In German online media, it’s a rather common phenomenon: as soon as news concerning Ukraine or Russia appear, comments are flooded from people blaming the West being aggressor, blaming the media being brought into line and underlining, that Russia is not involved in conflict but if, it would defend only its evident interests in that region. In virtual spheres, influence of Russian propaganda is obvious and long since well reported. Russian narration cleverly uses some far spread tendencies in German society as a basis to implement its narration about Ukraine in the public. And Kremlin goes even further: not only in Germany, but in whole EU Moscow supports right-winged movements and can relay on a network of lobbyists. Among them even a former German Bundeskanzler. Main goal of the Kremlin-PR and its subscribers: to reduce Ukraine to object of its own fate and to disguise its existence.
Made up mostly by same arguments, Kremlin-PR in Internet often rather easily could be proved as counterfactual and their argumentation as not stringent. A shortage of their tenors would be like this: West implemented a fascist junta in Kyiv; people from Donbas just defend themselves against West-Ukrainian Banderaites, who thanks to CIA believe they’d be better off with becoming a European country. Russia is for sure not involved in conflict. And if, just a little bit, since Putin has to protect Russians in Donbas. Ok, maybe Russia even may act offensive in Ukraine. But it must, since the West wants to encircle and destroy it. So, basically it acts defensive. And more basically, never forget: there are no Russians in Donbas. No one ever proved, except for Western politicians, Ukrainian politicians, Western journalists, Ukrainian journalists. But they are all brainwashed and corrupted. Even some Russians proved their country was involved in Ukraine? So what! They are even more brainwashed, traitors and spies for sure.
This way to argue may be not too convincing. But that’s not its main goal. Main goal is to cause mistrust and doubts about official coverage in Western media. And somehow to make forget, that there is a conflict in Ukraine and a conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Presenting the war in Donbas as a clash of basically Russia and the West is one of the key moments in Kremlin’s narration: as long as an independent and sovereign nation between Donetsk and Lviv can be disguised, as long as a multi-dimensional conflict can be presented as a two-dimensional dispute of Russia and the West, Ukraine may remain just a scene. It is harder to develop solidarity with a scene then with a real people. As long as there are doubts virulent that it was just the West who staged a coup in Kyiv, Europeans may prefer to criticize their own side than to recognize Ukrainian people being not the objects, but the subjects of their fate and therefore worth to support.
Russian PR-strategists know this and longing to keep Ukraine a shapeless and unknown construct. Though basing on a lack of substance, it is propaganda’s quantity influencing public opinion. Since Germany plays a key role in defining EU’s position, German society is one of the main goals the Kremlin tries to score with its propagandistic efforts. It’s a long since well known fact, that Moscow founded special kind of public relation agencies to publish just any comment in social media and online expanses of German media. That Moscow in November 2014 launched a German-language version of its state-controlled web-channel “Russia today,” just underlines, how important German opinion in times of conflict in Ukraine became. Germany indeed as well offers various special features making it even more attractive for Russian propaganda: a huge number of former Soviet citizens of German origin immigrated after 1991 to Germany, estimating goes up to more than two million. Their integration wasn’t too easy, for most Germans they remained “the Russians.” Therefore still today many of them are emotionally closer bound to Moscow than to Berlin. No wonder, that among the fighters in Donbas German volunteers of such roots appeared. In times of conflict, many of them, still speaking Russian fluently and as mother language, stand loyal to Russia and serve as important addressees and multipliers of the Kremlin’s narration. Beside this, in German society certain sympathy for Russia always existed due to some historical links. This is strengthened by the fact that many Germans today still feel and express their guilt for World War Two crimes first towards Russia: criticizing Moscow too strong remains an uncomfortable task even for those, who rather clearly see the events in Donbas.
Disgust with development of the European Union and a far spread tendency of mistrust against policy of US marking other gateways Moscow uses to implement an alternative narration about the events in Ukraine: States long since are criticized for their imperial policy, for Vietnam, for Iraq and Afghanistan, for exporting their way of life everywhere without being asked, having nothing else in mind than business. Since US policy in many ways can be criticized for sure, it is compelling not only in Germany, but in whole Europe to think events in Ukraine may be as well staged from the White House. Accompanied by a spread lack of certain knowledge about the historical, political, social, cultural, and economical relation between Ukraine, Russia, and in East of Europe as whole, this position is feed by Russian PR-activists in strong manner: even if Russia is aggressor in Donbas – since Washington wanted to disintegrate Ukraine from Moscow as just another step of its imperial ambitions, isn’t it finally justified that someone tries to resist them? Not a small number of spectators may feel a malicious pleasure seeing a somehow charismatic bad guy like Putin foiling those imagined plans of the West.
How strong activities of the Kremlin impacting the public opinion in Germany is rather uncertain. Following the virtual trend, one could get to the point a majority of Germans supports Putin in Ukrainian case. A recently published poll of German Allensbach Institute however mentions that just a minority of 20 percent believes Russian narration of the conflict, while 55 percent see Kremlin as the direct aggressor, and another 34 percent rates Russian-backed separatism as the conflict’s cause. Truth probably lies somewhere in between.
