It is almost three years that Russia has been at war with Ukraine. And I think over and over again whether the Kremlin would have dared to do so if Ukraine had already been a NATO member. I began to reflect even more closely on this after visiting the North Atlantic Alliance’s headquarters in Brussels (thanks to the Den Summer School of Journalism and the NATO Information and Documentation Center). So a conversation with Admiral Ihor KABANENKO, former minister-counselor at the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, defense and security expert, was a good opportunity to ask and receive competent answers to thorny questions. Besides, oligarch Viktor Pinchuk’s recent proposal of a “compromise,” whereby “Ukraine will not join NATO in the near- or midterm,” makes Alliance membership a still more topical issue in this country. The interview with Ihor Kabanenko focuses on our chances to become a NATO member and on whether “soft power” is effective.
“HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIES”
Mr. Kabanenko, what do you think about Pinchuk’s proposal of “compromises” in his WSJ article?
“The point is that the war in Ukraine has lasted for nearly three years. There is little, if any, success on the diplomatic level. This particularly applies to the Minsk protocols which are in fact not working today. On the other hand, the Kremlin continues to employ hybrid tactics and strategy in this war. Noticeably, the populace is somewhat fatigued from the war and wants it to be over. But the ‘compromises’ you mentioned are a misleading idea, and the hybrid approach means using the situation and people’s aspirations in a certain political direction. Instead of directing this into the channel of really good steps, such as rallying the nation for defending independence, establishing an attractive socioeconomic pattern, and forming a viable society and state, [Pinchuk] suggests a controversial approach, when sovereignty and independence are a matter of bargaining.
“History is a good teacher that proves by facts that appeasement is an example of bad diplomacy. The experience of the Baltic countries and Poland in the past century shows that the policy of appeasement in the late 1930s produced no good results – on the contrary, it led to the stagnation of statehood, the loss of territories, and sufferings of the populace. This diplomacy only whetted the aggressor’s appetite and finally resulted in the outbreak of World War Two. We must not ignore this experience. For this reason, statements like ‘we should not go to NATO,’ ‘let us drop European ambitions,’ ‘let us offer Russia control over Sevastopol,’ and other, which are aimed at forming quasi-entities on the territory of Ukraine or/and bargaining on our country’s sovereign rights and elements of independence, are in fact the repetition of a similar policy. Shall we experiment again?
“Unfortunately, the NATO issue has long been a matter of speculation in this country to please certain political ambitions. For example, according to Rating’s public opinion poll, 47 percent of Ukrainians support NATO, but other sources claim there can be 78 percent of such people, depending on how the question is formulated. We’ve had no referendum; no well-known personalities, whom the populace trusts, have ever publicly commented on this; there has been no vigorous explanatory campaign, while old-time stereotypes still endure. Indeed, it’s necessary to explain ‘who is who’ by way of irrefutable facts instead of indulging in invention and disinformation. It’s necessary to stop manipulating people in the gray zone about this. It is substitution of facts by conjectures which are presented as something that has already happened.
“In my view, it is good that a peace debate is underway. However, we must carefully assess the conditions of peace. Are there any conditions now? First of all, both sides should aspire for peace. If one side is aspiring and the other one is doing entirely different things, it is in fact the path to admitting a defeat and saying: ‘OK, we are ready to trade off our independence.’ This must not be done. National dignity must not be traded off, for only strong and closely-knit nations can win in turbulent times. Independence and national dignity are priceless and cannot be a matter of political bargain. We must not adjust to those who in fact show by their actions that they do not reckon with Ukraine – it is a road to nowhere.
“There are at least three key aspects in establishing a lasting peace: first of all, when both sides of a conflict aspire for it; secondly, there should be acceptable peace conditions and sovereignty and territorial integrity must not be traded off; and, thirdly, diplomacy (‘soft power’) should be applied as part of a single political and defense strategy in close interaction with an effective system of national security and defense (‘hard power’). The three factors will only work if they are part of a whole.
“We need a comprehensive defense strategy based on national unity, flexible deterrence, and adequate response.”
“THE LEADERSHIP SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO INTRODUCING THE ALLIANCE’S STANDARDS”
As you have already noted, there are different estimates of the percentage of the Ukrainians who support NATO. To what extent do you think the populace knows about the Alliance? Is it really necessary to explain to the people about NATO?
“Naturally, it is. A program of public information about NATO was mapped out recently, but very few can say what effect it produces. There also are quite a lot of other programs, but people just do not know about them. So there should be a very serious information campaign. Whenever we speak of NATO, it is about the things that produce tangible results for the defense of our state and for strengthening our national armed forces. In my opinion, we must understand that the Soviet defense model – ‘shut up and obey orders’ – is a vestige of the past. One of the 20th century’s main lessons is that the Soviet system historically lost in the political, economic, social, as well as military, dimensions. There should be a different model based on leadership, respect for an individual – in other words, on understanding that a human being, a serviceman, is the principal value. He should become the main value, the motive force, and the object of the state’s primary interest. We should create combat and logistics systems, motivations – there are a lot of things to work on.
