Communication between the government and experts leaves much to be desired. The complaints of people with experience and specialized knowledge in the security sector show that high-ranking officials either think they know everything and, hence, do not need expert help or are simply afraid of those who are wiser and more experienced than they. This situation is, of course, inadmissible in wartime. But there is a chance to change it.
The front-line letter of Colonel Viktor Pokusa to the Ukrainian leadership, which the newspaper Den published on March 12, 2015, became an occasion for an unprecedented event. After reading the sensational letter, in which the colonel openly and sharply says about not only the army problems, but also the ways of solving them, the Council of National Security Reforms and the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Research held a roundtable, “Urgent Measures to Increase Ukraine’s Defense Capability at a Time of Russian Aggression,” on March 19 at Ukrinform.
ADMIRAL IHOR KABANENKO CALLED ON THE LEADERSHIP NOT TO IGNORE THE THREAT FROM THE SEA. READ IN THE NEXT DAY ISSUES MR. KABANENKO’S ARTICLE ON THE CONDITION OF AND INDISPENSABLE REFORMS IN THE UKRAINIAN NAVY
We must note here the organizational role of Valentyn Badrak who was stunned with the colonel’s letter and promptly responded to it by gathering such prominent experts and officials as Volodymyr Horbulin, Yevhen Marchuk, Ihor Kabanenko, Andrii Artiushenko, Oleksandr Stetsenko, et al. Previous meetings of this kind had been held at a different level and, what is more, behind the closed door. Now it was an open event.
The first result is that experts and officials will discuss today the possibility of establishing a central executive body which (this was a unanimous opinion at the roundtable) will deal with the Ukrainian armed forces’ rearmament, set things going in the defense industry, and promote international cooperation in this field. Here follow the opinions of roundtable experts on the theoretical and practical results of the “letter from the front.”
“WE NEED A BODY THAT COULD DISTRIBUTE AND SYNTHESIZE ALL THAT CONCERNS FRONT-LINE REQUIREMENTS”
Volodymyr HORBULIN, director, National Institute of Strategic Studies:
“The root cause of all our difficulties and troubles is that the system of public administration in the security and defense sector has been totally ruined. There is no executive or legislative body that could join this country’s efforts in various directions, such as mobilization, draft boards, production of the needed weapon systems, and forecasting further military developments in the east. The Cabinet has not a single person directly responsible for the military-industrial complex (MIC). The premier has enough duties of his own, especially of economic, social, and diplomatic nature. The president works quite successfully on the international arena. But there is no body that could concentrate functions, distribute, and then synthesize all that concerns front-line requirements and resources. This body should be a military-industrial commission as part of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) staff.
“I took part, on an optional basis, in the formation of all the three supplements to the government defense order (GDO). The data furnished by the General Staff for the GDO could surprise any person who has nothing to do with the military-technical policy. The situation has improved this year, and the GDO was adopted in February. But the money cannot be used because our MIC is unable to meet the General Staff’s technical requirements. Failure to assess each other’s capabilities is a result of the military-technical policy. For this reason, the money allotted in unheard-of amounts is not being utilized as before.”
“WE HAVE LEGISLATIVELY SET A GOAL TO ACHIEVE NATO MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA. AND WE HAVE NO OTHER WAY TO GO”
Vadym TIUTIUNNYK, military expert, RNBO staff member in 1992-2011, National Institute of Strategic Studies associate:
“Let us not forget that we have legislatively set a goal to achieve NATO membership criteria. And we have no other way to go. We are facing a most acute problem of compatibility in communication, control, and logistic support. The same applies to state secrets. I would like the Cabinet to have a good and strong secretariat. For there can be a strong secretariat in the government, but ministries will remain worthless. Can the Cabinet secretariat assume the functions of ministries and address all these matters? A ministry should be the core, and the government should consist of political figures. Our political parties are doing their best to avoid responsibility in such critical spheres. The political system needs to be changed, for there will be no strong ministries and agencies in a country where there are no politically responsible persons.”
