited similar cases of, to put it mildly, not very comfortable conditions, which soldiers have to endure. High officials offered no response at all to the 53th Brigade’s protest. It should be noted that this case cannot be compared, for example, to the provocative action of former Aidar Battalion commander Serhii Melnychuk, who once burned tires in front of the Defense Ministry’s building. This time, it was not a demarche but a true protest, a statement of demands, a cry for help. The help, which is needed on the issue that has been overshadowed for two years already, but requires a clear algorithm to solve it.
Serhii M., a UAF officer:
“It is true that the National Guard gets the best equipment, vehicles, and automatic weapons. All of it is new and expensive. We in the UAF have seen it only on pictures and on TV. Why is it so? Well, maybe the nation’s leaders have some special plans for the National Guard, including mopping-up operations. I am not aware of such things. As for the possible use of the Internal Troops against the people, I do not see it as possible after the Euromaidan. The government will never dare do it, because the people have proved that Ukrainians cannot be broken by force.
“Most of the serving officers, including those on staff duty, are mobilized reserve officers. Many of them had only a superficial understanding of the fighting before. It was in direct contact with the enemy that they gained experience, which no academy can teach. And this is another problem: we need to develop a system of officer training. We need truly professional officers with combat experience, rather than lawyers who got commissioned as aircraft technician after a perfunctory ROTC training. Secondly, we need to sort out logistics, as there are issues with food, water, firewood, underwear, clothes, and more. Of course, we have seen a tangible progress over the past two years, but the issue has not been fully resolved. In addition, we need quality equipment. Even if Kuhuar armored vehicles are out of question, we need something to be able to respond quickly to the situation. And thirdly, we need respect for the soldier. He is the foundation of our military, and he should feel the government cares for him and his family. The personnel issue is a big problem as well, since there are cases when police lieutenant colonels who have extensive command experience serve as privates. It is accumulated issues that give rise to such protests.”
Colonel Serhii HALUSHKO, deputy commander of the anti-terrorist operation:
“With regard to the case in the Mykolaiv region, this is an example of a specific low-level commander, the battalion commander in this case, failing to create the right living conditions at a shooting range or in a training center. The hard questions should be asked of him, instead of generalizing the issue to the entire Armed Forces. There are many examples of far better living conditions for soldiers, and it depends on the specific low-level commanders who are responsible for it. From personal experience, I would say that even at the frontlines, many commanders have created decent conditions, up to baths, which soldiers construct with their own hands. It is not always necessary to wait for the foreign aid or volunteers’ help.
“Our task for the preceding year, I mean 2015, was to create from scratch 15 new brigades and regiments, and several dozen battalions. No other uniformed service in the country faced such a monumental task. It is difficult to find another country in the world that would set such ambitious objectives while providing limited funding. The National Guard faces more modest tasks than the Armed Forces. Therefore, direct comparison between the two services is uncalled for, since they have different objectives, logistics standards, requirements for equipment. Regarding basic logistics, I see no fundamental difference between them.”