“NATO standards are in the West, not in the East. They prove to be viable – unlike the ones in which man is a cog in the machine and ‘closes all gaps’ in defense and other spheres. People want to be respected by the state and inside the armed forces. Besides, it is necessary not only to widen the circle of the people who have combat experience, have studied in the West, and taken part in joint programs, but also to offer them key offices in the Ministry of Defense. It is advisable to introduce NATO standards at an accelerated pace. I think the leadership should attach more importance to this introduction – it is, of course, good to shake hands at a top political and diplomatic level, but, in reality, things are or are not done at the working level, where one must work more. For example, NATO has opened eight trust funds in support of Ukraine, but, as far as I know, we have problems that hinder seizing these opportunities as much as possible. At the same time, there are positive results in the combat training and special operations of airmobile troops. These examples of ‘success stories,’ especially the value-related side of the matter, should be spoken about and propagated as much as possible, for this will help the military in practice. NATO is not a military bloc but a politico-military club based on the common values of liberal democracy and ways of their protection. I’ve often heard people say: ‘If we were a NATO member, we would not have this conflict.’ NATO is a club, where one is for all and all are for one, where it does not matter whether its member is a big or small country and how its economy fares – what really matters is values and ability to defend them and form a single defense union on this basis.
“As our adversaries are resorting to propaganda based on disinformation and invented facts, and the borderline between fact and fabrication is being effaced, we need to establish strategic communications. Experience shows that they are indispensable, but we must provide more explanations, spotlight true facts, and make more efforts in our state. Some people say: ‘NATO is not exactly expecting us.’ It is a totally wrong approach. We must ask ourselves a different question: ‘What are we striving for? Where is our future? What model shall we use? What is the way of our existence? What are our national values and what keeps us together?’ I think it is a matter of principle. It is our civilizational choice. If this is the case, we must move in this direction and always improve the governmental and political system, economy, and defense capability of Ukraine. This will produce a result. Vacillations to the left and right of zero will still result in zero. We should move in the chosen direction and do our best to be successful on this way.
“Today, three years after the Revolution of Dignity, one must not suggest going back or aside. Moreover, if we hypothetically imagine that Ukraine will be neutral (will not move towards NATO), there will be a ruin because we will remain one on one with all the real, not just potential, threats from abroad. We badly need a circle of allies today – it is a way to defend our independence and become part of the Euro-Atlantic community, the Euro-Atlantic family. Of course, it is an uneasy time there as well. Yet experience shows that hesitation only speeds up the emergence of problems and results in a destructive scenario. We must choose a clear strategic course and keep moving forward, making some tactical corrections on the way in order to apply the world’s best practices.
“Also of importance is military culture. For this reason, key offices should be held by the people who believe in and are ready to defend the values of democracy and have the ability and the experience to do so. Yes, it is important to speak to our Western colleagues in the same language (terminology and the same interpretation of various aspects), but still more important is the aspiration that this country should live in security and have prospects. I can see no other way than one in the Euro-Atlantic direction. Values, territory, and sovereignty must not be traded off for myths.”
“WE ARE TODAY ON THE FRONT EDGE OF DEFENDING THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION”
About history. We have already missed some chances to enter NATO. Which ones? And why did we fail to make use of them?
“I think we stood an immense chance in the 1990s, when the population of East European countries rallied together for the sake of common values. They clearly identified their European choice and the Euro-Atlantic way of defending liberal democracy. They succeeded in this. Unfortunately, Ukraine opted for a multi-vector policy at the time. Then there was a chance in the first decade of the 21st century, which we also missed. Of course, the missed chances affected everything that occurred further on. The year 2010 saw active actions to seize the informational space in Crimea and the Donbas in order to speeds up the partition of this country. This fact was also conducive to the current situation.”
What chances to join NATO does Ukraine have after the Russian aggression?
“I think we do have chances – even better ones than before. We are today on the front edge of defending the Western civilization. Yes, it is a serious test for us. Yet more and more people in the West are aware of the importance of what Ukraine is doing. I think this factor caused the Warsaw Summit to endorse such an unprecedented document as the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Unfortunately, there is very little public information about the way this document is being concretely fulfilled. This raises the question ‘Why?’ NATO has opened a lot of previously closed doors. This offers Ukraine good opportunities that should be seized. It is again the question of efficiency at the working level.”
“WE SHOULD DROP THE ‘WE ARE SPECIAL’ APPROACH”
What do you think about the current leadership’s promise that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will apply NATO standards by 2020? Is it realistic?