“WE ARE TOLD: ‘BUILD FASTER.’ BUT WHO WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACT THAT DOZENS OF EQUIPMENT PIECES WERE LEFT ON THE BATTLEFIELD?”
Oleksandr STETSENKO, Deputy General Manager, state-run concern Ukroboronprom:
“Everything is not as bad in this country as we think. The war forced us all to look around and analyze what has been and is still to be done. The main question of today is to establish a commission headed by the prime minister, with a first premier as his deputy, which would deal with all matters that concern keeping the Armed Forces of Ukraine combat ready. Our equipment has been in service for 30-40 years, and when look at the condition in which it comes to us for major repairs, you are horrified. The ministry of defense says it is ‘routine maintenance,’ but we receive vehicles with even their engines and sights dismantled… So, we need to revamp our defense industry.
“I can tell you how many tanks and pieces of ammunition we dispatched past year and are dispatching today. But this raises a question: what is the effectiveness of their usage? How much equipment has been abandoned in the ATO zone? We are told: ‘Build faster.’ But this takes a lot of money, and what about tomorrow? Who will be held responsible for the fact that dozens of equipment pieces were left on the battlefield? Did that equipment fulfill its combat mission? It is difficult to answer this because there is no proper analysis. Today, there are no people in the defense ministry, who could coordinate MIC matters, but we badly need a person who knows thoroughly about this system. The General Staff should feed back the information on weapons deployment. For instance, we have the Stugna antitank missile system, but do we know its battlefield effectiveness? We do not know about the performance of this equipment and its losses from the moment of production.
“Ukroboronprom is doing its utmost to restore, upgrade, and produce new equipment. We have an absolute imbalance of state-run enterprises, enterprises of mixed ownership, and private companies. We do not have a generalized picture of who is doing what because what all enterprises have been doing up to now is to create jobs and employ people. For this reason, technological designs, equipment, and documentation were being sold abroad. Now all this should be coordinated. Things will be OK, and we will win!”
“UKRAINE WILL HAVE TO TRAIN SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES”
Yevhen MARCHUK, prime minister of Ukraine in 1995-96, minister of defense in 2003-04:
“I believe the political leadership badly needs to explain to society what a military-political strategy is. Today’s society has immersed into a conflict due to the war – funerals, tragedies, atrocious killings… It is a shock for people. I think the army has even outstripped the church, as far as public trust is concerned. Our society, which shapes an attitude to military service as well as what is known as morale and motivation of servicemen, has become wiser in the past two years. Yet it keeps raising some questions through the media, to which there are no definite answers so far.
“Parliament has resolved to grant a ‘special status’ to certain areas of the Donbas. The president, the premier, and our foreign partners have stated unequivocally and repeatedly that there can be no military solution of this problem. But can this problem be resolved in a diplomatic way only – without the military component? It cannot. And what do you think is going on in the hearts of soldiers, officers, and the wounded, when they hear Ukraine’s topmost officials say that there is no military solution to this problem? Therefore, it is very important that the political leadership of all levels should explain to society in easy-to-grasp terms about what is going on in this country today.
“Officially, we are conducting an ‘antiterrorist operation’ (ATO), and, clearly, this status has certain, including international legal, consequences. But who will explain what will occur further in military, political, and international legal terms in addition to there being a frozen conflict? We should be open at least to ourselves. We are aware that our Western friends and partners would like to see this conflict frozen. And we should not feel hurt, although this is a serious strategic defeat for us. It is rather difficult to resolve this problem. But I will say again that the leadership should explain to the military, their families, experts, and all conscientious individuals what its military and political strategy is.
“Clearly, it is very difficult to answer this question, but if this problem remains unresolved, we should not wonder why there are so many unmotivated people. Some 17,000 deserters is a very bad thing, and professionals are asking: has anybody found the root cause of this staggering number? It is not just a figure – we must draw a lesson from this and understand what is affecting the human factor in society.
