A lot has been said and written about the differences between Ukraine and Russia. These differences are on an upward curve, with each passing day. But on that further on. The point is that there are differences as well as rapprochement opportunities, so much so one can ponder the threat of this trend to Ukraine (in the first place) and Russia.
First, the differences. These are found, of course, in the evolution of both political systems, in the fact that Ukraine and Russia found different ways out of their then practically similar neo-totalitarian condition. One option for the post-socialist countries was a variety of “colored” revolutions and the milder, not so obvious kinds of inner crisis. The other one was the adopting of an upgraded kind of totalitarianism. The latter was the historical choice Russia and Belarus made. I mean the countries that were part of Europe’s civilizational and political-cultural realities, because the evolution of [Central] Asian states was a different story.
Dialogs between nations are conducted by people, so the main question is whether the Russian in the street is capable of conducting a dialog? This depends on the person and the kind of dialog. Here the situation appears to be rather controversial.
Of course, it would be nice and dandy if the population of Russia were totally brainwashed by official propaganda. That’s not the case – and I have said as much on more than one occasion. There is no propaganda in the original sense; the Russian man in the street is not imposed any ideas. His Weltanschauung has been studied well enough. By the rules of mass culture he was sold precisely the kind of product he wanted, so there is no way to project the past Soviet notion of society onto the current Russian one.
The previous Soviet model of the Russian nation was getting obsolete in its universal and constant duality, as in the status of a janitor and general secretary of the party. At the time, a junior research fellow, district party committee “instructor,” KGB officer would share impressions of the existing realities with his trusted friends in the kitchen or in the smoking room, drifting further away from the official discourse. There is a joke dating back to the 1930s about an old man who, during a party meeting (another version says it was during an NKVD interrogation), lashed out at all those casting aspersions on Soviet power, exclaiming, “They are telling lies, just like those on the radio!” Now the realities are different.
Today in Russia, there is no fake “unity between the Party and the people.” Instead, there is the actual unity between the television and the viewer. This is exerting an influence on the sober-minded part of society, on a daily basis. Of course, people do not rush out on the street to beat the living lights out of Ukrainians, but a distinct image of the enemy has been implanted in their minds.
They’re in no hurry to beat them up. Moreover, they [Russians] are prepared to cooperate with them on a daily basis, believing that Ukrainians should – and could – have no reason for animosity toward Russians. This opinion was recently voiced by film director Vladimir Menshov. The trouble is that Russians aren’t the only ones to harbor this belief. The real and potential collaborationists are those citizens of Ukraine who do not understand the outrage of their fellow countrymen, saying so they grabbed Crimea, so what. That’s kid’s play. Grownups don’t behave that way. Grownups prefer to do business.
Even if such a dialog is conducted by Russians and Ukrainians who live in peace, without international law, national dignity, this will serve no one’s benefit, except the Russian ruling elite that will benefit from this very much. I’m afraid that there are people among the Ukrainian elite who would be happy to have this kind of situation.
At this point, Russian verbiage demands that one start eulogizing our great younger generation, that these young people will build a new kind of relationships between the nations – and other stuff reminding one of Manilov, the silly sentimentalist with pursed lips in Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls.
I have reiterated that young people are no reformers. They accept that which is offered by the older generation, be it revolution or reaction – otherwise they stand no chance of building a career. Progress in any given society is rooted in ambition, whether we like it or not.
All who have tried to change anything for the better have been people of middle or old age, because they knew what had to be changed and why. Pedocracy, first bitterly discussed in 1964 by the Egyptian Islamist author, Sayyid Qutb, in his book Milestones, remains proof of political adventurism, be it on the part of Trotsky, Mao or Surkov.
A certain type of a young political-career-building man has formed in Russia over the past 15 years. Here loyalty to principles and convictions is out of the question; this is for the freaks, losers, and dupes. The main thing is having power over others, climbing up the ladder, being a member of the nomenklatura – whether in power or opposition doesn’t matter, and changing sides is always a possibility. Former National Bolsheviks are known to have become big shots in the “Young Guard.”
Therefore, a researcher specializing in Russian society should by no means reduce his findings to those in power, the ruling elite. The point in question is a public and political order, created by that society, including the active opposition. Of the utmost importance is the kind of culture prevalent there – and I mean culture as a whole, not ideology. This makes control over the individual far more effective and all-embracing, more totalitarian than under the previous totalitarian regime.
Over a brief historical period we have been witness to those in power banking first on children from the suburbs and commuter towns, also, almost simultaneously, on hipsters. Consumerism, utilitarianism, pragmatic patriotism (winning success along with one’s country) appeared to have won. Presiding over it all were connoisseurs of myrrh, French wines, cocaine, haute couture and haute cuisine, femmes fatales, gentle boys and brutal men.
In the end, however, the connoisseurs of Shishkin, Aivazovsky, vodka (whisky at best), shashliks, and dumb blondes got the upper hand. That was the hipsters’ and pedocracy’s end. Now patriotic [well-to-do] parents were sending their children to study abroad – as had done those before them, so nothing new to pass on to the next generation. Today, the younger generation is off the politicians’ radar [in Russia] because no one gives a hoot, which means that these young people will become the most conservative part of society. If anyone opens fire “on the headquarters,” this will be Stalin’s, Yezhov’s way, not Chairman Mao’s way.
As for opposition in Russia, it is now clear that Nemtsov’s murder was the beginning of the final ban on all public actions on the part of the so-called democrats. Few have noticed something else. Over the past several months the most serious repressions have addressed the nationalist camp. And I mean repressions. As in the good old NKVD times, the guards escorting a column of corrective labor camp inmates open fire and shoot to kill if any of the inmates takes a step left or right out of line.
This is being done precisely the Soviet way. Nothing is allowed unless authorized or initiated “upstairs.” Under the circumstances one wonders about the subject of the Russia-Ukraine dialog – I mean Russia’s stand in the matter. Will Russia put up with the idea of contact with the Ukrainian public outside the purely utilitarian domain? For quite some time, Russian nationals returning from Ukraine have been unlawfully detained at the airport “to ascertain details of the trip.”
The paradox of Kremlin politics is that Russia’s desire to absorb Ukraine and Ukrainians actually results in Russians being isolated from Ukrainians, but let me stress again that this isolation is selective. Nothing new here. The good old Soviet notion of friendship of nations, implying peaceful communication between the nomenklaturas and apolitical townsfolk, forbidding a “deeper intellectual and cultural integration of the peoples of the USSR.” Worse still, Russians were deliberately kept ill-informed about the history and culture of the Ukrainian people, officially being the closest to the Russian people.
The current head of Russia’s newly established federal agency in charge of nationalities is an Alpha and Chechnya war veteran, not even a KGB/FSB analyst but a trained commando who started his career with the Vitebsk VDV (Paratroopers) Division. Some friendship of nations Russia will have!
Dmitry Shusharin is a Moscow-based historian and political journalist