“I think it is a very ambitious statement. Unfortunately, there are serious doubts today that this will happen. I personally cannot say that these processes are as rapid and profound as they should be. The year 2020 is round the corner, but the bulk of the work should have been done in the beginning. But, in my view, the main thing is a change in military culture, which will allow committed professionals to pursue an open policy towards partners and allies. Very much is still to be done here. It is one thing to say that we have applied so many standards, but it is another thing to adhere to them so that nobody will say that ‘we are special.’
“Incidentally, ‘we are special’ is a thing that existed in all the Eastern European countries that were switching to NATO standards. There was a huge domestic lobby that was saying: ‘We don’t need this, for this may be working over there but not in our country because we are special.’ But the politico-military establishment of those countries quickly understood that it was an isolationist approach that slowed down the necessary reforms. Unfortunately, a similar situation is now in Ukraine. We should drop the ‘we are special’ approach. For what are we ‘special’ in? I can accept the fact that we have inherited certain armament standards, infrastructures, and assets from the Soviet era. But are we also ‘special’ in that we still think in the categories of the past, thwarting changes for the better and keeping at bay people who have expertise? There are a considerable number of people in our Armed Forces, who know what is to be done, but, at the same time, we lose very much because of the belief that ‘we are special’ and due to some half-hearted approaches and decisions (‘we will change something, but just a little’). This does harm at the very beginning of an idea because changes must be made quickly and produce a final, not an intermediary, result. If changes take too much time, this irritates people and compromises the very idea of these changes, and people do not see the desired result. It must be clear that the time of ‘Potemkin villages’ is gone, and practical changes are needed.”
We have already mentioned Russian propaganda. As is known, propaganda appeals to certain feelings. Particularly, what it will perhaps play on in the east is people’s disappointment with Ukraine. So, maybe, it is worthwhile not only to speak of faith, but also to restore belief in the state?
“This is also the question of an attractive socioeconomic model. In my view, what matters here is the political will to change the existing post-Soviet model so that people could see at least the small changes they really want to see. People should believe in the ongoing changes and see success stories – only then will they rally around the values that form these changes. This will ensure the viability of society, and we will hold out.”
What is your attitude to the idea of changing the presentation of information in Ukraine? We have already said today that some positive steps are discussed not the way some failures are. Maybe, information should be presented in a more balanced way for Ukraine and for the rest of the world?
“In my opinion, successes will form a critical mass when it will be possible not only to speak of them, but also to see them in real life. Of course, one can speak of some steps, but people should feel this on their own. There should be strategic communications that make it possible to communicate on equal terms, we must replace hype with a frank and truthful ‘government-society’ communication, we should not be afraid to speak about failures and mistakes, about why things went one way or another, learn the lessons of the past, and modify our future actions in accordance with them.
“It is also necessary to reduce power distance (unfortunately, Ukraine has a very high indicator of power distance – 92. We are next to Honduras and Guatemala in the Geert Hofstede rating). In that case people will have a greater belief in the government and form a societal optimism which, as is known, makes one redouble their efforts and shapes the future of a country.”
“WE SHOULD FORM A CIRCLE OF ALLIES”
Let us turn to another longstanding problem – the Minsk Accords. Some people believe that the format should be changed. But, for example, the representative of Estonia in NATO said that if the format were changed, Russia might pronounce the previous agreements null and void, which will give her a juridical right to violate the Minsk Accords.
“It is not an interstate agreement, so the format itself comprises a lot of things that are not binding for one side or the other. I am personally not very optimistic about more progress in this format. I think we should form a circle of allies in the diplomatic sphere in order to pressure the Kremlin into withdrawing Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and allow the latter to reestablish control over the state border. It is the basic condition. All the rest should occur thereafter. In my view, this should be the gravitation center of all diplomatic efforts.
“It is impossible to say today how Russia did it in 2014 and whether there were any ‘little green men’ here. The presence of Russian troops is obvious to everybody and needs no evidence. Therefore, Ukraine should use the format to form, support, and encourage a circle of allies that are really aware of the ruinous nature of the current threats from the East to the West and are prepared to work side by side to stop this. It’s not an easy task. Moscow is now doing very much to upset the world order, split the Western community, separate certain countries, and to influence their policies. We know the latest events, including Donald Trump’s press conference on January 11. I think we should work in this very direction – not to appease Russia but to force it by a joint effort to make peace and withdraw its troops.”
It is very important for Ukraine now to achieve what you call “viability.” One of its main features is integration. Are there any practical mechanisms to do this?
