The yearend has brought maybe not always visible but nevertheless essential warming in the relations between Ukraine and the European Union. One cannot speak about some breakthroughs, since both sides are not prepared for them yet. However, it is obvious that first steps have been made, able to result in changing the relationship’s quality. The European Parliament’s resolution on the Broader Europe initiative, pointing out that Europe should keep the door open for the new members, was only one of the signals everybody awaited. A Ukraine-EU Committee meeting is to be held soon, with preliminary consultations having already being held in Brussels concerning the future Ukraine-EU Action Plan. Another significant event was signing a trilateral communiquО by the vice premiers of Ukraine and Poland and the European Commission’s vice president regarding the ill-famed Odesa- Brody pipeline (the issue in question was prolonging it to P л lock in Poland and filling it with the light technological oil). What is most important about the pipeline is that this is in fact the first project that involves EU structures on such a deep level. The importance of the talks about the Action Plan is in that they should result in the gradual extension of many basic EU standards to Ukraine. The diplomats have called these moves a “pragmatic approach.” So, what is really new is the fact that for the first time a truly pragmatic talks have begun.
Negotiations on working out the Ukraine-EU Action Plan are to start in the end of 2003 or in January 2004. This is what both Kyiv and Brussels claim. It is also planned that the talks will be completed by late April next year. Kyiv’s position on the eve of the negotiations is something like the following: the document should be a joint one, it should be a political agreement; both sides should have equal rights, the right to their own viewpoint, and obligation to respect the other side’s view. Brussels’s stand, as may be inferred from statements by Commissar of the European Commission Chris Patten, one of those in charge for drafting the Action Plan, makes it possible for one to expect that at least a compromise decision is possible. The term of the document’s validity suggested by Ukraine is two to three years, meaning that it would be possible to start work on its implementation even before the presidential elections, as Chris Patten said during his October’s visit to Kyiv.
Patten also said that the document should encompass a deepened political dialog, Ukraine’s participation in the EU common market, and creating much deeper cooperation in the fields of justice and interior affairs, concerning primarily the issues of migration and border security. Obviously, issues such as cooperation in the spheres of transport, energy sector, and telecommunications will also be reflected in it.
From Ukraine’s standpoint, the Action Plan should clearly define the steps Kyiv is to take for gradually approaching the moment when four major EU freedoms will be applied to Ukraine: the freedoms of people, goods, capital, and services moving across borders. Clauses on the free access to the EU internal market along with extending these four freedoms to neighboring countries can also be found in the Broader Europe initiative.
Kyiv believes that implementing the Ukraine-EU Action Plan will lead to the next stage in the development of the relationship, at which point it will become possible to speak about signing two agreements: on Ukraine’s association with the EU following the model of the European agreements that existed between the European Union and those Central and East European countries joining it next May along with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as on free trade. Today one can hear from Ukrainian diplomats that it is impossible to remove all problems arising here in two years. In part, the issue of creating a free trade zone is conditioned not only by Ukraine’s entering the World Trade Organization but also detailed negotiations with the EU on this account. Incidentally, the question of obtaining free market country status from the EU is still relevant. The latter claims that Russia was granted this status earlier than Ukraine only because it was first to start the relevant procedures. Incidentally, today the preconditions have already been created for a situation such that negotiations with the EU free trade zone can start irrespectively of the terms of Ukraine entering the WTO, which is a necessary requirement.
The problem of the free movement of people across borders will not be solved until steps are clearly defined to be undertaken to remove Ukraine from the so-called Schengen blacklist. This, in its turn, requires not only signing an agreement on readmission (and simultaneously signing a similar agreement with Russia) but also approving many amendments to adjust Ukraine’s legislation to the Schengen ones in the issues of border protection, fighting illegal migration, and customs policy. There is a certain progress achieved in the EU stand on this issue. In part, Commissar Patten stated in Kyiv that everything is possible, and one could infer from his words that the issues of readmission and liberalizing the visa regime are closely interlaced. In the not distant past all discussions on this topic recalled a dialog of the deaf.
Ukrainian diplomats also claim that the dispute becomes more constructive in that Ukraine is treated not as a bad child but as somebody who is instructed how to act in one way or another.
In all fairness, one has to recognize that the Ukrainian side also started to approach the problem in a more pragmatic manner. Today Kyiv demonstrates its will to discuss less the political status of its relations with the EU (in any case, the term, neighbor, suggested by the EU cannot serve as a political status) thom move forward to the moment when this discussion will become unavoidable. The more so that before 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria are to join the EU, the latter will not be prepared to discuss any prospects. There is no use to point out that Brussels’s decision to announce European prospects for the Balkan states, simultaneously avoiding discussing this subject with Ukraine, far from agrees with the current situation — the West has always proceeded from its own considerations. Finally, for a certain period a formula “everything but participation in EU institutions” would be completely appropriate.
Among the factors furthering gradual changes in the situation was not only the aspiration to mitigate negative effects of the EU enlargement, Ukrainian diplomatic circles believe. Though Brussels does not say this openly, it cannot help but take into consideration the situation concerning the unexpected forming of the Single Economic Space. The West was simply taken aback with this, and far from all in the West are prepared to recognize Russia’s deciding influence in the post-Soviet space and Ukraine being de facto included into the geo-economic system created by Moscow. Brussels’s proposition to Ukraine to go through all the necessary procedures to join its single space as soon as possible looks like an implication, since it is impossible to be in two single spaces simultaneously. Incidentally, the SES agreement in its Moscow wording envisages transition to a single customs space with subsequent implementation of a single currency etc. The West’s attitude toward Russian politicians’ statements on their hope to live in a single country within the borders of the former USSR is also far from encouraging.
It is also obvious what obstacles may appear for further movement. The West has repeatedly pointed out the need for conducting fair, democratic, and free elections and will closely watch every movement in this direction.