Keeping Ukraine shapeless is supported by its spread unrenownedness. Public consciousness for such young nation only slowly rises, experts are yet rare. Main debates in German public tending to forget a Ukrainian perspective in covering the conflict; it is often presented rather as a tension only between Russia and the West, in which Ukraine plays only role of an object. While the allegedly Western perspective is thought to be omnipresent standard, allegedly Russian experts can rely on special attention, if they raise their voice. Since a nuanced view on the East of Europe and the Post-Soviet countries only slowly develops, many Russian experts may in public being experts as well for its neighbor countries. As well, not only experts of a rather scientist or otherwise professional, rather independent accesses are able to express their opinion: former German Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroeder is a most prominent example, how economical interests and dependences play a role in shaping opinion. Schroeder, whose engagement in Gazprom is well known, is a prominent advocate of Putin, whom he once called flawless democrat. Being rather popular since he refused Germany taking part in war against Iraq in 2003, he regularly criticizes German Government and the West for its approach on Russia.
In December 2015 a group of German scientists, representatives of churches, artists, actors, and different former politicians signed an open letter claiming to keep peace in Europe. The West should stop to confront Russia, maintain the dialog with Moscow and pay more respect to its fears and interests. Most of them may have a notable interest in keeping peace, a certain expertise on East of Europe or the historic concerns of events in Ukraine indeed majority has not. Among the subscribers not only Eckhard Cordes, who as Head of East Committee of German Economy has a virtual interest in prosper relations with Russia as most important market of the East, but as well Gerhard Schroeder. The list gained huge public attention and support – though it ignored an important feature of the conflict in Ukraine nearly completely: Ukraine itself. Once more, a multi-dimensional conflict was explained rather by a two-dimensional scheme: the West, Russia, and the nameless space somewhere in between.
In another open letter just a couple of days later, a group of German scientists and professionals with respective knowledge on the East criticized first letters statement, underlining that in Ukraine a distinct aggressor and a distinct victim obviously can be named. Far from being a hymn on Ukraine or concealing its problems, the group underlined the way Russia chose to develop already years ago. Despite its plus in expertise and knowledge of this latter gathered less attention – as if a plea for peace was always more comfortable then a profound analysis breaking up with handed down views on the world. Preemptive appeasement becomes the altar, on which Ukraine one day may be sacrificed just to avoid naming things clearly and to avoid any troubles.
Still, such scenario isn’t too certain: Contemporary German government may strengthen its steps of sanctions and isolation against Moscow, even if they are not too beloved among population. German economy won’t be too happy, but will follow the primate of policy. Even those partners in the EU, among whose isolation of Russia isn’t too popular, may once more be willing to proceed and even expand them. But in fact, here the most important card Putin is able to play may be found: in Europe, populists are on the run. EU-skepticism and the fear, that national identity and democracy may be replaced by grey bureaucratic ruling commissions in Brussels are of increasing popularity. Crisis of economy and a huge increment of migration are serving as amplifiers of such fears. For basically antagonistic groups of right- and left-winged spectrum such developments as liberalization, modern capitalism, and globalization are to condemn as core problems of all aberration and they may unite in defending Russian attempts in Ukraine. So, Russian PR-strategy for both sides skillfully developed an offer for its support: Leftists still tending to rate Russia as the main representative of former Soviet Union and an important counterweight to the US. Naming Ukrainian Government a Fascist Junta creates the ultimate killer argument: Western-backed Nazis in Kyiv fits narrative of Anti-Americanism just too great than to watch this idea with too many doubts. For the right-winged again, Russia attracts with authoritarianism, conservatism, traditionalism, a closed society, and a stretch of militarism.
Offering both a narration to interpret the conflict as caused by unloved Western policy without regarding Ukrainian perspective, it is obvious, that Moscow pays stronger afford to have good relations to the right-winged and right-populist movements. The financial support for French National Front is well known. Members of Hungarian Jobbik Party or the English UKIP are repeatedly appearing as guests on Russia Today, German populists of AfD are sounding on the situation about cooperation with or support from Russia. Austria’s FPO can be rated to the faithful allies of the Kremlin in Europe. Members of those European Parties went in May 2014 as election monitors on Crimea and afterwards asserted, elections would have been fair and according to international standard. It is often mentioned, that one of Putin’s main goals is to disunite European Union – supporting populism may be a promising way to do so: past years’ elections in different European countries witnessed increasing votes for such movements.
Expressing their solidarity with Russia being under Western pressure, once more the known scheme appears: Ukraine rarely appears as more than the scene, remains neither friend nor enemy, only a debauched nation torn between the East and the West. Implementing own image of its nation among the Western world and attracting more consciousness for its history, culture, and state of being may be the main task for Ukraine to spread its prominence in the world. The transformation from object to subject may lead even to broader solidarity among Europe, since understanding may rise that there’s not a torn between people being instrumentalized by two super powers, but that nowadays conflict in Ukraine is the struggle of a nation becoming independent from its past.