“I think the leadership plays an immense role in building ‘viability’ (incidentally, the NATO Riga conference also discussed this). For the leadership should be a generator, provide impetuses, and create mechanisms by forming an attractive socioeconomic and political model, reducing power distance, and conducting a bilateral dialog with civil society and private business. The leadership’s role is to unite and consolidate. In principle, this is the situation in any liberal democratic country because the authorities are supposed to coordinate, consolidate, and unite. This is the way any country can survive and achieve viability, for this helps society to knit together. In this case society can resist all the risks, and it is difficult to split it by means of, say, manipulations because there are firm inner persuasions. Naturally, civil society and private business also play an important role because very much also depends on their pro-activity, pragmatism, and joint efforts.”
Ukraine-NATO: a chance deferred
By Ivan KAPSAMUN, The Day
“NATO, mainly it is not a question of money, it is a question of security. Russian aggression demonstrated again there is no other security system but NATO which was effective to stop the aggression,” President Petro Poroshenko said to Reuters the other day.
Why then is Ukraine not in NATO? Why is the current leadership making ambiguous statements about the North Atlantic Alliance? What path has Ukraine already passed and what chances did we have?
JULY 10, 2002. DONETSK. SENSATIONAL VISIT. YEVHEN MARCHUK, SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COUNCIL (RIGHT), ACCOMPANIED NATO SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGE ROBERTSON DURING THE FIRST VISIT OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL BLOC’S LEADER TO UKRAINE. INCIDENTALLY, THE THEN DONETSK ELITE (FROM CITY MAYOR OLEKSANDR LUKIANCHENKO TO OBLAST GOVERNOR VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH) HAILED ROBERTSON’S VISIT. DONETSK ALSO HOSTED A ROUNDTABLE, “REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS” / UKRINFORM photo
Before 2000, there was consistent and meaningful enough cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance. It will be recalled that our country took part in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, then there was the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine in 1997, there was the Ukraine-NATO Committee (UNC) and a lot of various meetings and working contacts. An atmosphere of Ukraine-NATO confidence was being formed. In December 1999, National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) Secretary Yevhen Marchuk was appointed chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation with NATO. Then there was a radical transition from ordinary cooperation to the legitimization of Ukraine’s course towards joining NATO in the future.
It was announced for the first time on the official level about Ukraine’s intention to join the North Atlantic Alliance at the RNBO session on May 23, 2002. “As the situation in Europe has changed, it is pointless for Ukraine to further pursue the policy of non-alignment. And it is even harmful in some cases,” Mr. Marchuk said at the time. And it is also very important to recall the position of the then president Leonid Kuchma because he changed it some time later: “We know that nobody has ever been at war inside NATO. And I want us never to fight – this is main goal of our policy.”
As soon as October 2002, the Verkhovna Rada held parliamentary hearings on NATO. As a result of a heated debate, it was resolved: “Preparation for NATO membership is a decisive factor of Ukraine’s progress on this path…”
The Law of Ukraine “On Foundations of Ukraine’s National Security,” passed on June 19, 2003, by a constitutional majority, confirmed Ukraine’s intention to integrate into North Atlantic Alliance structures. Even the Party of Regions faction voted for the law. Article 8, “The Main Directions of the Governmental National Security Policy,” proclaimed that Ukraine would pursue an active foreign policy in order “to gain membership to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while preserving good-neighborly relations and a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as other countries of the world.”
It is Mr. Marchuk who laid the groundwork, presented, reported, and answered questions at all stages. All the necessary legal instruments to pursue this course had been prepared by the summer of 2003. In addition, Ukraine’s intentions about accession to NATO were set out more concretely in the new version of the RNBO-approved Military Doctrine of Ukraine. It was brought into force by the president’s decree on June 15, 2004.
The Kremlin’s response did not keep us waiting. As soon as in the summer of 2004, after the NATO Istanbul summit, Kuchma made a U-turn. When it became clear that Ukraine was on the point of signing the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), Kuchma and Vladimir Putin disappeared from the press “radar screens” for a couple of days somewhere on the Sea of Azov shore. When Kuchma came back, he ordered the abovementioned formula on cooperation with NATO to be immediately excluded from the military doctrine. Later, when the Yanukovych team came to power, it also forced parliament to delete this formula from the Law “On Foundations of Ukraine’s National Security.”
We must also recall the story of the 2008 Bucharest summit, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy blocked granting the MAP to Ukraine and Georgia. As a result, Russia attacked Georgia in August of the same year and illegally occupied 20 percent of that country’s territory. And, perhaps aware that NATO will not react, as it did not in the case with Georgia, Moscow unlawfully annexed Crimea in 2014 and still continues its aggression in eastern Ukraine. Likewise, it must be stressed that if Kuchma and Yanukovych had not played with the foreign-policy course, Russia would have hardly dared to commit an open aggression. Ukraine would have a totally different status and relationship with the Alliance.
The current leadership must also draw conclusions. Firstly, it should analyze the contemporary history of Ukraine and the way this country has already passed. Secondly, it is time to speak clearly about our intention and desire to follow this path as fast as possible and make up for what we lost.
