Paul Moreira’s propagandistic film Ukraine: les masques de la revolution, shown at the French Canal+ in early February, has triggered sharp debates not only in Ukraine, but also in France itself (see “A Special Operation a la Francaise” in Den No. 19-20, February 5-6, 2016). Philippe de Lara, French philosopher, a professor at University Paris II, is one of those who immediately subjected the film to sober and scathing criticism. In an interview with The Day, de Lara focuses on the response of France’s media and intellectuals to the scandalous film as well as on the effective instruments of projecting an alternative vision of Ukraine events in Europe.
Moreira’s film caused many reactions from French journalists and experts. In your opinion, what does it indicate? Was it an evidence of growing interest in Ukraine or just an indignation at violation of journalism ethics and standards by Canal+?
“Both: the fact that the film manipulated grossly the interviews and footages used is partly obvious, on ethical and professional grounds. But there is more: its overstatement of the force and influence of radical nationalists, and his claim that all of them are fascists, if not nazis, antisemitic etc., its confusion between the volunteers in Donbas and armed ‘militias,’ this had to be refuted by people knowing Ukraine and the situation since Maidan. And this was done forcefully. Of course, some people are ready to believe these fantasies, some ignorant may have been convinced by the film, but, because the negative reactions were almost unanimous (except of blogs known for their allegiance to Novorossia) this case, on the whole, had the positive effect to clarify an issue which was very often confused.
“Most of the people interested in European politics don’t trust Putin and the Russian version of the Ukrainian revolution as covertly triggered and monitored by the CIA and local fascists, but they still have doubts, are vulnerable to phony information as long as they don’t have accurate and up-to-date information on Ukraine. They are influenced by the ‘there is no smoke without fire’ principle: even if they are aware that such propaganda is mostly lies stemming from the old Soviet war against Ukrainian independence, still there might be a kernel of truth in this story telling.
“I can’t say yet if this is the beginning of a comeback of Ukraine on the fore, but it is certainly an occasion to dispel unfortunately common prejudices.”
Galia Ackerman suggested that Moreira’s film may be a kind of special operation by Kremlin, that they just used Moreira’s unawareness about events in Ukraine. Do you agree with such an assessment? How could this happen with such an authoritative channel as Canal+?
“Obviously, when someone dishes the dirt on Ukraine in exactly the same terms as the Kremlin does, this cannot be chance only. In Soviet times, the communist propaganda mastered perfectly the art of two channeled campaigns, using both direct bold PR (through the embassies, the friends of USSR, etc.) and concealed clever brainwashing through well established medias. Moreira is probably not a pro Kremlin man, he is rather a useful idiot. He belongs to a radical far left fascinated by conspiracy theories. Their sharp criticism of the damages of globalization, perfectly legitimate, turns to a paranoid hatred of Capitalism, United States, and to a blind leniency towards anything else, including bloody regimes as long as they are enemy of the Western world. In the movie, even worse than the Ukrainian ‘fascists’ is Ms. Victoria Nuland, considered as the proof that the Maidan movement was just a puppet monitored by the CIA. By the same token, so called populist far right parties fighting against the EU (and sponsored by the Kremlin) have a certain appeal for far left people, the anti liberal anti-American furor bridging the two extremes.
“I may add that Moreira had no previous knowledge of Ukraine, that he is enough conceited and unscrupulous to have worked by himself without consulting experts, so he was an unconscious but submissive exploder of Russian propaganda.”
You mentioned that the image of Ukraine is now improving in Europe and particularly France, but not in the Netherlands. What did you mean? What factors are contributing for these tendencies? Can’t we talk about some kind of tiredness of Ukraine in Europe?
“The referendum on (rather against!) the association agreement of Ukraine with EU has a devastating effect in Netherlands. European institutions are facing a growing dissatisfaction because of their inability to cope with the refugees crisis and with the high rate of unemployment. But in France, unlike UK or Netherlands, this anger does not go so far as to wish to dismantle the EU or leave it.
“Significantly the FN, boosted by the discontent against traditional parties and its populist discourse still stumble on an invisible barrier, because of its anti EU and anti Euro program, and it is now striving to change it slightly, to gain new voters without losing those it already has. As to your second question, there is indeed a kind of tiredness of Ukraine, even if it is balanced by a growing awareness of the dangerous game of Russia against Europe. The hybrid war, the reforms (given their slowness) are almost invisible facts, or difficult to understand. Ukraine should do more efforts to implement and to promote the spirit of Maidan. Otherwise Europeans, including those most sympathetic to Ukraine will come to think that a second Orange revolution failure is happening, and that we should be cautious in our support, to stay in speaking terms with the next Yanukovych. Excuse me being so rough. This is not of course my personal opinion, but it has good or at least understandable reasons.
Several months ago, you told me that the real problem is the inefficiency of the press service of the Ukrainian Embassy in France, which does not help in putting Ukraine back to the fore. Did you see some improvement of their work since then? In your opinion, what tools can be efficient for promoting the alternative vision of Ukraine in Europe? Can Diaspora become an important agent in this process?
“The Ukrainian Embassy is again in its game, and does a great job with limited forces. But the main tools to promote a better vision of Ukraine depends neither on diplomats nor on Diaspora, who are only accessory for that matter. It depends on the facts on the ground and on the ability of Ukraine to promote itself, not only through official and traditional channels, but also to get the attention and esteem of businessmen, of intellectuals, of artists. More people must travel to Ukraine, it is dramatic experience (this is how I became convinced of the greatness and strategic importance of this country, when I came for the first time at the beginning of 2013). More visible changes (in the economy, in the judiciary, in fight against corruption, in the lustration) must occur in Ukraine.”