“I have spoken to psychologists who deal with people who come back from the front. The most painful thing for the servicemen who have come back from front is to see that the country is living a peaceful life. Discotheques, entertainments, etc. is good from the angle of societal health. But how can one explain this to soldiers and parents of the servicemen who have come back home crippled?
“The next problem – it is necessary to revamp military education, from the lyceum to the General Staff Academy.
“We have all seen the way Russia moved from its abstract aggressive ambitions to an outright military aggression. Russia has changed its military doctrine – it has increased the component of aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons outside the country. Three or four years ago it formed special operation forces and passed a law that allows this force ‘to be deployed outside Russia.’ It has boosted its military budget by several times in the past few years. France had built a Mistral warship for Russia before the aggression began. If this ship had been deployed in Sevastopol, it would be riding now at anchor off Odesa and controlling the main facilities along the entire sea coast. Quite recently, German specialists were training Russian special-purpose commandos, while the Yanukovych team was busy dismantling the armed forces. In 2007 Russia announced withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (it finished this process on March 11, 2015). A year later Russia attacked Georgia.
“I know what a military doctrine is, for I personally happened to work on this document. So, I do not understand why the state leadership has problems with this.”
“ALL EYES ON THE SEA! RUSSIA WILL HAVE AN OFFENSIVE STRIKE GROUPING THERE AS SOON AS THE SUMMER OF THIS YEAR”
Ihor KABANENKO, admiral (in reserve), deputy defense minister of Ukraine in 2014, military expert:
“The decision to restore the Joint Operational Command was made last year, but the question is why it is not being fulfilled.
“We are all looking east, at dry land. But if you look at the Black Sea, you should know that the opposite side will have a reinforced offensive strike grouping there as soon as the summer of this year. It is Project 636.3 submarines, new frigates, and ships armed with Moskit surface-to-surface missiles. A small grouping of 6 units comprises 76 Aegis-type medium-range antiaircraft missiles, crew-served air defense weapons, and 40 supersonic cruise missiles which are difficult to shoot down. Submarines also carry missiles, torpedoes, and space-operated integrated computerized control systems. This grouping will create a zone in which any actions of a littoral state can be blocked. The front line is 160-180 miles wide and up to 80 miles deep. This force can embrace our coastal area, and the area of Azov and the Caucasus.
“The Russian minister of defense has also conducted a war game for the marines to disembark on the coast of other states. In other words, an offensive component is being prepared for some major actions.
“As for us and the Government Defense Order, the Corvette program has been frozen, and foreign equipment is being purchased. For example, one piece is being purchased for 14 million hryvnias, while we have a producer that is one of the world’s top five leaders and offers an integrated system which covers hundreds of facilities in a certain area. On the other hand, they invest 1 billion hryvnias in the repairs of a 39-year-old ship. We see the continuation of a story, when there was an attempt to move the naval headquarters from Odesa, but this time they are trying to relocate it from the place where there are all the control facilities to another part of the city.
“As for staff placement, a number of key offices have been abolished or reduced in rank. For example, the office of General Staff deputy chief in charge of Euro-Atlantic integration has been abolished. We kept this office intact in the Yanukovych era, but it is being abolished now… It is not clear who will maintain communication with NATO fleets, deal with training, military aid, etc. This means we are closing this project.
“We do not have a strategy of the national Navy, and there is no understanding of the situation. So, all eyes on the sea! By many indications, the situation is dangerous there. What is needed is a systemic strategy and definition, and funding. If it is planned to channel 14 billion into armaments, at least 2 billion should be invested in the Navy. This will in fact make it possible to finish the corvette, lay a new one, build a number of missile boats, purchase the required weapons, and load our defense production facilities. The situation is that the now existing threats may be put into practice. Incidentally, the chief inspector of the Navy is… a land forces general who has not served even a day in the Navy.”
