Militaristic frenzy has erupted with renewed force in Russia. The cries “Crimea is ours!” are forgotten, and stories about the Donbas and the rest of Ukraine are gradually leaving the federal TV channels. Now, the entirety of the “Russian world’s” romantic supporters’ enthusiasm is aimed at the Middle East.
Russia has opened not just a military front in Syria, but a diplomatic one as well. The Kremlin’s political objectives in Syria currently remain unclear, despite propaganda dwelling much on fighting terrorists of the Islamic State (ISIS).
Russian air force presence in the country consists of 12 Su-24M frontline bombers, 12 Su-25SM ground attack planes, 4 Su-30SM fighters, 6 Su-34 bombers as well as Mi-24 strike helicopters and Mi-8 multipurpose ones.
Su-30 fighters are designed to gain air superiority. Despite having been upgraded to enable ground strikes, they are still aircraft of the 1970s vintage. Therefore, they cannot hit ground targets on high-altitude missions and become vulnerable target for the enemy’s MANPADs when closing on their targets.
The Su-24M is an all-weather front-line bomber, and it can reach its targets by flying at low altitude. It has been in service since the early 1970s and is known for a somewhat high accident rate. Since its introduction, over 80 planes have been lost in emergencies.
The Su-34 was developed from the mid-1980s and saw its first shipments to line squadrons in 2000. It is designed to destroy ground and surface targets and disable air defense systems. A few Su-34s took part in the Caucasian war of 2008, but the bomber was officially accepted into service only in March 2014. This was due to the fact that the air force found a number of serious flaws with the plane. The Su-34s are to undergo military trials in Syria.
Russia expanding its involvement in the Syrian conflict is associated with a number of risks and difficulties.
Firstly. Air strikes alone, even if highly effective, which some doubt already, are not enough. Without a ground operation and occupation of the territory in question, the militants will quickly restore their infrastructure and return to the positions left following the air strikes.
Secondly. Taking into account the Russian troops’ non-participation in ground operations, it leaves Bashar al-Assad’s army to do it. His forces control about 17 percent of Syria, mainly the coastal areas, and hold the line that passes through Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, and Latakia.
The Syrian army had about 150,000 soldiers in 2014, with another 60,000 in the guard. The Alawite militia and al-Assad’s allies from the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, supported and equipped by Iran, have several tens of thousands fighters among them. However, the latter group has suffered significant losses and is now gradually withdrawing from battle and concentrating on the border with Lebanon and Israel. There are claims that about 15,000 soldiers of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Iran are present in Syria as well.
At the moment, al-Assad’s army can only fight defensively, trying to hold its positions. Air strikes can help with it until (as evidenced by the experience of Afghanistan) the militants get truly effective air defense weapons.
The ISIS has 30,000 to 50,000 fighters, armed with heavy weapons captured from army depots. The secular opposition has 45,000 to 60,000 soldiers. The Islamic Front numbers about 45,000. It was formed of seven Islamic groups in November 2013. Its goal is the overthrow of the al-Assad regime and building an Islamic-oriented state. Another player opposed to the Syrian president and now Russia is Salafist radical grouping Jabhat al-Nusra (the Victory Front), which is associated with al-Qaeda. Various estimates put the group’s numbers in a range from 6,000 to 10,000 fighters.
Although al-Assad’s enemies are disunited and often at war with one another, they, however, have an important advantage in their considerable human resources.
Russia is facing a very difficult dilemma. If this intervention does not lead to a significant change in the situation, the conflict should turn into a war of attrition, with al-Assad’s army becoming its first victim. It is fraught with serious image losses for Vladimir Putin personally.
An alternative may involve sending land forces to Syria, albeit camouflaged as the so-called volunteers. For this purpose, the Kremlin can use the Donbas separatists, freed up by the lull in Ukraine fighting. Anyway, they cannot restart their prewar lives, and using them in Syria comes in handy. The risks of this option are clear. The losses will grow, the outcome is absolutely unpredictable, but the specter of a new Afghan war will become real instead of virtual one.
Another problem is logistics. Russia finds it quite hard to provide even for its existing military presence. Sealift is associated with passage through the Black Sea Straits, which makes the nature of cargoes known to NATO member Turkey, which Russia has less than cordial relations with.
Landing ships of the Black Sea Fleet alone will not solve this problem, while hiring Russian merchant ships will be hard as well, for the simple reason of their low number. In addition, they need to send armaments to Syria to replace al-Assad’s army losses that will inevitably mount. Logistical difficulties go beyond those just listed.
The third problem is financial. Alexei Kudrin has calculated that the Syrian campaign costs will be comparable to the costs of holding military exercises. However, the latter are relatively short-term, while the minimum duration of the former is several months. The funding required is an order of magnitude higher. Pledging increased allocations for the Ministry of Defense in the future budget is all well and good, but Russia has on its hands Crimea, the Donbas (at least for the time being) and its own nearly-bankrupt regions. Money is the blood of war, and Russia is short on it.
Now to the diplomatic front.
Iraq and Egypt allegedly support the Russian intervention in Syria. However, their support is highly situation-dependent. The government of Iraq wants another Russian force to be sent to help it, while the Egyptian leadership finds strengthening of anti-terrorist campaign in Syria advantageous as it may decrease the terrorists’ numbers in the Sinai Peninsula.
After the Iranian nuclear program crisis has been resolved, that nation will refrain from getting its troops too deeply involved in Syria, as its confrontation with Saudi Arabia and Qatar comes to the forefront now. In addition, Iran would lose from harming its relations with the US, which it has worked so hard to improve. Thus, it will support Russia, but there are certain limits to this support. A serious strengthening of the Kremlin’s position in Syria is not in Iran’s interest.
Russia has become an ally of Shiite Iran and Alawite Syria. For the Sunnis, who make up a majority of Muslims, this attaches a mighty stigma to Russia. Besides, the Arabs and the Persians have opposed each other for ages. The Alawite majority is not even seen as Muslim by most Sunnis. Thus, verbal support from Egypt should not deceive Russians. Much more important is the demarche of the US, UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia against the Russian intervention in Syria. For the last two, it is also a kind of protest against the Russian-Iranian alliance.
France has always considered Syria as part of its zone of influence. There are still many Francophones there. The government of that power is seriously displeased, and it immediately affected the course of the Normandy Four negotiations. Thus, the Kremlin’s move worsened at once relations with a country that has always been considered pro-Russian.
The militaristic frenzy will gradually fade in Russia, but getting out of Syria will be much more difficult than from the Donbas. It seems that the Kremlin did not think about it beforehand. The Afghan tragedy repeats itself as a farce.
